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ABSTRACT 
 
JEN MCDANELD: Splitting Suffrage:  
1869 and the Narrative Forms of Race and Gender in U.S. Feminism 
(Under the direction of Jane F. Thrailkill and Robyn Wiegman) 
 
American feminism, like American literature, has a canon: an iconic set of texts, 
events, movements, and figures that are so well known that the mere mention of a name or a 
date carries with it an entire history. This dissertation takes one such moment—the 1869 
“split” within the U.S. suffrage movement over the Fifteenth Amendment and the granting of 
voting rights to black men ahead of women—as a site for the literary-critical analysis of the 
narrative practices that undergird this process of canonization. Despite the sustained attention 
to suffrage in the fields of American and feminist history, literary scholars have shown little 
critical interest in the movement. This project addresses this absence from two angles: first, 
by attending to the historiography of suffrage as a literary object in itself; and second, by 
rehistoricizing the canonical suffrage story through a variety of literary, journalistic, and 
polemical texts. By investigating the story of the suffrage “split” across a variety of genres 
and historical periods, including nineteenth-century periodicals and novels, twentieth-century 
historiography, and twenty-first-century popular feminist work, I demonstrate that split-
narratives obscure the dynamic and shifting relationship between race and gender across 
historical eras and instead calcify a timeless antagonism between them. Ultimately, I argue 
that my readings of suffrage stories reanimate understandings of race and gender in 
American feminism and open up new textual terrain for American literary studies.  
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To TNF—my favorite. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Race-Versus-Gender Problem in Feminism:  
Contemporary Itineraries and Historical Underpinnings 
 
 In early January 2008, just as the Democratic presidential primary contests were 
getting underway, Gloria Steinem took to the pages of the New York Times to comment on 
race and gender in contemporary U.S. politics. She began the piece, “Women Are Never 
Front-Runners,” by engaging in a bit of role reversal fantasy, suggesting that if Barack 
Obama were a woman, he would have never been considered a feasible contender for the 
nation’s highest office:  
The woman in question became a lawyer after some years as a community 
organizer, married a corporate lawyer and is the mother of two little girls, ages 
9 and 6. Herself the daughter of a white American mother and a black African 
father—in this race-conscious country, she is considered black—she served as 
a state legislator for eight years, and became an inspirational voice for 
national unity. 
 
Steinem asks her readers to consider whether Obama’s biography would qualify a female 
candidate for the U.S. Senate, not to mention the White House; she assumes not. Not only 
would this imaginary figure not be a “viable candidate,” but the fact that readers presumably 
cannot fathom her rise “to head the most powerful nation on earth” leads Steinem to argue 
that “[g]ender is probably the most restricting force in American life, whether the question is 
who must be in the kitchen or who could be in the White House.”  
Steinem was perplexed. Only days before, Democrats had chosen Obama over his 
main rival, Hillary Clinton, in the Iowa caucuses, and Steinem wanted to know how such an 
upset could have occurred. Clinton had been widely expected to win the nomination in 2008 
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after putting in over 7 years as the junior Senator from New York in addition to her time in 
the White House as First Lady. But a younger, post-Baby-Boomer first-term Senator from 
Chicago had built a passionate coalition of supporters over the previous year, breaking 
fundraising records and igniting a movement that would stymie Clinton’s seemingly fated 
path to the presidency and with it, the hope that women’s highest of glass ceilings might 
finally be broken. How had this happened, Steinem wondered? 
Obama’s Iowa victory was not without precedent, according to Steinem, but “follows 
our historical pattern for making change” in which the constraints of gender have been more 
difficult to overcome than those of race. As evidence of the more formidable nature of the 
“sex barrier,” Steinem cites the Reconstruction era of constitutional revision as a foundation 
for this pattern: “Black men were given the vote a half-century before women of any race 
were allowed to mark a ballot, and generally have ascended to positions of power, from the 
military to the boardroom, before any women (with the possible exception of obedient family 
members in the latter).” Despite her insistence that she is “not advocating a competition for 
who has it toughest,” Steinem produces a litany of reasons why sexism is “not taken as 
seriously” as racism, among them, that women do most of the childrearing, are considered 
“naturally” different or inferior much like people of color once were, and have a difficult 
time wielding power without being viewed as either weak, on the one hand, or overbearing, 
on the other. For Steinem, it seemed like Democrats had been energized by the possibility of 
breaking the race barrier when it comes to presidential politics but had let the gender barrier 
pass relatively unnoticed. Young women in particular, she suggests, have not recognized the 
power and significance of Clinton’s run, and she concludes by insisting that “It’s time to take 
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equal pride in breaking all the barriers. We have to be able to say: ‘I’m supporting her 
because she’ll be a great president and because she’s a woman.’” 
The critical response to the piece came quickly, with feminist writers, academics, and 
journalists variously decrying Steinem’s insistence that gender trumps race, or her suggestion 
that young women do not seem to know what’s best for them, or her implication that 
feminists must vote for the female candidate if they are to be considered true feminists. 
Rebecca Walker, editor of the “third-wave” feminist tome To Be Real, wrote a paradigmatic 
response, arguing that contrary to Steinem’s claim, “racism and classism are as definitive as 
sexism,” citing the “forty percent of black men [who] don’t finish high school in America” 
and the “one in four [who] are incarcerated.” Walker claims that despite what Steinem 
implies, “women are not only victims, but active participants in the shaping of their lives,” 
“men are not the enemy,” and “young women are not stupid.” Steinem’s “divisive discourse” 
is “bad for women,” “bad for Hillary’s campaign,” and bad for feminism too: it is rhetoric 
like hers that has “few women lining up behind the ‘feminist’ placard” while “many more 
ru[n] in the other direction.” According to Walker, these women are not “ungrateful or 
unintelligent,” but instead realize that “confrontational political labels and a religious fixation 
on gender aren’t productive.” Steinem has, in sum, “crystallized” for Walker that Clinton 
“runs the risk of being seen as a Second Wave candidate” who cannot connect with the next 
generation and cannot see that “gender is not enough to win” young women’s vote.  
Other writers followed suit, claiming that Steinem’s piece represented “the very worst 
of second-wave feminism” and put forth a “bizarre reading of history” in which “African 
American men somehow [have been] standing over and above white women” (“Race and 
Gender in Presidential Politics”). In a debate with Steinem on Democracy Now one week 
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after the editorial’s publication, feminist scholar Melissa Harris-Lacewell suggested that 
Steinem’s use of Reconstruction history “ignores that black men were then lynched regularly 
for any attempt to actually exercise” the right to vote. According to Harris-Lacewell, the 
intersections of race and gender are “more complicated” than Steinem allows: “African 
American men have been complicit in the oppression of African American women. White 
women have been complicit in the oppression of black men and black women.” She then 
segues into a comparison of Clinton’s “difficulties” on the campaign trail with Obama’s 
“death threats,” suggesting that the two candidates cannot possibly be seen as equally 
disadvantaged: “she tears up at being sort of beat up by him, when her husband can come in 
and rally around her and suggest that we need to sort of support her because she’s having 
difficulties, while Barack Obama is getting death threats, basically lynching threats on him 
and his family.” According to Harris-Lacewell, Clinton’s support among older white women 
“indicate[s] the ways in which white women’s particular race and gender position can be of 
major benefit to them when running against an African American man.” Steinem hears this 
claim as an accusation of racism: “Well, are white women being racist when they vote for 
Hillary Clinton? I do not know. We’d have to look into the heart of every person who’s 
voting.” Harris-Lacewell insists that this is not what she means, but one gets the sense from 
the rest of the “debate” that these two feminists are talking past one another; subsequent 
writers would note the acrimony of the conversation, suggesting that Harris-Lacewell “was a 
few nasty barbs short of calling Steinem an out-an-out racist” (Martin, “Why Race and 
Gender Do Matter”).  
If these responses seem disjointed, that’s because they are. And if they seem familiar, 
there’s reason for that too. Steinem’s editorial set off a debate about race, gender, and 
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feminism in the 2008 election that until that point had been mostly sidelined by Democrats’ 
expressions of enthusiasm over the possibilities inherent in their two strongest candidates for 
president. The ensuing discourse in the media over the next several months largely covered 
the same rhetorical and conceptual ground, as Obama and Clinton continued on the primary 
trail, with Clinton trailing in delegates but not conceding until early June. Feminist Clinton-
supporters lamented their candidate’s sexist treatment by the media; feminist Obama-
supporters pushed back, often with critiques of what they saw as at best, tone-deaf, and at 
worst, racist, claims of gender’s liabilities in American politics. What had been a healthy 
competition between two popular candidates, had devolved, according to some critics, into a 
“crisis” that threatened not just the Democratic party and its chances to take back the White 
House, but the future of feminism itself (Reed). More than four years and another election 
season later, how might feminists read this discursive field and the problems placed at its 
center?1 
 
The (Origin) Story of the Race-Versus-Gender Problem 
One way to understand the discursive field of the 2008 primary is as the repetition of 
one of the oldest stories within U.S. feminism. The story is about race, gender, and politics 
and its touchstone moment is not 2008, but 1869. According to this story, when the Fifteenth 
Amendment was passed that year, giving black men the right to vote, but leaving women of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See Beverly Guy-Sheftall and Johnnetta Betsch Cole’s collection Who Should Be First?: 
Feminists Speak Out on the 2008 Presidential Campaign (2010) for a selection of both 
popular and academic responses to the Obama-Clinton contest. The 2008 Democratic 
primary race—and the public debate surrounding it—is beginning to receive more attention 
from scholars interested in race and gender in contemporary U.S. politics and culture; 
sociologist Enid Logan published the first monograph on the topic in 2011. See Logan, “At 
This Defining Moment”, esp. Chapter 4, for a discussion of the dynamics of the Obama-
Clinton race for the presidency. 
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all races out, an insidious pattern was put in place: white women would betray the promise of 
an integrated liberation movement that would fight both racial and gendered oppression, 
choosing instead to fight for their rights in racist terms. This betrayal would not remain mired 
in the past, so the story goes, but would haunt U.S. feminism at every turn over the next 
century and beyond. Like any story, this one has its primary characters, both villains and 
heroines; its integral plot points, both high and low; its arc of action, central tropes, and 
themes. And most crucially, it has its lessons—the morals of the story that make its telling so 
worthwhile. It is to this story, and the effects of its reiteration, that this project attends.  
The public debate over the Obama-Clinton contest represents both an overture to and 
exemplar of this most fundamental feminist story. In the popular media, the 2008 primary 
presented a choice not only between two candidates and their visions for the nation, but 
between two categories of identity. Would race or gender be the winner in the “zero-sum 
game” of “breakthrough politics?” (Leibovich) As Mark Leibovich, political reporter and 
Chief National Correspondent for New York Times Magazine, framed it in a representative 
piece aptly titled “Rights vs. Rights,” “Either Senator Barack Obama will be the first 
African-American or Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton will be the first woman to win the 
presidential nomination of a major American political party.” Each candidate would seize the 
nomination “soaked in history as a culminating figure of one of the great ideological 
movements of the last century—civil rights or women’s rights” (Leibovich). The choice 
between the two movements that Democrats faced, according to this writer, is not unique to 
the contemporary American political environment, but “ha[s] a long, complicated history 
dating back to abolitionism and the origins of modern feminism” that portends “an inevitable 
friction” between Clinton and Obama. Post-Civil War America again provides a parallel, 
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when abolitionist and woman suffrage activists such as Frederick Douglass and Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton “split” in a “bitter case” over who would win the vote, and when. The “ideals” 
of these two historical figures, and the two groups they represented 
would eventually clash, resulting in increasingly divisive rhetoric that reached 
a harsh climax after Stanton condemned the 15th Amendment—which gave 
black men the right to vote but left out women of all races—as something that 
would establish ‘an aristocracy of sex on this continent.’ She also alluded to 
the ‘lower orders’ like Irish, blacks, Germans, Chinese. (Leibovich)  
 
Other writers refer to this Reconstruction-era “split” as a “bitter schism in the long alliance of 
abolitionists and suffragists, and within the suffrage movement” (Applegate) and an “ugly 
history of the nineteenth century, when the failure of the women’s movement to bring about 
universal adult suffrage metastasized into racial resentment and rift that weakened feminism 
throughout much of the twentieth century” (“Morning in America”).  
The choice in 2008 between Obama and Clinton represents, in these renderings, a 
recursive problem in American political history, one in which the election constitutes a 
contemporary illustration of the eternal struggle between race and gender. Would women line 
up behind Clinton because she’s female? Would African Americans vote for Obama because 
he’s black? And what, then, about African American women? Would they, as one writer put 
it, “choose their racial identity over their gender identity in deciding where to use the power 
of their votes?” (Feldt) 
 The race-versus-gender choice was clear: when faced with a white woman, a black 
man, and the opportunity to take back the White House after eight long years, what would 
Democratic voters do? Some critics attempted to refuse this “choice” and instead analyze the 
“oppression sweepstakes” or “oppression Olympics” that the media seemed to be 
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constructing and stoking (Pollitt; Martin, “Why Race and Gender Do Matter”).2 While a 
handful of these analysts denounced the “competition between race and gender” as it was 
currently delineated, insisting that we resist the “toxic Punch and Judy show of embattled 
identity” and refuse to turn a “historic breakthrough moment” into one “marred by having to 
choose between ‘race cards’ and ‘gender cards,’” it seemed far easier to employ the race-
versus-gender framing than avoid it (Pollitt; “Morning in America”). For instance, Clinton-
supporters repeatedly decried sexism as “the worst of the ‘isms,” and cited their belief that 
“[p]eople are more sensitive to racism than sexism” (Saslow; Long). And as Steinem’s 
editorial indicates, even when authors explicitly assert that they want to avoid the race-
versus-gender rhetoric of which group “has it toughest,” they appear to be pulled into just 
that sort of discourse. For example, Robin Morgan, author of the infamous takedown of the 
sexist male Left in her 1970 “Goodbye to All That,” updated her essay with a second 
iteration that begins by critiquing the “competition” between “two communities” over the 
Obama-Clinton primary, but then formulates the problem in precisely those terms. Morgan 
condemns the sexism Clinton endures on the campaign trail, insists that Obama has not 
experienced parallel indignities, and places sexism beyond racism by suggesting that sexual 
oppression precedes racial oppression: “A few non-racist countries may exist—but sexism is 
everywhere. No matter how many ways a woman breaks free from other discriminations, she 
remains a female human being in a world still so patriarchal that it’s the ‘norm’” (“Goodbye 
to All That #2”).  
Obama-supporters, on the other hand, frequently underscore the misogyny on the 
campaign trail but then maintain that racism is in fact “more insidious and trickier to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Along with Pollitt and Martin, “Why Race and Gender Do Matter,” see Price and Bravo for 
additional pieces that attempt to take a critical stance toward the race-versus-gender framing. 
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confront” (Reed). Author Lorrie Moore writes that Obama’s election would be more 
meaningful because “middle-class white girls” “have managed on their own” while boys, 
“especially boys of color” “are suffering in this country.” Another writer goes to great 
lengths detailing the sexism of the anti-Clinton progressives, but then pivots into the claim 
that “[i]n today’s United States, racism continues to have more damaging economic and 
social structural implications for African-Americans than sexism has for women” (Traister). 
While sexism certainly exists, according to these arguments, it exists as a milder, less 
pernicious form of discrimination, one that should not be compared to historical or 
contemporary forms of racial discrimination.3  
But comparing the two forms of discrimination appears irresistible to the feminist 
writers supporting Clinton. Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of the discursive 
production around the 2008 primary is the feminist practice of constructing reversals and 
parallels to illustrate their arguments about the damaging effects of sexism. As I noted above, 
Steinem begins her editorial with this sort of reversal, imagining Obama to be a woman in 
order to demonstrate the double-binds of gender when it comes to American politics. Other 
writers construct more elaborate analogies, in which every instance of misogyny used against 
Clinton undergoes an imaginary reversal to become instead about race—the point being to 
demonstrate that racism is “beyond the pale” in ways that sexism is not (Pollitt). A t-shirt that 
reads “Hillary, cook my food, but don’t run my country” becomes “Obama, shine my shoes, 
but don’t run my country” in order to show how unacceptable, even inconceivable, such !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Even as these writers allow that misogyny plays a role in U.S. politics, they frequently 
reinscribe the problem by referring to Clinton, or those who defend her, in misogynistic 
terms. See Goldberg, “Hell Hath No Fury,” for a description of Clinton-supporter Robin 
Morgan as “hysterical” and O’Rourke’s description of Clinton as “brittle” and “embittered” 
for two examples. See Traister and Fortini for longer analyses of the sexist treatment of 
Clinton by progressives.  
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rhetoric would be if it were racialized instead of gendered (Long). When another button-
wearing Hillary-supporter is stopped by a stranger on the street and told that “A woman’s 
place is in the kitchen,” her response is to reverse and redirect the sexism into racism: 
“Would he have stopped a black man and said something derogatory like that?...No, I don’t 
think so. But somehow sexism is still okay. We all know racism is endemic in this society, 
but people who would never dare to make a racist comment on purpose say sexist things all 
the time” (qtd. in Saslow). Morgan’s “Goodbye to All That (#2)” provides a host of these 
reversals, saying “goodbye to the toxic viciousness” of “sociopathic woman-hating” by way 
of representing its parallel form of racism: 
[Goodbye to] John McCain answering ‘How do we beat the bitch? With 
‘Excellent question!’ Would he have dared reply similarly to ‘How do we beat 
the black bastard?’ For shame. Goodbye to the HRC [Hillary Rodham 
Clinton] nutcracker with metal spikes between splayed thighs. If it was a tap-
dancing blackface doll, we would be righteously outraged—and they would 
not be selling it in airports. Shame…If it were about Jews, we would 
recognize it instantly as anti-Semitic propaganda; if about race, as KKK 
poison. Hell, PETA would go ballistic if such vomitous spew were directed at 
animals. Where is our sense of outrage—as citizens, voters, Americans? 
 
Feminist supporters of Clinton clearly feel that sexist discourse in the campaign was 
alternately either not visible, or visible yet acceptable, and their method for rectifying this 
problem is to represent it through the lens of race. The lamentations about what these writers 
see as the discursive permissibility of sexism in the public sphere are not quite the same thing 
as the claim that sexism is more serious than racism, but the repeated comparisons and 
parallels drawn in these pieces makes it easy to conflate the two arguments, especially when 
high-profile writers such as Steinem make precisely that claim.4  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 See Mitchell, “Full Transcript,” in which Clinton herself claims, like Steinem, that gender is 
more of a liability than race in presidential politics. In parsing these claims, I do not mean to 
say that Clinton-supporters did not engage in racist rhetoric in their critiques of Obama or the 
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 In this contest, the different sides of the race-versus-gender problem come to stand in 
not only for racial and sexual identities, but also as markers of age and generational 
feminism. Media coverage of the primaries frequently notes the “split” among Democratic 
women, which ran “largely along generational lines, with older women who had waged their 
own battles showing more solidarity and younger ones arguing that voting for a male 
candidate over a female one was itself a sign of progress and confidence” (Kantor). National 
Organization for Women leaders claim that “The problem is that too many young women 
have…turn[ed] to Obama because they feel no obligation to vote for a historic first for their 
gender” (Saslow). Another writer suggests that the primary has “provided a Rorschach for 
our intergenerational disconnect” (Martin, “More Than a Mother-Daughter Debate”). 
Clinton-proponents note with consternation that younger women supported Obama at higher 
rates than Clinton and suggest that the younger cohort is “eager to win male approval by 
showing they’re not feminists” (Morgan, “Goodbye to All That #2”). When one feminist 
writer admits, in a confessional tone, that she is not supporting Clinton “at least in part 
because she reminds [her] of being scolded by [her] mother,” feminist scholar and Clinton-
backer Linda Hirshman retorts that this admission is not just an insult to these young 
women’s mothers, but to “all those women who had the effrontery to start the feminist 
movement in the 1960s” (Hirshman, “Hillary Clinton as the Battleground”).5  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
campaign more generally. See comments by Geraldine Ferraro for an example of this kind of 
rhetoric, in which the former Vice Presidential nominee suggests that Obama was “very 
lucky to be who he is” because “[i]f [he] was a white man, he would not be in this position” 
(qtd. in Farber). See also Maddaus for Ferraro’s subsequent defense of her comments, in 
which she suggests critics attack her “because [she’s] white.” For a longer-view analysis of 
the racist rhetoric of the Clinton campaign, see Berman.  
 
5 See also Bennetts for a piece on the “anger of older female voters” who resented calls for 
Clinton to step aside in the face of “Obama’s inevitability.” Bennetts correlates this call with 
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Feminist Obama-supporters likewise see the support for Clinton as an index both of 
women’s age and the “wave” of feminism with which they identify. As one journalist puts it, 
“the frustration with the feminist old guard’s reaction to Hillary Clinton is not unmerited. 
The exhortations from Robin Morgan have not exactly been lyrical, or tuned to ears of 
women younger than 50” (Traister). As evidence, the author cites younger women claiming 
they were “appalled” by “those editorials by Gloria Steinem” and Morgan, which they say 
“alienated” them “from second-wave feminism” (Traister). The outcome of the primary 
becomes not just about which form of identity wins out—race or gender—but which form of 
feminism—young or old? “second-wave” or third?—will triumph. As one feminist Obama-
supporter puts it, “If Clinton wins, the older-line women’s movement will continue; it will be 
a continuation of power for them. If she doesn’t win, it will be a death knell for those people. 
And that may be a good thing—that a younger generation will start to take over” (qtd. in 
Reed). The struggle is not only a struggle between race and gender, but a struggle for the 
“future of feminism”—will the “rage” of the “old guard” Clinton-feminists “damage” 
feminism into oblivion? (Goldberg, “Hell Hath No Fury”) Will older women’s reluctance to 
fall in line result in the “grimmest irony imaginable”—the election of the antifeminist John 
McCain? (Goldberg, “3A.M. for Feminism”) Or perhaps the results will be less dire, but the 
debate will still “unravel” feminist progress and “weaken” the feminist movement, which 
Hirschman describes as “having trouble reproducing” (Reed; Hirshman, “Looking to the 
Future”). The outcome of the primary was not clear, but already its discursive framing had 
become a “crisis” for feminism, one rooted in the pitting of race against gender and its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the more general tendency for society to discard older women “[o]nce they’ve passed the age 
of facile objectification and commodification.” 
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subsequent translation through feminist “waves” and their age and generational corollaries.6 
What had begun as a hopeful, exciting opportunity had devolved, according to these 
accounts, into something else entirely: not inspiring or grand at all, but a drearily familiar 
“rhetoric of disenfranchisement” that had “become destructive” (Goldberg, “3 A.M. for 
Feminism”).   
The public discourse of the Obama-Clinton primary election is at once an instance of 
contemporary feminist political debate and a map of the conceptual terrain of the race-
versus-gender problem within U.S. feminism. The contours of that terrain are all present in 
this discourse: the competition between “who has it toughest”—white women or black men; 
the cataloging of identity-based discriminations; the recriminations of white feminist racism, 
the defensive measures taken in the face of such accusations, and the age- and “wave-” based 
extrapolations from the resulting back-and-forth. Race and gender are pitted against one 
another, a discursive formulation so compelling that writers and scholars are drawn into it 
even as they critique and attempt to avoid it. The problem is represented as intractable and 
part of a long history, on the one hand, and a mortal danger to the future of feminism, on the 
other. Indeed, the “choices” presented by the Obama-Clinton rivalry are vital to ensuring a 
viable feminism in the present and at the same time discursively rooted in similar “choices” 
made by woman’s rights activists in the nineteenth century.  
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 During this debate in the popular media, only one piece that I am aware of suggested that 
the Obama-Clinton primary was productive for feminism, rather than a crisis; see Fortini, in 
which the author suggests that the debate would “leav[e] behind a legacy of reawakened 
feminism—the fourth wave, if you will.” 
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Shifting the Story 
I was both fascinated and perplexed by the Obama-Clinton debate in 2008. It seemed 
that the discursive dissonance between what feminists claimed to be arguing, and the forms 
those arguments took, was not simply a cause for alarm, or dismay, but something to 
consider critically. It appeared as though commentators were unable to view things from each 
other’s perspective, for one thing; Clinton-supporters seemed not to see how their claims for 
gender’s more oppressive liabilities registered as a form of discounting the oppression of 
African Americans of both sexes. Feminist scholars and Obama-supporters, on the other 
hand, seemed not to hear the frustration of these white women who felt as though sexism was 
“allowed” in ways that racism was not. And I wanted to understand how the position of black 
women functioned within these arguments—at times figured as the ultimate symbol of the 
race-versus-gender “choice,” at times made completely invisible, at times fetishized as the 
only position unimplicated in a politics of negation. I was also curious about how history was 
deployed to buttress both sides of the debate—either as a way of pointing to the “origin” of 
the problem or as a form of evidence for which “side” deserved to win the contemporary 
iteration of the contest.  
The race-versus-gender problem represented in the Obama-Clinton debate circulates 
widely in feminist studies, both as a pairing in which one is pitted against the other, and as 
corollary to the critique of white feminist racism. While the critique of racism within the 
women’s movement dates back to the mid-nineteenth-century, over the past four decades it 
has received greater scholarly attention, particularly by critics interested in bringing the 
experience and contributions of women of color into clearer view. Scholars such as bell 
hooks argued that white women took for granted that their experience was universal, forcing 
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black women to remain marginal “others” in the struggle for equality with white men 
(Feminist Theory 3). White women’s concept of “sisterhood” was thoroughly critiqued for its 
universalist assumptions and its sometimes overt, sometimes covert aggression in allowing 
white women to set the feminist agenda in the name of all women.7 Other axes of identity, 
such as race, class, and sexuality, were made central to the analysis of women’s lives and 
women’s oppression, and the concept of intersectionality was used to critique how a “single-
axis framework” of either race or  gender “erases Black women in the conceptualization, 
identification, and remediation of race and sex discrimination by limiting inquiry to the 
experiences of otherwise-privileged members of the group” (Crenshaw 140). These 
interventions did not, of course, undo feminist racism or halt new iterations from circulating, 
but they certainly changed the field of feminist inquiry.8  
While this shift in the field has had enormous critical and political significance, it has 
also produced a body of literature that relies on the nineteenth-century woman’s rights 
movement as a point of origin for the problem of white feminist racism. These narratives 
offered valuable correctives to a white feminist practice that uncritically valorized feminist 
forbearers such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony and the development of a 
historical “sisterhood” among all women that ignored difference, and differences in power, 
within that category. Nineteenth-century suffragists such as Stanton and Anthony were read 
instead as problematic figures who represented the racism at the core of the development of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See the groundbreaking collection All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But 
Some of Us Are Brave (Hull et al.), esp. xvii-xxxii, for one of the first critiques of the 
silencing of women of color in both movement feminism and its scholarly counterpart.  
 
8 For a small sampling of this influential body of work, see Davis, Women, Race & Class; 
Thornton Dill; hooks, Ain’t I a Woman? and Feminist Theory; Spelman; Lorde; Anzaldua; 
and Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought. 
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U.S. feminism. The condemnation of the suffragist movement and the representation of its 
mistakes served a narrative of feminist failure, in which the feminism of the past is 
recursively chastised for failing to live up to present-day standards, and present-day 
feminism is in danger of falling prey to the same fate if it is unable to learn from this past. 
One curious effect of this critical practice has been to solidify a rhetorical and conceptual 
framework that places race and gender in opposition to one another in the name of critiquing 
white feminist racism. While the problem of white feminist racism is certainly of great 
significance, both in contemporary terms and in its historical formations, the reiteration of 
the critique of this object, and the uses of history to underwrite the narrative of critique, have 
gone unexamined.  
This project interrogates these issues through the lens of a historical event referenced 
with remarkable frequency in both feminist academic work and the media coverage of the 
Obama-Clinton primary: the 1869 “split” in the U.S. suffrage movement over the Fifteenth 
Amendment and its granting of the right to vote to black men ahead of women. Just as this 
event was used as a form of evidence for both sides of the primary debate (recall that 
Steinem used it as proof that gender presents a more difficult barrier to break than race, while 
Harris-Lacewell referenced it to demonstrate the recursive problem of white feminist racism), 
it has also circulated as a governing trope in wide-ranging narratives of U.S. feminism over 
the past fifty years. I argue that this event has been consolidated through narrative practices 
into a hypercanonical symbol of the race-versus-gender problem in American feminism, the 
reiteration of this symbol functioning as a way for feminists to secure progressive, antiracist 
positions in the present. This process has, paradoxically, made it more difficult to understand 
how racism and racialized rhetoric functioned in the Reconstruction era, on the one hand, and 
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obscured the theoretical contributions of black woman suffragists, on the other. Further, the 
canonization of the 1869 “split” has solidified the sense that the race-versus-gender problem 
is intractable, unavoidable, and destined to repeat itself in ways that threaten the future of 
feminism. This, then, is the practice I would like to intervene in. Through readings of a wide 
array of texts, from women’s movement historiography, to radical feminist polemical work 
of the 1960s, to a variety of nineteenth-century print culture and oratory, I attempt to 
interrupt the naturalized narrative of 1869 and loosen race and gender from the fixed 
positions the “split” has calcified for them. Ultimately, I hope to show how critical attention 
to a variety of “split-narratives” illustrates how the two categories are not fixed in 
antagonism, but part of dynamic processes of political strategy and resistance.  
 
Suffragism and its Absence in U.S. Literary Studies 
 While scholars in the fields of American and feminist history have demonstrated an 
intense and sustained focus on suffragism over the past 30 years, literary critics have largely 
passed over the movement. The extent of the literary-critical engagement with American 
suffragism lies primarily in the realm of the fictional representation of suffragists in a handful 
of novels.9 Even this area of study has gone relatively unexamined from a literary perspective !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Most of this work looks at fictional depictions of suffragists and the movement as part of 
wider examinations of woman’s rights and feminist activism of the nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries. For studies of the literary production of nineteenth-century suffragism, 
see: Petty; Bardes and Gossett; Kahane; Levander; Chapman and Green; Chapman. There is 
some indication that the scope of the critical interest in suffrage might be widening beyond 
the fictional representation of the movement and its activists to a more diverse set of texts; 
for recent studies of suffrage performance and material culture (such as parades and 
advertisements), see Lumsden, Ford, Lunardini, and Finnegan; on suffrage theater, see 
Glenn, Goddard, and Friedl; on women’s periodicals, see Russo and Kramarae, Cane and 
Alves, and Solomon. 
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due to what scholars have described as a reluctance to “treat seriously” the fiction of reform 
and instead to view these texts as mere didactic tracts of little literary interest (Petty 1). 
Critics such as Leslie Petty have noted that because of the lack of attention to texts that 
“explicitly depict feminist activism,” a work such as Henry James’s The Bostonians (1886) 
has frequently been read as a “unique text about feminist reform” rather than “as part of a 
larger tradition of such fiction” (1).  
The obscuring of this fictional tradition is certainly something to remedy, but it is 
equally important to widen the scope of suffrage scholarship within American literary 
studies. Mary Chapman and Angela Mills’ recent edited collection, Treacherous Texts: U.S. 
Suffrage Literature, 1846-1946 (2011) begins this work by bringing together an impressive 
array of suffrage texts chosen for their creative and rhetorical strategies as well as their 
various interventions into the culture and politics of their respective eras.10 As the editors 
note, there is a “vast, creative, and stylistically interesting” body of American suffrage 
literature, but this work has “not yet received adequate attention from historians, rhetoric 
scholars, or literary critics,” a fact that can at least partially be attributed to the lack of 
availability of these texts, many of which are out of print or only available on microfilm (4). 
Chapman and Mills’ collection aims to begin the process of “recuperation” of suffrage as an 
area of critical significance in American literary studies by demonstrating the wide scope of 
suffrage print culture—fiction and poetry as well as autobiography, essays, and drama—from 
before the Civil War to well after passage of the 19th Amendment (4).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 As Chapman and Mills note, the only other collection devoted entirely to U.S. suffrage 
literature is Bettina Friedl’s On to Victory: Propaganda Plays of the Suffrage Movement 
(1987), although a handful of other anthologies include literary selections along with 
historical documents of the movement; see Boydston et al. and Kraditor.    
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While Treacherous Texts brings together a fascinating group of texts that will surely 
prove valuable to scholars as they take up the study of U.S. suffrage politics and its 
associated cultural production, in the current project I am more interested in reframing what 
might count as “suffrage literature.” Certainly there is a vast body of traditionally-literary 
texts, from both nineteenth- and twentieth-century iterations of the movement, but why not 
also look to the massive body of work right underneath our noses? By this I of course mean 
the immense historiography of U.S. suffrage that has amassed over the past forty years 
alongside the development of the new women’s history. These historiographical works might 
be read not only for their critical work in reclaiming woman’s suffrage as a topic of 
significance for the historical record, or for their interventions in tracing women’s 
involvement in the sphere of politics, but also as narratives that circulate widely and perform 
significant work in the realm of feminist studies. When read this way, not simply as histories 
of suffrage but as suffrage stories, a canonized narrative of suffrage emerges, one that might 
be read as a literary object in itself. When thought of in terms of canonicity, a host of new 
questions arise: what makes one suffrage story more canonical than others? What does this 
canon exclude, and what does it produce? And what are the consequences of telling a story 
so frequently that it hardly need be told anymore, when a mere reference to a date (1869) or a 
term (the “suffrage split”) can stand in for the story as a whole?  
 
Reframing 1869 
The woman’s suffrage movement “splitting in two” over whether to support or 
denounce the Reconstruction Amendments is indeed one of the most frequently-told stories 
in the history of the American women’s movement. These narratives, found across a variety 
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of historiographical, theoretical, and polemical texts, reference a real historical event, to be 
sure, but they also construct that event through the narrative practices they employ. This 
project takes these practices as an entry point into understanding how a standard narrative 
map of this event in feminist history develops over time and across a variety of different 
types of texts. This methodology owes much to the work of Clare Hemmings, whose recent 
study of narratives of progress and loss in contemporary feminist theory frames a body of 
work not usually read for its production of narrative as a genre with distinct narrative 
practices. In Why Stories Matter (2011) Hemmings explores what she calls the “political 
grammar” of feminist narrative with the goal of “breaking open dominant forms” of 
storytelling within feminist theory through the analysis of how those stories work on their 
readers and develop into commonsense, naturalized ways of understanding the past (3). 
Hemmings takes the glosses of feminist history found in articles across the major academic 
journals of feminist theory as her primary objects of study, looking to how these narratives 
are transformed into shorthand ways of understanding feminism “despite the fact that we 
know that history is more complicated than the stories we tell about it” (16). Similarly, I am 
interested in how narratives of the 1869 suffrage “split” within feminist historiography have 
been constructed and then translated into shorthand iterations that repeat across a variety of 
texts. As Hemmings notes, what we take for granted in feminism’s past has effects in the 
present—and interrogating “the technologies of the presumed” and “the politics of the 
rehearsed” of these self-evident stories is a method for understanding those contemporary 
consequences (19, 20).  
Hemmings is exclusively interested in the consolidations of history in feminist theory, 
but when it comes to what to do after this reading, her work does not provide as much 
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guidance—a point she repeatedly acknowledges at the outset of Why Stories Matter. In 
arguing for the importance of focusing on dominant narratives and the techniques through 
which these narratives are secured, Hemmings presents the alternative to this method as 
“corrective redress” that, in her view, is ultimately doomed to produce new blindsides and 
gaps “while the dominant [narrative] that is corrected remains intact” (14-15). For 
Hemmings, one is either interested in “the politics that produce and sustain one version of 
history as more true than another” or one is attempting to “intervene at the level of truth-
telling” to create a “fuller, richer version of the recent past of Western feminist theory than 
these dominant narratives allow” (16, 12); one is either analyzing how dominant narratives 
function or hopelessly attempting to “plug the gaps” in flawed histories in order to make 
them whole (16). Indeed, the dominant/alternate relation Hemmings produces appears to 
leave little room for any other type of rehistoricization beyond a “corrective” attempt to “set 
our story straight” once and for all (20). 
But what if one would like to try to read the disorder of an individual historical 
moment that lies beneath its historical consolidation and the stories we tell about it? To be 
interested in this, in my view, does not necessarily commit one to a “corrective” account of 
that history, or even to an “alternate” version of it; it can instead work as an attempt at 
accounting for the sheer complexity of any historical investigation and as a method for 
deconstructing naturalized narratives of the past. Hemmings wants the chaos of a historical 
moment, what she calls the “snapshot of the discursive dissonance that makes up feminist 
history,” to “operate as a reminder that all histories are selective and motivated”—for her, the 
messiness of the history of feminism can only serve to highlight the ways that there is no one, 
true, objective way to tell the past (16). But I am less interested in using this dissonance as a 
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reminder than I am in rendering that history again in order to think through the ways that 
feminists’ commonsense knowledge of feminism’s past obscures the objects it canonizes. To 
that end, in this project I explore both contemporary itineraries of the discursive construct of 
the “split” as well as a variety of nineteenth- and twentieth-century texts that shift the terms 
and shape of those well-known stories.  
In the first chapter, I demonstrate how feminist historiography has not simply 
documented but constructed the 1869 “split” within suffragism through narrative practices 
organized around a consensus that one “side,” led by Stanton and Anthony, betrayed 
feminism by opposing the Fifteenth Amendment in racist terms. These narratives, in turn, 
produce the “split” as a self-evident critical object for contemporary scholars, one that need 
only be invoked to signal this germinal betrayal. Through readings of foundational 
historiographical studies by Eleanor Flexner, Aileen Kraditor, and Ellen DuBois, as well as 
the next wave of suffrage histories that build on their analyses, I show how this body of work 
deploys narrative tropes, techniques, and affective strategies to secure progressive feminist 
positions in the present at the expense of the recognition of the complex subject positions of 
nineteenth-century suffragists, both black and white. This process has not only obscured 
other ways of understanding this historical moment—it has effaced the very betrayal it takes 
as its primary focus by failing to explore the potent contexts in which race and gender 
operated in the volatile decade following the Civil War.  
In the next two chapters I then turn to a variety of nineteenth-century suffrage texts to 
explore other ways of understanding the movement in 1869. In the second chapter, I explore 
how white suffragists deployed rhetorics of race in Stanton’s feminist newspaper, The 
Revolution (1868-1870). By tracing the periodical’s framing of the Fifteenth Amendment 
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debates across its two years of publication, I call attention to the specific ways that white 
suffragists construct the figure of the black woman to navigate their position as victims of 
male privilege, on the one hand, and inheritors of white privilege, on the other—as both 
oppressed and oppressing. Despite the fame of its founder, this periodical has been given 
little focused critical attention; when the newspaper is cited, it is primarily used as historical 
evidence for Stanton’s betrayal of feminist solidarity, rather than as a text that can shed light 
on the shifting relation between the formation of feminist politics and its discursive contexts. 
I argue that a close reading of The Revolution allows for a fuller view of the ways that white 
suffragists such as Stanton deployed racialized rhetorics for particular purposes, exploiting 
the black female figure to perform a number of strategic functions in negotiating their 
ambivalent and shifting positions in relation to the racist and patriarchal postwar political 
system of the nineteenth century. My analysis suggests more generally that by focusing on 
volumes, rather than texts published in weekly installments across a number of years, literary 
critics have missed an opportunity to trace an unstable, unfolding history in which suffrage 
arguments and positions evolve over time and in response to shifting political and cultural 
conditions.  
The Revolution represents an example of an unexplored text that, when read not just 
for its documentation of suffragist failures but also for its discursive strategies, can illuminate 
the contexts and consequences of white suffragist rhetoric that narratives of the 1869 “split” 
obscure. The third chapter examines how the historiographical construction of this event also 
subsumes the activism and intellectual work of black woman suffragists such as Frances 
Ellen Watkins Harper by representing them as having to “choose” between their race and 
their sex in the face of the Fifteenth Amendment debates. Through readings of her novel 
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Minnie’s Sacrifice (1869), as well as her Reconstruction-era short stories and oratory, I argue 
that Harper develops a black female standpoint that critiques the false “choice” between race 
and gender and redefines the concept of suffrage as not simply a right to be won, but a 
method for understanding difference and oppression. Harper’s work suggests that in framing 
the suffrage issue as a struggle or choice between race and gender, split-narratives 
rhetorically erase white and male privilege and at the same time render black women’s 
theoretical contributions to the movement invisible. By putting Harper’s literary work 
alongside the split-narratives that suppress it, the chapter demonstrates how American 
literature can be used to transform the narratives of American feminism by exposing their 
blind spots and shifting their critical focus.  
 In the final chapter, I track the discursive construct of the 1869 “split” as it circulates 
through foundational radical “second wave” feminist texts, exploring how representations of 
the nineteenth-century suffrage movement undergird the wave periodization of feminism and 
are used as a method for defining—and claiming—feminism in the late-1960s and early-
1970s. These movement documents and manifestoes construct their own historical narratives 
that produce the “split” not in race-versus-gender terms, as the historiography does, but in 
terms of radical-versus-conservative politics. These stories of the past form the basis for a 
radical feminist heritage that legitimates the present-day movement and defends it against 
liberal feminists, on the one hand, and male Leftists, on the other. While this body of work 
has been critiqued for its reproduction of the racism of “first-wave” feminists such as 
Stanton, I argue that the feminist practice of reiterating “second-wave” failures has become a 
canonical narrative that produces the political agency of feminism in the present by refusing 
to recognize other stories these radical feminist texts can tell about the political culture in 
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which feminism is generated. Ultimately, I suggest that “splitting suffrage” and “waving 
feminism” are parallel narrative practices, the “split” and the “wave” two canonical narrative 
figures that allow feminists to connect with the past and at the same time guarantee the 
superiority of the present and the future of feminism. 
 These chapters demonstrate how stories of the 1869 suffrage “split” have effaced the 
past in ways that run contrary to what those narratives appear to advocate. Racism and the 
race/gender opposition are not objects of critique or sites of interrogation, but instead are 
deployed as tropes that obscure their historical formation and reproduce them as fixed, 
timeless things rather than dynamic, historical processes. This dissonance is akin to 
Hemmings’s concept of narrative amenability, which she describes as the ways in which “our 
own stories, narrative constructs, and grammatical forms” can circulate within “discursive 
uses of gender and feminism we might otherwise wish to disentangle ourselves from” (Why 
Stories Matter 2). As the 2008 Obama-Clinton debate demonstrates, the construction and 
reiteration of the race/gender opposition is not solely an issue for feminist scholarship, but 
one that circulates in both feminist and non-feminist popular culture. The development of the 
1869 “split” as a commonsense story of the origin of the race-versus-gender problem and 
white feminist racism becomes a self-fulfilling narrative with wide-ranging itineraries; in an 
important sense, race and gender are locked in eternal, permanent opposition not because 
history proves it so but because we keep telling it that way.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
U.S. Suffrage Historiography, White Feminist Racism,  
and the “Risks of Replication”:  
Readings of the 1869 Suffrage “Split” 
 
“I am particularly interested in feminist stories when a consensus emerges about what really 
happened, because that indicates fixing of both the past and present as providing their own 
evidence for one another in ways that reduce rather than increase political and theoretical 
accountability. The story no longer needs to be interrogated because we all recognize it; we 
no longer need to explain why we think this story needs to be told; the storyteller is not 
responsible for its effects.” 
 
—Clare Hemmings, “What is a Feminist Theorist Responsible For?” 72 
 
“At the end of the century, all sorts of references echo back in assessments of the past and 
echo forward in predictions of the future; the whole exercise can be construed as fantastic.” 
—Joan Scott, “Fantasy Echo” 285 
 
Turning on the radio in my car one day this past July, I was surprised to find myself 
listening to a discussion of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and her effects on the U.S. suffrage 
movement. Steve Inskeep, the host of NPR’s “Morning Edition,” was interviewing historian 
Lori Ginzberg about her recent biography of the famous suffragist and co-founder of the 
nineteenth-century U.S. woman’s rights movement. It was clear from the outset, however, 
that this biography was no mere celebration of that woman, or her movement, or its 
successes—far from it. The clue to this came early on, when Inskeep introduced Stanton as a 
figure who “deeply influenced women’s rights as we talk of them today, even though she 
didn’t really fight for all women.” Ginzberg takes this idea and runs with it, describing 
Stanton as a suffragist who claimed to be fighting for universal suffrage, when in fact, she 
actually meant elite white women such as herself. When Inskeep asks Ginzberg to elaborate 
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on this point, she responds by briefly outlining the post-Civil War “battle” over the Fifteenth 
Amendment, in which one “side” of the suffrage movement supported the enfranchisement 
of black men while other suffragists such as Stanton wanted to “hold out” for an amendment 
that would include women too. Stanton, in Ginzberg’s view, “claimed” that her side stood on 
the “highest moral ground” but in reality, they “descended to some rather ugly racist 
rhetoric” that had “modern implications” for us as feminists: according to Ginzberg, this 
event in suffrage history “helped create” an “ongoing problem” for feminism, in which the 
term “women” comes to silently stand in for middle-class, white women and the movement 
is forever marked by its inception in racism.  
It was a brief interview, but listeners could quickly get the drift—in Ginzberg’s 
narration of it, there were two sides to the nineteenth-century suffrage movement, and 
Stanton was on the wrong side, the racist side. According to the narrative, this wrongness, 
these mistakes, were not quarantined in the past, but permeated feminism’s future—Stanton’s 
mistakes are, in fact, our own. Listening to Ginzberg tell it, I found myself cringing, a 
reaction that, upon closer consideration, contained a number of impulses and desires. As I 
later tried to map this reflex, I saw that it first contained the recognition of myself as white, 
and through this recognition, I came to see myself as tied to Stanton and her racism. This 
recognition turned into feelings of disgust and loathing, affects that then led to a desire to 
disavow Stanton as a symbol of white feminist racism. Ginzberg’s rendering of the 
suffragist-as-racist created a strong need to disidentify with Stanton and her followers in 
some kind of imaginary effort to be the right kind of white feminist in contemporary terms.  
I begin with this short exchange and my reaction to it because they so neatly illustrate 
a narrative process within contemporary U.S. feminism that calls for interrogation. What 
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Ginzberg was describing is known as the “suffrage split” in the historiography, a phrase that 
references a real historical event but, as I will argue, also constructs that event in particular 
ways that we ought to consider. A term that has become remarkably common within both 
U.S. feminist history and theory, the suffrage “split” refers to the emergence of two national 
suffragist organizations in 1869 after woman suffrage leaders disagreed over the Fifteenth 
Amendment and the enfranchisement of black men ahead of women. Stanton, as Ginzberg 
indicates, was at the head of the group of suffragists who rejected the Fifteenth Amendment 
and argued for the need to enfranchise women and black men at the same time, often while 
deploying a wide variety of racist rhetoric.  
But the NPR interview did not simply describe a historical event—it produced one 
that in turn became the symbol for the failures of a movement. Ginzberg’s rendering of 
Stanton’s role in the “split” portrays a political actor whose racist beliefs and rhetoric tainted 
not only her legacy, or the legacy of suffrage, but the entire future of U.S. feminism; the 
story of the “split” becomes a story of the suffrage movement, its failures, and their lasting 
impacts on and meanings for feminism today. In the process of telling this story, the 
interview produced not just a particular kind of past, but also a particular kind of present-day 
feminism and its attendant contemporary listener. In listening to Ginzberg’s narrative, I was 
encouraged to disavow Stanton and through that disavowal identify with the “correct” side of 
a contemporary feminism—the one that Ginzberg endorses, the one that has learned the 
lesson of the past and not simply inherited its failures, but moved beyond them. The story of 
nineteenth-century suffrage was simultaneously a story of feminism’s present, one that urged 
the listener to listen in specific ways that entail a proper feminism, cleansed of the errors of 
history.  
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This is an example of the kind of narrative practice that I want to explore in greater 
depth. The NPR narrative is not unique in its construction of the “split” within suffrage or its 
implications for the future of feminism; it represents a popularized and current form of a 
widespread narrative practice within feminist historiography that dates back to the 1950s and 
the emergence of the new women’s history. This body of feminist historiography constructs 
the 1869 “split” again and again, in ways that allow it to function as a self-evident, virtually 
obvious critical object—a reference to the “split” efficiently evokes the race-versus-gender 
quandary and white suffragist racism, without need for elaboration. It is not that those two 
objects are not interesting or important, but here I am more concerned with tracking their 
recursive invocation and the narratives that facilitate it, rather than an attempt to verify that 
racism, on the one hand, or redeem its historical subjects, on the other. The establishment of 
the historical facts of this suffrage event has certainly been a valuable development in 
women’s and feminist history. But these facts seem to have crystallized into a standard 
narrative formula, a kind of shorthand that you might expect to have consequences because 
of its ubiquity in the historiography, the significance assigned to it, and the axiomatic quality 
it has developed. It is those consequences that are going unexamined in favor of the continual 
reiteration of this historical “rupture” within the feminist movement. In this chapter, I select 
from a variety of this work to explore how the “split” has become shorthand for white 
suffragist racism, and the consequences of this now-commonplace feminist story. I argue that 
while this narrative practice has allowed contemporary readers to secure a progressive 
antiracist feminist position in the present, it has simultaneously, and paradoxically, obscured 
both the critical object of white suffragist racism and the complex subject positions of 
nineteenth-century suffragists, both white and black.  
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My analysis, then, seeks not to dispute the historiographical consensus of this event, 
but rather develop an understanding of the effects of this consensus. To be clear: my critique 
of split-narratives is not meant to suggest that white suffragists were somehow not racist; that 
Stanton and other white U.S. suffragists deployed a variety of racisms, both subtle and overt, 
benevolent and malicious, as they lobbied for their cause, is a historical fact. My readings of 
the split-narratives within feminist historiography that focus on this racism are not meant as 
“apology” for white suffragist bigotry or a tempering of its harms, but as an accounting of the 
work the narratives of this event perform in their construction of a feminist history and 
contemporary understandings of our present.  
 
Deploying History 
Studies of the U.S. woman’s suffrage movement, once but a footnote in the historical 
record, flourished in the second half of the twentieth century. With the advent of “second 
wave” feminism in the political arena and the new women’s history in academia, the 
unearthing of women’s experiences within and contributions to U.S. political and cultural life 
took on new significance.1 Wide-ranging accounts of the early woman’s movement appeared. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 This scholarly movement questioned the lack of a historical record of women’s activities 
and opened up a new field that could correct this absence. See Deutrich and Purdy, 
“Introduction” xv-xviii, for an overview. This new field would not simply “add women” to 
the annals of history, but also sought to transform what history was and could be. Joan Kelly 
suggested in 1976 that the recovery underway “ha[d] shaken the conceptual foundations of 
historical study” (1); she continues: “the moment one assumes that women are a part of 
humanity in the fullest sense—the period or set of events with which we deal takes on a 
wholly different character or meaning from the normally accepted one (2). These women’s 
historians were not only critiquing a lack of attention to women in the discipline of history, 
but also arguing that in order to gain full emancipation in U.S. society, this absence must be 
redressed. In other words, women’s history was not just about history, but about the present 
day; as Sheila Ryan Johansson argued in 1973, the stakes of this new historical enterprise 
were dire—women needed to gain a sense of their history in order to develop a 
 ! 31!
Biographies of central activist figures were written. Women’s absence in familiar histories 
was redressed, where the addition of women to traditional history often transformed what 
that history was and could be. That the suffrage movement took on a large role in this reform 
and transformation of the historical record is perhaps not surprising; the movement was, after 
all, a large mobilization of women struggling for the previously inconceivable right to legal 
recognition and citizenship.2 And it was a struggle that was arduous and long, but ultimately 
successful; enfranchisement did not secure women’s political, social, or economic equality 
(as some activists at the time thought it could), but it was a victory of a specific and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
“consciousness of collective identity” and to avoid “collective amnesia” (427). Likewise, 
Nancy Cott and Elizabeth Pleck introduce their volume A Heritage of Her Own: Toward a 
New Social History of American Women (1979) by suggesting that women’s history is bound 
up with present-day feminist politics: “The endeavor of truth-telling begun by researchers, 
teachers, and writers of women’s history in the past decade has served a ‘consciousness-
raising function: women who learn more fully about their own history often become more 
conscious of identification with their gender-group, more aware that their personal 
circumstances carry the legacy of a sex-specific historical experience, more determined to 
advance their position as women” (9). Women’s history, in other words, was not a solitary 
scholarly enterprise, and its effects were not limited to the scholarly world; the stakes were 
political, they were big, and they were urgent. See Deutrich and Purdy, eds; Carroll; and 
Cott, ed. for detailed examples of the field and its mission.  
 
2 Indeed, the history of suffrage developed alongside this new women’s history; what I call 
the “classic” histories of the suffrage movement by Eleanor Flexner (1959), Aileen Kraditor 
(1965), and Ellen DuBois (1978) were the first histories of the movement to appear and an 
important part of this larger movement toward recovery, revision, and transformation of the 
historical field of knowledge as well as the larger field of U.S. politics. This does not mean, 
however, that these histories were not challenged by the theorists of the new women’s 
history; each of them were variously critiqued for focusing too much on the political arena at 
the expense of a focus on the domestic and everyday. See Lerner, “New Approaches”; 
Gordon, Buhle, and Dye; and Smith-Rosenberg, “The New Woman,” for examples of this 
type of critique. DuBois responds in a 1980 symposium on “Politics and Culture in Women’s 
History” in which she defends the study of the political sphere as a vitally necessary part of 
the project of women’s emancipation. See also Gordon, “What Should Women’s Historians 
Do?” for a similar argument, in which she suggests that studying social conflict is important 
and necessarily involves political history of the sort often criticized by early proponents of 
the new women’s history. 
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meaningful kind, both in its symbolism and in its practice. Indeed, the movement and its 
accomplishments did not signal the end of women’s subordination but instead (one of) the 
beginnings of U.S. feminism.  
If the history of suffrage has proven central to the history of feminism, it has also 
produced central governing anxieties there. To read this body of work is to become well 
acquainted with the ultimate success of the movement, but it is its “failures” that permeate 
the historiography in myriad ways that are striking and evocative. The 1869 “split” within the 
suffrage movement is one such “failure.”3 Rooted in the vagaries of Reconstruction-era 
politics, this historical event dominates the history of suffrage in ways that require 
interrogation. Indeed, I argue that the historiography is overdetermined by this event; it 
functions not simply as a familiar historical fact but as an extraordinary outlet for a variety of 
critical exigencies of feminist work. Reading the historiography as a narrative practice, for 
the stories it produces, provides a way to explore this process and its meanings. While these 
split-narratives are rehearsed in a number of registers and with multiple techniques, they are 
all based on the same historical details.   
Those details are as follows: after the Civil War, Congress passed a series of 
amendments to the Constitution that guaranteed specific rights to newly-freed black men. 
The first of these, the Thirteenth Amendment, was proposed and ratified in 1865, abolishing 
the institution of slavery at the close of the war. The Fourteenth Amendment, passed by 
Congress in 1866, guaranteed citizenship to all persons born in the U.S. While it did not go !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 I put the term “failure” in quotations because it seems that these moments might be 
characterized in multiple ways, not only in the registers of dysfunction and disappointment. 
That this is not the case—that failure is the dominant idiom through which this historical 
event is articulated—is a narrative phenomenon that this chapter, and the project as a whole, 
seeks to unpack.  
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so far as to guarantee voting rights, this amendment, in a series of convoluted sections, stated 
that any state that abridged male suffrage would have its representation reduced by the same 
proportion that it disenfranchised its male inhabitants. The amendment took two years for 
state ratification, and on its heels in 1869 came the Fifteenth Amendment, which clarified its 
predecessor by guaranteeing male suffrage and making it illegal to deny the vote to citizens 
“on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude” (US Const., amend. XV, sec. 
1). With the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, the Reconstruction-era of 
constitutional revision came to a close.  
The proposal and passage of the Reconstruction Amendments were closely followed, 
debated, supported, and protested by woman suffragists of the period. In particular, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s insertion of the word “male” into the Constitution, gendered 
language not previously present anywhere in the document, was lamented as a setback for 
those interested in arguing that women were citizens under the amendment’s first section.4 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The first section reads: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws” (US Const., amend. XIV, sec. 1). Many woman suffragists would 
later argue that under this section women were defined as citizens, even as the amendment’s 
second section appears to take a narrower view: “Representatives shall be apportioned among 
the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of 
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election…is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such a State, being twenty-one years of 
age, and citizens of the United States, in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State” (US Const., amend. XIV, sec. 2). The apparent 
contradiction between these two sections would be the source of significant debate among 
suffragists for the next several years. See Stanton, Anthony, and Gage 407-520 for a detailed 
account of the “New Departure,” the suffragist strategy that hinged on a broad interpretation 
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments through which suffragists claimed women were 
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The Fifteenth Amendment, which protects voting rights on the basis of race, but not that of 
gender, added more certainty to suffragists’ fear: women were not to be recipients of these 
newly-enumerated rights.  
In New York in May of 1869, as Congress sent the Fifteenth Amendment to the states 
for ratification, activists held a meeting of the American Equal Rights Association (AERA), 
an organization created by abolitionists and woman suffragists three years earlier to advance 
the cause of freedom for former slaves and women. This particular meeting of the AERA 
focused on whether to support ratification of the Fifteenth or protest it on the grounds that it 
failed to grant women suffrage along with black men. From records kept of the meeting’s 
proceedings, we know that several prominent suffragists came out in favor of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, citing the precarious situation of the newly-freed black men who needed the 
vote as protection against mounting terror and violence in the Southern states.5 Other 
suffragists, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony among them, disagreed; in their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
already enfranchised. This strategy sought to have the courts recognize women as citizens 
under the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also DuBois, “Taking the Law into 
Our Hands,” for an analysis of this strategy. The Supreme Court would eventually reject the 
New Departure in 1875 with Minor v. Hapersett. 
 
5 See Stanton, Anthony, and Gage 378-399 for the minutes of this meeting. They are also 
available in the pages of Stanton and Anthony’s suffrage newspaper, The Revolution; see 
“Annual Meeting” (May 20, 1869) and “Annual Meeting” (May 27, 1869) for the full 
stenographic reports. That both of these sources were compiled and edited by Stanton and 
Anthony, who were of course not neutral observers of this event, raises obvious questions of 
whether the records are slanted toward one side of the debate. Buhle and Buhle note this 
limitation when they write of Stanton and Anthony’s “partisan” treatment of issues  
(“Introduction” xix) and their History as a work that “was at once a profoundly personal and 
self-consciously political venture” (“Introduction” xviii). Isenberg takes a similar view, 
suggesting that the massive History provides a sense of totality when in fact the work is an 
interested narrative: “The process of creating a total historical account means that some of 
the cultural imperatives that defined the movement have been lost or masked, because all 
stories and myths of origins create the illusion of completeness” (2). See Kerr 77 for a similar 
analysis. 
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view, the Fifteenth Amendment should be defeated because it failed to grant universal voting 
rights. A motion to support the Fifteenth Amendment was passed at the meeting.6 
Immediately following, Stanton, Anthony, and several other supporters of woman suffrage 
convened to another location and founded the National Woman Suffrage Association 
(NWSA), an organization that would focus on winning women’s right to vote. Weeks later, 
the woman suffragists who supported the Fifteenth Amendment formed their own 
association, resulting in the formal founding of the American Woman Suffrage Association 
(AWSA) in November of 1869. Despite multiple attempts at unifying over the ensuing years, 
these two national organizations would remain separate until 1890, when they formed the 
National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA).  
 Nearly all suffrage histories (and a substantial amount of more general feminist 
work, both historical and theoretical) deal with this historical event in some way; it is 
undoubtedly one of the most commonly cited episodes within the history of suffrage and the 
“first wave” of feminism more generally.7 And while the details of this event are easy enough !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 The motion that passed read as follows: “Resolved, That the American Equal Rights 
Association, in loyalty to its comprehensive demands for the political equality of all 
American citizens, without distinction of race or sex, hails the extension of suffrage to any 
class heretofore disfranchised, as a cheering part of the triumph of our whole idea. Resolved, 
therefore, That we gratefully welcome the pending fifteenth amendment, prohibiting 
disfranchisement on account of race, and earnestly solicit the State Legislatures to pass it 
without delay” (“Annual Meeting,” May 27, 1869: 321). The defeated motion that Stanton 
proposed read: “Until the Constitution shall know neither black nor white, neither male nor 
female, but only the equal rights of all classes, we renew our solemn indictment against that 
instrument as defective, unworthy, and an oppressive charter for the self-government of a 
free people” (qtd. in Aptheker 47). 
 
7 For histories of the U.S. suffrage movement, see: Flexner; Kraditor; DuBois, Feminism and 
Suffrage; Aptheker; Scott and Scott; Cott, The Grounding of Modern Feminism; Kugler; 
Wheeler, ed.; DuBois, Woman Suffrage and Women’s Rights; Terborg-Penn, African 
American Women; Weatherford; Baker, ed., Votes for Women; Baker, Sisters; Hill; and 
Dudden. For studies that focus on a specific topic in relation to U.S. suffragism, see: Tax; 
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to delineate, it is their interpretation that becomes more fraught, more freighted with the 
weight of their historical impact on present-day feminist politics. Once ignored, like the rest 
of women’s history, this episode within suffragism has been uncovered, explored, and 
assigned historical significance, rescued from the male-centered historical record that more 
often than not considered suffrage a political transaction between men.8 That this is a 
necessary, valuable development seems clear. What interests me, however, and what 
provides the central motivation for this chapter, is the conversion of this historical event into 
an omnipresent scene to which each subsequent history must trace back, explain, and 
understand, again and again. How do we get from the details outlined above to something we 
now know as the “split?”9 The distance between these two objects, between the past event !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Davis, Women, Race & Class; Bardes and Gossett; Andolsen; Scott, Natural Allies; Lebsock; 
Giddings; Graham; Marilley; Marshall; Isenberg; Newman; Vacca; Wellman; Davis, 
Political Thought; and Sneider. This is not an exhaustive list but should give a sense of the 
interest in the movement since 1959. 
 
8 In their study of women within the discipline of history, Schmidt and Schmidt show that 
women had been virtually erased from college level American history textbooks, and 
reference texts that manage to do this even in regard to the issue of women’s suffrage: they 
quote from Leland D. Baldwin and Robert Kelley’s Survey of American History (1967) as an 
example of a work “making the passage of the nineteenth amendment strictly a political 
maneuver between men” (50). They go on to suggest that it is not just textbooks and their 
authors that are to blame: “More mysterious than the ability to depict a world without 
women, a world whose existence is clearly denied by the writers’ and readers’ own 
experiences, is the fact that until very recently not a single professor protested that historical 
‘truth’ should be so unlike reality, not a single paying customer demanded her money back 
on the basis that she had paid for a history course and had been sold a male fantasy instead” 
(54). For another critique of textbooks from the women’s history movement, see Gordon et 
al. “Historical Phallacies.” 
 
9 I put quotation marks around the term “split” to signal its constructed nature and to make 
clear that understanding this historical moment in this language is not the only way one 
might approach the event. While the quotation marks are distracting, this distraction is 
precisely the point: the “split” is so ubiquitous in the historiography that it necessary to 
remind oneself that it is not a given object, but one produced through that body of work.  
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and the canonized point on the timeline of feminist history, can be measured in narrative 
terms. Indeed, narrativizing this suffrage moment is obligatory in this body of work; the 
stories produced are often quite varied, but each are anchored to, and one might say burdened 
by, the necessity of explicating why and how the suffrage movement “split in two.” How 
should we read this compulsion to return to this moment in feminist history? And what are 
the effects of this obsessive historiographical practice for feminism? 
Joan Scott coined the term “fantasy echo” to describe the ways that inchoate and 
messy history is transformed into something usable in the present, a concept that applies 
nicely to the historiographical construction of the “split.” In “Fantasy Echo: History and the 
Construction of Identity” (2001), Scott suggests that history be thought of as “a fantasized 
narrative that impose[s] sequential order on otherwise chaotic and contingent occurrences” 
and that this narrative, in turn, “contributes to the articulation of political identity” (290). In 
Scott’s formulation, fantasy “mobilizes a collectivity” (287) through narrative that “evokes, 
erases, and thereby resolves social antagonism” (290). The “echo” part of Scott’s concept is 
meant to convey the uncertainty of fantasy’s origins: does it exist in the past or the present? 
How can an original “source” ever be located? The “echo” serves as “a reminder of the 
temporal inexactness of fantasy’s condensations, condensations that nonetheless work to 
conceal or minimize difference through repetition” (292). Scott uses this term to consider 
how two fantasies of feminist history—the maternal figure and the female orator—have 
operated as common ground for feminists interested in establishing solidarity not only across 
difference, but also across time. These narratives, while certainly having salience in what 
Scott calls the “‘real’ world,” are examples of how “political movements use history” to 
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create continuity and commonalities out of disunity, disorganization, and disharmony: as 
Scott succinctly puts it, “this has been [their] efficacy” (303).  
What I find so useful about Scott’s concept is its insistence that we take seriously the 
way critical and political desires are projected onto—indeed, woven into—the histories we 
tell. That this is a principally narrative process suggests that we ought to read history closely 
for the ways it constructs its stories and what those stories ask of us as readers. Indeed, this is 
precisely what historian Laura Mayhall calls for in her examination of the relationship 
between social history and suffrage when she suggests that any recuperation of the political 
for suffrage history “would analyze not only the language and practices of women 
suffragists, but also the tropes and narrative forms utilized by suffrage historians, as well as 
the processes by which the archives of the movement were constructed” (179). Exploring the 
narrative practices of suffrage history draws attention to the constructed nature of the 
canonical stories of feminism that are “all too easily naturalized” (King, “Producing Sex, 
Theory, and Culture” 83).  
Clare Hemmings’s recent work on feminist storytelling is instructive for 
understanding the significance of the narrative construction of feminism. In Why Stories 
Matter (2011) Hemmings brings into focus the methods and techniques by which dominant 
stories of feminist theory have become legible to readers. By looking to the citation practices 
in feminist theory to understand how feminist stories become easily recognizable and 
commonplace, she suggests that the moment a story of feminism no longer seems to need 
interrogation is precisely the moment when we should read more carefully for that story’s 
narrative tactics and their effects. Hemmings reminds us that dominant narratives of the past 
become dominant for a reason, emphasizing the way we read these stories, the way they 
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work on us as readers, as a method of intervening in the “politics of the rehearsed” (20). 
While each of these scholars track different disciplines and subjects within feminist studies, 
they all underscore a central point: that the narrativization of feminism is not a problem to be 
fixed, but a process to be interpreted. The suffrage “split” provides just this sort of 
interpretive opportunity. In the following sections, I trace the ways this historical event is 
constructed and deployed through narrative in three classic histories of suffrage, map how 
these narrative techniques and tropes circulate in a variety of later historiography, and finally, 
consider what is produced (and what goes missing) in the process.  
 
Classic Constructions of the “Split” 
 
 The earliest histories of U.S. suffrage—those by Eleanor Flexner (1959), Aileen 
Kraditor (1965), and Ellen DuBois (1978)—construct different narratives of the 1869 event, 
but each of them define that event in terms of a “split” that must be explicated. These three 
accounts have been fundamental in the field of feminist history—they are widely cited, 
echoed, critiqued, and praised in succeeding work—and I argue that one crucial aspect of 
their influence has been to provide a narrative template that subsequent histories will employ. 
All three histories construct the historical event as a “split”; all three consolidate the “split” 
into a race-versus-gender problem; all three then construct narratives out of this problem that 
proliferate the “split’s” significance within feminist history. They perform these rhetorical 
moves using much of the same historical evidence, and yet they do so in widely divergent 
ways, with varying effects. 
The first major history to appear, Flexner’s Century of Struggle, covers a significant 
portion of the woman’s rights movement in the United States, from its pre-Revolution form 
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to passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, and within this long period, develops a concise 
progressive narrative of the suffrage movement, moving from its disorganized origins in the 
abolitionist ranks, through internal conflict and division, to eventual success in obtaining its 
goals. Within this larger story of progress and eventual triumph, Flexner constructs the 
“split” in such a way that roots it in white suffragist racism. “The first inkling of what was in 
store came in the wording of a proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which 
was introduced into Congress in the early summer of 1866” (143)—Flexner’s initial 
foreshadowing of the moment provides chronological depth to the event (it was not sudden, 
but began years before) but also anchors it in debates over the Reconstruction Amendments: 
despite the detailed account of the division within the movement that will follow, for Flexner, 
the problem begins here. “What was in store” for the movement is the suffragists’ 
disagreement over how to react to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the insertion of 
the word “male” into the Constitution, and the granting of the right to vote to black men 
ahead of women.  
 After properly foreshadowing the trouble on the movement’s horizon, Flexner moves 
to show Stanton and Anthony’s racism in order to set up the division to come. She cites 
Anthony’s promise that she would “‘cut off this right arm of mine’” before she would 
support an amendment that gave the ballot to black men but not to women and Stanton’s use 
of slurs such as “Sambo” and her warnings of the dangers of enfranchising “ignorant 
foreigners” before women (144).10 Against these comments and attitudes, Flexner pits the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Stanton’s comments on “ignorant foreigners,” comments that will be echoed in many of 
the subsequent histories of suffrage, points to a lacuna within the historiography. While it is 
not simply black men that are enfranchised by the Fifteenth Amendment, but men of all 
races, the historical narratives of the 1869 event largely cover over this fact. This is one of 
the complexities that is not borne out by the consolidation of the “split”—the problem 
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more moderate Lucy Stone and Julia Ward Howe, who both argued for women’s 
enfranchisement but refused to jeopardize black men’s chances at the ballot; she quotes 
Stone: “I will be thankful in my soul if any body can get out of this terrible pit” (qtd. in 
Flexner 145) to demonstrate the stark differences between the sides’ rhetoric. This “rift” was 
only “deepen[ed]” (149) by Stanton and Anthony’s friendship with George Francis Train, a 
notorious and wealthy financier, as well as an alleged Copperhead—according to Flexner, 
this relationship “brought down on their heads fresh wrath from former adherents” who could 
not support an alliance with a man who was known to openly oppose negro suffrage (150).  
This questionable alliance leads Flexner to her accounting of the “actual split” that 
occurs in May of 1869 (151). When the AERA refused to support an amendment for 
woman’s suffrage at one of its conventions, Stanton and Anthony immediately created the 
NWSA, citing the need for a group to take up woman’s cause in the serious and sustained 
way that had been lacking in the current abolitionist framework. This new organization, 
according to Flexner, was less open and flexible than the previous one; while Stanton and 
Anthony claimed that membership was open to “any woman who believed in suffrage,” “in 
point of fact, only those joined who were willing to follow the uncompromising policies of 
its leaders (152). To this distinction, Flexner adds a series of other differences between the 
two organizations—the AWSA avoided issues not directly related to suffrage, while the 
NWSA took a broader view of woman’s rights; the AWSA focused on state and regional 
suffrage efforts, while the NWSA worked for a federal amendment; and more broadly, the 
AWSA developed into a more conservative organization, while the NWSA became more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
becomes one of black men versus (white) women, thereby erasing a significant segment of 
the population enfranchised by the Reconstruction Amendments.  !
 ! 42!
radical—but by this time in her construction of the historical moment, it is clear that 
whatever these subsequent differences were, they were not the more fundamental difference 
over the question of whose “hour” it was (as Wendell Philips famously put it): the negro’s, or 
woman’s? 
Even as her story makes white suffragist racism central, Flexner’s construction of the 
“split” contributes to her narrative of progress. Flexner shows that the “split” is rooted in 
different reactions among white female suffragists to black male enfranchisement—the 
moderate, sensible, and pragmatic against the radical, stubborn, and idealistic. The reader is 
repeatedly encouraged to see Stanton and Anthony as out of step with political reality and 
angry about it: their “indignation” “knew no bounds” after the Fourteenth Amendment was 
passed (144). Writing of Stanton, Flexner continues: “She might have listened to Frederick 
Douglass (who had so staunchly supported her unprecedented plea for woman suffrage at the 
Seneca Falls convention) when—speaking in the spring of 1869—he drew a distinction 
between the predicament of the freedmen in the South and that of the women…” (144).11 
Flexner continues in this vein, suggesting that Stanton and Anthony should have been able to 
see that their political goals were ahead of their political time: Stanton and Anthony argued 
that it would have been “easy” to include women in the amendment, but according to 
Flexner, “they failed to see that such a step was still far ahead of practical political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 The use of Frederick Douglass in these suffrage narratives warrants exploration; it seems 
to me that he is employed as a stock character, one who is always invoked in a positive light, 
but ultimately in ways that invariably lack depth. Indeed, he becomes both strikingly 
symbolic and empty at the same time—freighted with meaning and yet void of substance and 
overly simplified. See Kraditor 167, Giddings 67, Davis, Political Thought 137 for additional 
examples. The use of Sojourner Truth functions in a very similar way, although interestingly, 
she shows up less than Douglass in narratives specifically dealing with the 1869 “split.” I 
explore the historiographical deployments of Truth and Frances Ellen Watkins Harper in the 
third chapter.  
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possibilities” (148). The “failure” of these suffragists is made clear; the narrative voice 
informs us that they should have known better.  
Ultimately, however, Flexner grants Stanton and Anthony sincerity if not practicality. 
Though they are labeled “irreconcilables” along with all those who “sided” with them, they 
are at least genuine in their political desires: “Those who held out for linking the two issues 
of Negro and woman suffrage believed in all sincerity that they would help, not harm, each 
other” (145). Despite this grudging approval of the earnestness with which Stanton and 
Anthony fought for women’s right to vote, with the benefit of hindsight Flexner interprets 
their strategy as doomed from the start:  
From a historical vantage point, their optimism seems unfounded. Slavery and 
the condition of the Negro had been a boiling national issue for thirty-five 
years; a war had been fought over it. No such intensity of feeling existed yet 
regarding the status of women, even among the women themselves, excepting 
in a still relatively small group. (145) 
 
Like many of the historical actors she explicates, Flexner pits the fight against slavery against 
the issue of woman suffrage; in her view, the former was a mature cause, the latter, in its 
infancy, and this developmental understanding of the situation contributes to the sense that 
Stanton and Anthony were ahead of their time but unable to accept it. Even the United States 
Congress seemed to understand the situation better; indeed, Flexner directly juxtaposes 
Stanton and Anthony with their sensible congressional counterparts. Unlike Stanton and 
Anthony, “Friends of the women’s cause in Congress were realistic. Since there was little 
hope of either amending or opposing the Fifteenth Amendment, they acted instead to keep 
the woman suffrage issue alive by taking steps towards a federal woman suffrage 
amendment” (149). Positioning congressmen in this way not only suggests that these men 
react to (rather than help to create) some sort of hazy but real “political reality” of the nation, 
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but also that they were the ones responsible for keeping the issue alive in spite of the 
misguided actions of the NWSA. In this formulation, Stanton and Anthony are indeed out on 
a limb on their own; they are the only ones not able to see the obvious incommensurability 
between black male suffrage and woman suffrage, the only ones not able to come to terms 
with the governing politics of the time—mistakes the reader, with Flexner’s help, will not 
duplicate.  
The question hangs over the narrative, however: why did Stanton and Anthony not 
seem to understand what everyone else did, namely, that woman suffrage was not of the 
same urgent importance as black male enfranchisement during Reconstruction? Here the 
reader might recall Flexner’s citation of Stanton’s slurs, or Anthony’s insistence that she 
would rather cut off her own arm than support the Fifteenth Amendment, but Flexner 
positions her primary subjects in such a way that it is difficult for the reader to wholly indict 
them. Throughout the narrative, Stanton and Anthony are constructed as heroic characters—
misguided and rash, yet willing to expend enormous amounts of energy for their cause and 
entirely devoted. For example, in explaining the responses to the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Flexner gives the reader a sense of Stanton’s stunned reaction: “an 
appalling vista of herculean labor opened up before the women leaders; Mrs. Stanton was of 
the opinion that woman suffrage would be set back a full century if the proposed amendment 
were adopted” (144). This portrayal of Stanton’s mindset creates sympathy in the reader 
while simultaneously building Stanton’s stature as a character who is willing to take on this 
monumental task. Not only do we see that Stanton is not too far off in her prediction (the 
Nineteenth Amendment would be ratified by the states on August 15th, 1920) but we also 
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know that despite this “appalling vista” of “herculean labor” that Stanton envisions, she 
keeps fighting for the cause.  
Flexner repeatedly evokes admiration in her devoted protagonists even as she 
positions them as wayward and often wrong.  When she describes events that lead up to the 
“split,” Stanton and Anthony’s actions are situated as a causal factor for the divide, and yet 
they are also couched in the language of determination and verve:  
Mrs. Stanton and Miss Anthony and their followers held doggedly to their 
views and worked hard to secure petitions against the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The first signs of a split in the forces backing greater rights for women 
became apparent in the gatherings of the American Equal Rights Association, 
which was organized at the close of the war to further the interests of both 
Negroes and women, but whose emphasis, under the leadership of Wendell 
Phillips, Horace Greeley, Gerrit Smith, and others, shifted to passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment at all costs. (145) 
 
Flexner pits Stanton and Anthony and their tireless work and numerous petitions against 
abolitionist leaders; in this formulation, it is almost as though it is because Stanton and 
Anthony are so “dogged” and inexhaustible that the “split” is bound to happen. The reader is 
encouraged to see Stanton and Anthony’s energy and exertion as a threat to the unity of the 
suffrage cause but also as a testament to the power of individual activism and commitment. 
With their “doggedness” Stanton and Anthony almost single-handedly brought down the 
AERA—in Flexner’s narrative, this is both mistaken and extraordinary.  
 Flexner’s narration in these segments clearly aligns the reader with two positions: 
first, that Stanton and Anthony were unrealistic and radical compared to their counterparts in 
the AWSA and congress, and second, that we should forgive them these flaws, because they 
were borne out of optimism, sincerity, and determination. This flexible positioning of her 
subjects contributes to the pervasive optimism of the larger narrative; the reader is 
encouraged to see the suffrage “split” as a problematic obstacle, but one that can and will be 
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overcome on the steady march of progress. The “split” was unfortunate, but the suffrage 
cause would not be stopped because “there were far too many other forces pushing it 
forward” (154). This obstacle adds tension to a story whose end we are already familiar with, 
and this narrative conflict in turn provides evidence that these activists had to work, and work 
hard, to reach their goal. While Flexner’s narrative emphasizes the “split’s” origin in the 
pitting of race against gender, and that Stanton and Anthony were clearly on the wrong side 
of this equation, the reader is still encouraged to view them in a positive sense and to even 
perhaps learn something about the arduous work of political change.  
The next major suffrage history to appear, Aileen Kraditor’s The Ideas of the Woman 
Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920, relied heavily on Flexner’s work and consolidates the “split” 
even more. Kraditor credits Flexner in her Preface for producing the “only scholarly work 
that covers the entire movement in all its aspects” (vii) but suggests that despite being a 
“fine” example of woman’s history, “[i]ts very breadth, however, prevents it from dealing 
with ideological questions in great detail” (vii). Kraditor aims to explore these ideological 
questions in part by limiting her account of the movement to its last thirty years, beginning in 
1890 when the two suffrage organizations reunited. This, however, does not prevent her from 
constructing the 1869 moment in terms of a “split” as a way to provide the necessary 
background for an understanding of the 1890 formation of the National American Woman’s 
Suffrage Association (NAWSA). While the event itself is not Kraditor’s subject, because she 
needs to give at least a brief report of it in order to set up her period of interest, she distills 
the event into a few paragraphs scattered throughout her history. Laying out her opening 
chapter on the “History of Suffragist Organization,” she refers to the 1869 “split” as first and 
foremost stemming from a “disagree[ment]” between suffragists over the Fourteenth 
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Amendment and its use of the word “male” (3). As in Flexner’s account, the scene for 
conflict in the movement is set by the Republicans’ assertion that it was the “Negro’s hour” 
and that women, many of whom had fought for decades in the abolitionist ranks, would have 
to “wait for their rights” (3).  Kraditor continues:  
Some of them, including Miss Anthony and Mrs. Stanton, thought it would be 
better if the amendment were defeated, while others, including Mrs. Stone, 
argued that if women could not win their political freedom, it was well that 
Negro men could win theirs. On this and other issues the suffragists found 
they could not agree. In 1869 two separate organizations came into 
being…The split lasted until 1890 when the two factions merged into the 
National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), and a new era in 
woman suffrage history began. (3-4) 
 
Kraditor’s distillation of Flexner is notable for the way it condenses the reasons for the 
“split” down to a matter of wanting to defeat the Fourteenth Amendment or wanting to 
support black male suffrage—it is chiefly this, along with unenumerated “other issues” that 
cause the division. Whereas in Flexner those “other issues” are briefly named (if not given 
much significance), in Kraditor’s narrative, they are not salient enough to the author’s main 
point for even a cursory delineation. 
While Flexner constructs a narrative of inexorable progress out of the “split,” 
Kraditor performs a different sort of reading, employing the “split” to delineate periods 
within the suffrage movement and explain both its failures and successes.  For Kraditor, the 
“split” forms the foundation for a suffragist reunification that would bring about a “new era” 
for the movement, a period that would ultimately end with the passage of woman suffrage. 
This periodization of the movement, which creates a twenty year void after the “split” 
(reinforced by the 1890-1920 timeframe that Kraditor constructs and explores) suggests that 
the disagreement over black male enfranchisement results in an unproductive lull in the 
movement, precipitating a stage of dormancy between the furious activity of the 1848-1869 
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interval and the “new era” that would culminate in eventual success, but success with a 
cost.12 Far from Flexner’s narrative of progress, in Kraditor’s account the “split” has 
deadening, and lasting, effects on the movement.  
 In her chapter “The Southern Question” Kraditor clearly positions the “split” as an 
originary event in the movement, one that organizes suffragist eras and provides an 
unavoidable heritage for future activists. Fixing the suffrage future to this past, she writes, 
“The development of the woman suffrage organization from a strictly Northern group of 
crusaders for the rights of all men and women to a nationwide association that all but 
officially sanctioned second-class citizenship for Negroes may be traced in specific events in 
the history of the NAWSA” (166).13 Kraditor lays out the history of suffragism in the South 
in the lead-up to the final passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, again focusing on the final 
thirty years of the suffrage movement, but the “events” that transform the movement from a 
democratic struggle for universal voting rights to a racist movement for elite white women 
only are rooted in 1869. Kraditor continues, noting that “[t]he seeds of change from the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Kraditor is not alone in this characterization of the various periods of suffrage activity; the 
same year she published The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, James M. McPherson 
published “Abolitionism, Woman Suffrage and the Negro” in which he argues a similar 
point. Flexner too suggests a period of dormancy (although she emphasizes the inevitability 
of such a lull, rather than a strict cause-and-effect relationship due to the “split”); she writes 
that “[t]he division in the suffrage ranks was unfortunate; but it was inevitable during the 
1870s and ‘80’s, a period of intense economic development and change during which social 
forces polarized in the midst of widespread unrest. The break would continue until one trend 
or the other—respectability or radicalism—became dominant. In the meantime victories 
would also continue to be won, and the last major area in which, until now, no gains had 
been registered—that of politics—would be breached” (154-155). 
 
13 At this point in the margins of my used copy of Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 
an active reader has pithily summarized this transition as “equality to racism” with an arrow 
underneath, a rather succinct iteration of the narrative consolidation that I am investigating 
here. 
 
 ! 49!
founders’ equal concern for woman and for the Negro sprouted very early” when 
abolitionists who were also woman suffragists “discovered that they sometimes had to 
choose between their causes” (166). While these women could “theorize” that “whatever 
helped one group of Americans toward full equality helped the other too,” “the choice that 
circumstances sometimes forced was not easy” (166). Kraditor then provides a specific 
example:  
In discussions, for instance, of the Fourteenth Amendment prior to its passage, 
the Stanton-Anthony wing of the suffrage movement insisted that the cause of 
human freedom would be set back by an amendment that made it easier for 
the black man to vote while, by inserting the word male in the Constitution for 
the first time, it made it harder than before for women to get the ballot. The 
Lucy Stone wing, on the other hand, argued that if efforts to secure the vote 
for both Negroes and women failed, the women ought to acquiesce in the 
enfranchisement of Negroes, happy that one group at least had won its rights. 
Inevitably some suffragists soon began to speculate whether Negroes or 
women needed the suffrage more. (166) 
 
While much of this narrative will sound quite familiar because it coincides closely with 
Flexner’s, there is a significant difference between Flexner’s depiction of the “split” as an 
obstacle to feminist progress and Kraditor’s characterization of it as a seed that germinates 
within suffragism, intertwining itself with the tenets and tactics of the movement until fully 
incorporated.  Like Flexner, Kraditor cites Frederick Douglass’s view that black male 
suffrage was more urgently necessary than woman suffrage—in her paraphrase, she writes: 
“To you, he told the women, the vote is desirable; to us it is vital” (167)—and juxtaposes this 
with women’s assertion that they too deserved the vote just as much, if not more: 
Many women, however, declared that their rights deserved priority: first, 
because women were half the population whereas Negroes were only a small 
minority and, second, because in their opinion, after the Civil War the Negro 
man was in many ways better off than any woman, black or white. The latter 
assertion was buttressed by painstaking researches by women lawyers into the 
legal disabilities of women. (167-168) 
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The race-versus-gender problem that the “split” represents here will not only prove long-
lasting within suffragism, but will actively allow for the movement’s ultimate success: 
Kraditor writes that after 1869, “The stage was now set” (168) for a Southern-influenced 
(and increasingly racist) movement that “opened a new era for woman suffrage” (169) and 
culminates in the Nineteenth Amendment. The suffragists of the next generation—the cohort 
that came of age after Stanton and Anthony had retired or passed—are saddled with the 
“split’s” legacy and the implications of the cost of success. For Kraditor, the “split” figures 
not as obstacle, but as inheritance—a historical moment to which future problems, tactics, 
and patterns can be traced back.  
The third history of suffrage, Ellen DuBois’s Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence 
of an Independent Women’s Movement In America, 1848-1869 (1978), reinforces the idea of 
a “split” and its roots in suffragist opposition to black male enfranchisement. In the final 
chapter, “The Fifteenth Amendment and the Emergence of Independent Suffragism,” DuBois 
provides perhaps the most detailed assessment of the “split” to date. Unlike Kraditor or 
Flexner, in this chapter she takes the event as her central focus. According to her narrative, 
disagreement among the suffragists as to how to relate to the Republican party and its 
Reconstruction plans led to the creation of the two organizations. Specifically, the Fifteenth 
Amendment was at the heart of the rift: “Stanton and Anthony denounced it for excluding 
women, while the pro-Republican suffragists accepted and supported it in exchange for the 
promise of future Republican support for votes for women” (163). DuBois continues: 
“Inasmuch as the Republican party had clearly rejected the equal rights strategy of advancing 
the enfranchisement of blacks and women together, the New England suffragists’ 
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dependence on the party forced them to grant black suffrage strategic priority over woman 
suffrage, even on their own platform” (166).14  
This prioritization of black male suffrage over woman suffrage, according to DuBois, 
is what Stanton and Anthony could not abide. And in February 1869, when Congress passed 
the Fifteenth Amendment and began the process of ratification, “the differences within the 
woman suffrage movement” were “intensified” (172); the “New England” suffragists 
supported the amendment; the “New York” suffragists opposed it, and this opposition 
“inflamed already severe conflicts among reformers” (173). While DuBois argues that the 
NWSA’s opposition to the Fifteenth Amendment was rooted in a feminist desire to point out 
the “distinct system of sexual inequality” that they believed existed, she also notes that “this 
feminism was increasingly racist and elitist” and that “[t]he women among whom it was 
growing were white and middle-class and believed themselves the social and cultural 
superiors of the freedmen” (174-175).15 DuBois quotes Stanton frequently here to support 
this narrative:  
‘American women of wealth, education, virtue and refinement,’ she wrote in 
behalf of a sixteenth amendment, ‘if you do not wish the lower orders of 
Chinese, Africans, Germans and Irish, with their low ideas of womanhood to 
make laws for you and your daughters,…to dictate not only the civil, but 
moral codes by which you shall be governed, awake to the danger of your 
present position and demand that woman, too, shall be represented in the 
government!’ (178) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Here, as in other histories, “New England” refers to what would become the AWSA; in the 
literature as well as the primary sources, “Boston” is sometimes used instead. “New York” 
refers to the NWSA. 
 
15 DuBois notes that members of the AWSA were certainly not free of their own racist 
rhetoric, but that they were compelled to keep their racism mostly concealed because of their 
remaining Republican and abolitionist ties, a strategy NWSA members had no incentive to 
emulate. 
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This type of open racism, along with frequent attacks on the Fifteenth Amendment, created 
the “rift” within the AERA that culminated in the formation of the National Woman Suffrage 
Association. This, in turn, prompted the New England suffragists to form the AWSA, in 
which they “emphasized the importance of agitating for woman suffrage within a framework 
of support for the Fifteenth Amendment, and of proceeding in a more methodical and orderly 
fashion than had the National Association” (195). While DuBois makes it clear that 
differences between the two rival organizations would only grow over the following years, 
her narrative of the “split” places the enfranchisement of black men at the center of the divide 
between the two groups. Like her forerunners, DuBois constructs a narrative of the 1869 
event that consolidates it into the either/or question of race and gender. 
But unlike Flexner or Kraditor, DuBois defines the “split” as a generative rather than 
destructive force, arguing that the divide ultimately allowed feminists to form a self-reliant 
and more radical base from which to argue for women’s rights. According to DuBois, 
feminist reliance on abolitionist frameworks, organizations, and tactics, once a source of 
inspiration and guidance, had become, in the post-Civil War era, a hindrance and obstruction 
to feminist growth.16 The “split” allowed one “wing” of the movement—the NWSA—to 
develop unfettered and in ways that would ultimately benefit the larger women’s rights 
movement of the twentieth century. Far from Kraditor’s grim interpretation of what the 
conflict signified, DuBois sees growth and possibility where others find missteps and 
stagnation. Rather than framing the “split” as an obstacle to be overcome (like Flexner), or as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 More generally, DuBois argues that women’s independent involvement in the suffrage 
struggle, rather than the vote itself, was the ultimate catalyst for “new social relations 
between men and women” (201). For her, then, the “split” between the NWSA and the 
AWSA allowed the former to create an autonomous group that was not reliant on male 
abolitionists or political parties for their rhetoric, strategy, or definition of goals. 
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a corrupting origin that will be passed down to future generations (like Kraditor), DuBois 
frames it as a necessary milestone in an overarching developmental narrative.  
Framing the “split” in terms of feminist growth coupled with her insistence on 
Stanton and Anthony’s racism requires a considerable amount of reader alignment, character 
background, and rhetorical finesse. For instance, when analyzing the AWSA’s charge of 
racism against Stanton and the NWSA, DuBois concludes that the strategies that they 
“developed for advancing the feminist movement in this period were often racist” and that 
“in particular, they began to use arguments that exploited white women’s fear and hatred of 
black people” (178). She continues: “Such arguments slandered the freedmen by implying 
that poor black men were more responsible for women’s disenfranchisement than rich white 
ones. They also narrowed the focus and appeal of the suffrage movement. While ostensibly 
defending the rights of all women, Stanton spoke only on behalf of those of the white middle 
and upper classes” (178). In DuBois’s narrative, there is no equivocation about the racist 
tactics that Stanton, Anthony, and the NWSA employed to advance their cause. And yet, at 
this point in her interpretation, the reader has been consistently encouraged to identify with 
Stanton and Anthony and their feminist struggle. Not only does the history focus primarily 
on them—DuBois calls them “the central characters in this book” (19-20)—but the reader is 
repeatedly reminded that they are central precisely because they severed their abolitionist ties 
and began developing an independent feminist movement: “It was they who realized most 
clearly the limitations that political dependence on abolitionism imposed on feminism, and 
who took the lead in finding a new political context for woman suffrage” (20). Stanton and 
Anthony are set up as visionaries who are able to see beyond their current political landscape 
to a “new context” in which suffragism, and feminism, will flourish.  
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DuBois’s narrative also makes it clear that while Stanton and Anthony employed 
racist tactics, these tactics were not their first choice in terms of political strategy. More than 
Flexner or Kraditor, DuBois provides considerable background of her “central characters’” 
actions, with the effect of tempering their later choices. Before introducing the Fifteenth 
Amendment and the eventual “split,” DuBois primes the reader with Stanton and Anthony’s 
earlier attempts to have women recognized in the Fourteenth Amendment. During this 
period, Stanton and Anthony worked to strengthen (rather than sever) ties with abolitionists 
in a quest for universal suffrage to be constitutionally recognized. Their “wing” of suffragists 
are portrayed as active and decidedly open to collaboration and interdependence; they “take 
the lead” in developing a coalition and they are the ones to “invite” abolitionists to merge 
with them in an attempt to broaden their political base and thus increase both groups’ 
political power. DuBois notes that Stanton and Anthony were “optimistic” about the potential 
of this coalition but these hopes are soon dissolved in Reconstruction politics and the 
Republican refusal to support the women’s cause (64). She sums up this period in a way that 
develops Stanton and Anthony’s characters as reasonable, tireless, and, importantly, right: 
they were attempting to “make progress for woman suffrage in the face of abolitionists’ 
reluctance to support them,” and despite this reluctance, they kept trying (77). These attempts 
allowed them to “move beyond” their abolitionist phase and begin to “make their own 
strategic assessments and lay their own political plans, which was the only way the woman 
suffrage movement could grow” (77). Not only does DuBois’s assessment place blame on 
abolitionist “reluctance” to support woman suffrage, but it emphasizes how willing and 
hopeful Stanton and Anthony were about the universal suffrage strategy, despite indications 
that it would not be “stable” or “viable.” They tried to draw themselves closer to 
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abolitionists, but when this failed, they were forced to “move beyond” this strategy toward 
new horizons. Importantly, DuBois notes that this is the “only way” that suffragism was 
going to develop into a successful movement. Stanton and Anthony are thus positioned as the 
“true” feminists, the ones that knew what must be done to stimulate feminist growth.  
 Indeed, DuBois repeatedly sets up Stanton and Anthony as the torchbearers of 
feminism; their opposition to the Fifteenth Amendment is couched in language that urges the 
reader to view them as not only prescient but also genuine. Like Flexner, DuBois refers to 
Stanton and Anthony’s prediction that if Reconstruction ended without granting women the 
vote, the question would not be opened again for a generation. But DuBois goes further and 
makes it abundantly clear to the reader that they were undoubtedly right in this fear; she 
quotes several later suffragists and historians who affirm it, and then affirms it herself: “From 
an even longer perspective, it is clear that, after Reconstruction, suffragists did not have 
another substantial chance to secure the franchise for women in the Constitution until the 
decade following 1910” (172). DuBois suggests that those suffragists who supported the 
amendment were not as attuned to feminist politics, which leads to the most salient effect of 
such a statement: those suffragists, such as Stone and Blackwell, were not only not as 
prescient, but they were not as feminist as Stanton and Anthony: “The amendment’s 
supporters proudly proclaimed that it would make universal manhood suffrage the law of the 
land and bring the country that much closer to a true democracy. From a feminist 
perspective, however, this exclusively masculine definition of democracy was a step 
backward for freedom” (175). In this telling of it, the AWSA might have a reasonable 
perspective, but it is decidedly not a feminist one—the NWSA’s opponents are working to 
create less freedom for women, whereas Stanton and Anthony are committed to fighting this 
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at any cost. DuBois constructs a narrative of true feminist development out of the “split,” and 
Stanton and Anthony are its standard-bearers.  
 The “split” in this iteration is a necessary event on the developmental trajectory 
toward authentic feminism. There is a sense of narrative momentum that allows the reader to 
identify with the opening up of possibilities that this moment in suffragism makes possible. 
Throughout the narrative, the event is described as a motor for change and development: 
“While the Fifteenth Amendment debates stimulated woman suffrage from outside, conflict 
among suffragists powered the movement from within” (163). Far from being a moment of 
stagnation or setback, the “split” here is an engine of propulsion into the future; it “advanced 
the woman suffrage movement as a whole by providing it with a much firmer basis for 
sustained growth and with a sustained political program, which it had always lacked” (164). 
The “split” precipitates fresh and positive advancements; it allows feminists “to explore new 
alliances, new constituencies, and new strategies” (103) and ultimately represents the 
“greatest achievement of feminists in the postwar period” (164). DuBois goes so far as to say 
that “In many ways, American feminism was just beginning in 1869” (201).  This language 
of forward-momentum and growth is irresistible, and as Stanton and Anthony propel 
feminism forward the reader is propelled along with them.17 The simultaneous representation 
of the “split” as both a result of tension between race and gender as well as an 
unquestionably positive development for feminism sets this narrative apart from its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 That this development is predicated on forms of racism among the suffragists puts the 
reader in the odd position of simultaneously identifying and disidentifying with the 
characters of the narrative; we want to be “true” feminists but we do not want to reenact the 
racist strategies that Stanton and Anthony used on their way to developing an independent, 
and in DuBois’s narrative, genuine, movement. !
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predecessors. Like Kraditor, DuBois uses the moment to demarcate suffrage eras, but in this 
account the “split” brings about a new dawn for feminist struggle.  
Using similar evidence, plot points, characters, even dialogue, these classic histories 
of suffrage offer up split-narratives that explain the movement and its implications for 
feminism. By constructing the historical period in terms of division, defining that division in 
terms of white suffragist racism and competing priorities between race and gender, and then 
extrapolating to suggest particular meanings and trajectories for feminism, these narratives 
convert the events of 1869 into something that appears simultaneously more simple and more 
complex. Whether lauded as a positive development, lamented as a contaminating setback, or 
located somewhere in between, the “split” is converted into an narrative explication of 
feminist history and cultivates readers’ affective responses toward that history and the 
present it produces. The “split” is freighted with extraordinary significance in these 
narratives, each iteration producing understandings of how feminism’s past underwrites the 
feminist future.  
 
Mapping the “Split” and its Narrative Travels 
While close attention to the construction of the original split-narratives provides a 
nuanced sense of how the event figures as a touchstone in feminist historiography, it also 
allows for the isolation of specific parts of what I see as a narrative formula for producing the 
“split.” This formula is not stationary, but travels throughout subsequent iterations of split-
narratives. Like the earliest examples, later histories would perform their own consolidations 
and proliferations of the “split,” taking up similar techniques and evidence to tell their own 
stories of the event. In this section I map how this formula functions across a variety of 
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historiography to flesh out the different narrative effects the “split” can produce, but also to 
demonstrate the wide circulation of the “split” as a canonical object in feminism. Drawing 
from multiple sources, I have mapped a composite example to illustrate each part of a split-
narrative and its role in the production of this historical event (Figure 1). Because in this 
section I am concerned with the development of the split-narrative as a genre, rather than any 
one narrative and its place in the historiography, in what follows I refer to “narrators” and 
their stories, leaving authors’ names and works to the citations. My hope is that this tactic 
allows for a fuller sense of the ways this body of work functions as a whole to both 
consolidate the past event and amplify its meanings for the feminist present.18   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Mapping a composite split-narrative drawn from multiple histories, rather than one 
narrative from a single work, has the advantage of visually demonstrating how widely the 
“split” circulates, but also how these narratives within feminist history and historiography 
work together to produce a canonical object in feminism, to create a sense that this is a 
moment we all already “know.” The composite also highlights the constructed nature of my 
own reading of these narratives. 
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Figure 1. Diagram of a Composite Split-Narrative. 
 
Perhaps the most obvious element of the split-narrative formula is the term “split” 
itself: this terminology is already an interpretation of sorts, and yet it has become the 
dominant idiom through which the historical event is known within feminist history. Readers 
 ! 60!
are introduced to the suffrage event through this lens of rifts, breaks, and fissures. As I have 
shown above, Flexner employs the terms “split” and “rift” several times (151, 150) while 
DuBois describes the event as a “break” and a “breach” between woman suffrage leaders, 
suggesting that “the split between abolitionists and feminists…brought the conflict into the 
ranks of feminists themselves” (DuBois Feminism and Suffrage, 80-81). Subsequent 
narratives declare that the “essential unity” of abolitionism and feminism was “ended” after 
the “division” between suffragists occurred” (Aptheker 50, 42); the “rift grew wider,” the 
coalition “split[s] apart,” resulting in different “wing[s]” of suffragists (Hill 37, Wellman 
226, Kerr 63). As one narrator succinctly puts it, “The movement was torn apart, and two 
rival suffrage organizations were formed, creating a schism in the movement” (Kerr 61).19 
The idiom of the “split” is often merged with stronger characterizations that shade it 
with meaning in less subtle ways; for instance, while Kraditor describes the “split” as “the 
final divorce of woman suffrage from abolitionism” (173) another narrative suggests that the 
“rift” among suffragists widened and “provoked a crisis in the women’s suffrage movement 
that had been looming for several years” (Hill 37, 36). For another narrator, the “split” 
precipitated “a series of disagreements, disappointments, and conflict that would divide the 
prewar leaders” for some time to come (Scott, Natural Allies 135).  
The language of “splitting” and its attendant characterizations of division, crisis, and 
divorce do not merely report a historical event but characterize it from the outset. One could 
easily imagine alternate ways of describing this episode within suffrage—why not describe it 
as a “branching off,” for example? This description would of course generate its own !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 See Flexner 145; Kraditor 3-4; DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage 164; Terborg-Penn, 
African American Women 26; Davis, Political Thought 139; Marilley 78; and Giddings 67 
for additional examples of split-language. 
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production of the event—there is no completely neutral way of telling its story—but my 
point is that the metaphor of “branching off” has precisely not dominated the historiography, 
while the language of the “split” indeed has. Not only does this language already characterize 
the event in a particular way, with its suggestions of endings, rancor, and disillusionment, but 
it has become very nearly the only way of describing what happened within the suffrage 
movement in 1869.   
The “split” idiom contributes to larger narratives of the suffrage event and its causes 
that inevitably anchor the divide in the Reconstruction Amendments and the ensuing 
disagreements about granting black male suffrage ahead of women’s suffrage. Flexner tells 
us that the “first inkling” of the “split” can be seen “in the wording of a proposed Fourteenth 
Amendment” (143) and other narratives likewise embed the “split” in the different suffragist 
reactions to the amendments, which represent a conundrum for suffragists, one that will end 
up “splitting” the movement in two when activists find they cannot agree. The historiography 
repeatedly sets up the problem of the “split” as a problem rooted in this dispute; “the issue 
was divisive” (Scott, Natural Allies 135) and the “coalition split[s] apart…over the Fifteenth 
Amendment, which granted voting rights to formerly enslaved men but not to women” 
(Wellman 226).20  
Other narratives put the problem in strategic terms, suggesting that suffragists 
disagreed in their political calculations: “White abolitionist-suffragists could not agree on 
whether it was better to accept what the proposed amendments offered, or hold out for 
amendments that also recognized the rights of white and black women” (Newman 63) but the 
resulting problem is the same—the “split” is borne out of the Amendments and suffragists’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 See Kraditor 3-4, Marilley 76, Giddings 64, and Kerr 69 for additional examples of the use 
of the “Amendment Anchor.” 
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differing reactions to them. On the one hand, “The AWSA supported the Republican party’s 
effort to ratify the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments out of a conviction that a partial 
extension of the franchise was better than no extension at all” (Newman 63). But on the 
other, “The NWSA opposed the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments on the grounds that 
these amendments provided no constitutional protections for women, white or black” 
(Newman 63). As another narrator puts it, “Eventually the reformers split among themselves 
over whether to accept the Reconstruction amendments as steps toward equality” (Marilley 
68). The “split” is a direct result of the disputed amendments: “All parties at the time of the 
split understood the issue to be the acceptance or rejection of Stanton and Anthony’s 
campaign to defeat the Fifteenth Amendment” (Kerr 77). In these descriptions, there is no 
room for doubt about the origins of the event.  
 In rooting the “split” in the Reconstruction Amendments, this body of work 
consequently defines the problem in terms of competing priorities of race and gender. The 
story of the “split” becomes the story of suffragists “choosing” between women and black 
men: who “deserved” the vote more? As one narrative frames it, the movement was 
“severely strained when the rights of black freedmen and the rights of women were pitted 
against each other” (Andolsen 1). This problem is “structured” into the AERA and forced 
members to take sides: “Some of these women and men had a primary commitment to black 
suffrage. Others suffered divided loyalties between women and the freedmen” (DuBois, 
Feminism and Suffrage 166, 68). The division in the suffrage movement is thus a division of 
allegiance; two “sides” emerge, one supporting suffrage for black men and one supporting 
suffrage for women. “Many members of the [AERA] favored passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as written. Figures such as Stanton and Anthony, on the other hand, felt 
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reluctant to support an amendment that did not give the ballot to women” (Hill 33). The 
“split” is figured as a choice between race and gender, with one “side” choosing women, 
another choosing black men, and the suffrage movement splitting in two as a result.21 It is a 
choice between “the rights of two groups” that have “come into conflict” (Kerr 63); by 
deploying the idiom of a “split” and anchoring that construction to the Reconstruction 
Amendments, the narratives make the event within suffrage about an either/or “choice” in 
which the needs of newly-freed black men are measured against women’s.22  
The narrative construction of this race-versus-gender choice facilitates the focus on 
white suffragist racism—one side, represented most often by Stanton, refuses to support the 
amendments, while the other is willing to set aside women’s rights in order to observe what 
was often labeled the “negro’s hour.” While one group “moderated their dissent against the 
Fourteenth Amendment by appealing for black male suffrage and woman suffrage as equal 
rights reforms,” the other “intensified their demands for woman suffrage criticizing black 
male suffrage” (Marilley 74). Quotations of white suffragists’ racist commentary become 
evidence for why the movement breaks up; narratives frequently cite Anthony’s insistence 
that the Fifteenth Amendment “cast [women] under the heel of the lowest orders of 
manhood” (qtd. in Giddings 66) and Stanton’s use of slurs such as “Sambo” and her 
warnings of the dangers of enfranchising “unwashed, unlettered ditch-diggers, boot-blacks, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 See Kraditor 221; Andolsen 1; and Davis, Women, Race & Class 76 for additional 
examples of this formulation. 
 
22 One effect of this kind of narration is to make the term “women” a referent for “white 
women,” performing the very same kind of universalization that feminist historiographers 
lament in the rhetoric of suffragists such as Stanton (recall Ginzberg’s criticism that Stanton 
“didn’t really fight for all women” even as she waved the banner of universal suffrage). This 
goes to my point, elaborated on in the final section of the chapter, that the focus on the 
“suffrage split” ultimately obscures the very objects of analysis that it seems to highlight. 
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hostlers, butchers, and barbers” before women (qtd. in Davis, Political Thought 147). 
Stanton’s speeches and editorials in particular are frequently called upon to demonstrate the 
“increasingly racist and elitist” brand of feminism one “side” was brewing (DuBois, 
Feminism and Suffrage 174). For instance, several histories cite Stanton’s prediction of 
“fearful outrages” that white women would be vulnerable to if black men won the vote first: 
“what may [woman] be called to endure when all the lower orders, natives and foreigners, 
Dutch, Irish, Chinese and African, legislate for her and her daughters?” (qtd. in Davis, 
Political Thought 147)23 Against these racist exhortations, these histories juxtapose the more 
“moderate” side, the one that is willing to prioritize black men’s needs ahead of their own. 
Suffragist Lucy Stone is frequently cited here as evidence of this side’s principled position: 
“I will be thankful in my soul if any body can get out of this terrible pit” (qtd. in Kerr 70).24 
These repeated juxtapositions belie some histories’ insistence that the divide was not “a 
division between racists and non-racists”; the “split” is at every turn made to show how one 
“wing” of the movement was more virulently and eagerly racist than the other (Marilley 79). 
 Indeed, racism becomes the primary method of explaining why the “split” occurs. 
The “rift grew wider when Stanton began making negative comments about blacks and other 
minorities” (Hill 37). The moderate “wing” could not tolerate the “racist appeals” the other 
side employed and this racism winds up costing the movement “a solid core of female equal 
rights reformers” (Marilley 77). The historiography shows, again and again, that while “some 
white women were able to reconcile themselves to an amendment that affirmed black men’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 See Dudden 166 and 169; DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage 178; Terborg-Penn, African 
American Women 33; Kerr 68; and Graham 5 for additional examples of the narrative use of 
quotations such as these. 
 
24 See also Flexner 145 and Marilley 77 for similar uses of Stone’s quotation.!!
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right to vote,” the other group was “clearly rankled” and began to “retreat from support of 
racial justice” (Newman 64, 5). The “split” becomes not just a question of competing 
priorities, but a matter of one side’s “retreat” from justice and their anger at being prioritized 
behind black men. These narratives construct the “split” as not just a divide of “allegiance,” 
but a divide between racist suffragists and non-racist suffragists—racism becomes the 
primary method of explaining why the “split” occurred, the way to show the differences 
between the two “sides” constructed in the historiography.  
 These elements of the paradigmatic split-narrative work together to organize not just 
the suffrage past but its consequences for the feminist present. Thinking back to the NPR 
interview, the “split” in that particular iteration was figured as an original source of trouble 
for the feminism of the future—its “modern implications” were such that as I listened, I was 
encouraged to disidentify with Stanton and her followers, to castigate those figures so that I 
could be part of a future cleansed of past errors, rather than complicit in that problematic 
past. In the same fashion, the “split” is figured as a governing event in the historiography of 
suffrage: it constructs feminist historical eras and trajectories and cultivates the reader’s 
affect toward that past. The “split” thus does not just produce a certain form of feminist 
history; it produces a particular kind of reader who can be the antiracist feminist that the 
future requires.  
 The “split” functions as a delimiter in the construction of suffrage history and its 
place in the larger movement for women’s rights by dividing the movement into discrete and 
usable segments. “In the late 1860s,” one narrator suggests, “the movement had seemed to be 
in promising mode” but the “split” puts an end to this era and brings about a period of 
setbacks and defeats (Scott, Natural Allies 134). This period of pre-“split” “promise” is 
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emphasized in a number of histories; another work describes this period as a “golden age” of 
woman suffrage in which the movement had experienced a “period of growth unprecedented 
in the annals of reform” (Kerr 62). At the beginning of the 1860s, suffragists “could look 
back on a period of extraordinary accomplishment” but the postwar “split” “threatened to 
reverse the gains of two decades” and causes the movement to “founder” (Kerr 62, 63). The 
“split” does not just become a way of marking the divide between productive and non-
productive periods of activism, but actively creates those periods—in fact, I would argue that 
there would be no “golden age” of suffrage if not for the “split” that ends it.  
The corollary to this point, of course, is that if the “split” marks an ending within the 
movement, it also signals a beginning. This “new” era may be a period of “foundering” and 
frustration, or it could be one of development and growth, but in each case the “split” 
differentiates one suffrage era from another, allowing the narrator to organize the 
movement’s past. After the “split,” one history suggests “the activists entered a new decade 
with their hopes considerably dimmed” (Hill 39). The “promise” of the “golden age” of 
suffrage is dashed by the “split,” which brings on a period of “foundering” in the 1870s (Kerr 
63).25 The “split” provides a way to divide up the movement and signal to the reader the 
differences between two discrete periods of time. In each of these iterations, the “split” 
references an actual event, but as a critical object it simultaneously exceeds that event—it 
becomes a way to manage the history of the movement. The “split” emerges as a form of 
periodization, a method for categorizing suffrage history into blocks that can then be named, 
described, and evaluated by historians and their readers.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 See Kraditor 169; DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage 201; Scott, Natural Allies 134; Kerr 61; 
and Aptheker 13 for additional examples of periodizing language in split-narratives. 
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One consequence of this process is the creation of trajectories in which the history of 
the movement is constructed as a continuous arc of time that leads to the present. The 
direction or shape of this arc—whether it signals a trajectory of advancement, or one of 
decline—is largely shaped by the rendering of the “split.” The examples above have gestured 
toward this consequence; as the “split” divides up eras of “promise” from periods of 
“setbacks and defeats,” for instance, it becomes clear that the event marks the beginning of a 
kind of downturn within the movement. The “split” does not simply function as a neutral 
marker but a directional one, a narrative construct that tells the reader which way the 
movement is headed. Most of the time, that direction is decidedly down—the “split” very 
often signals the beginning of decline rather than the dawn of a new and promising era.26 
“Without the unity between the two freedom movements,” one narrator writes, woman 
suffrage was “nearly lost,” a nascent feminism was “badly damaged” and “the civil rights 
movement was severely weakened at a critical moment in its history” (Aptheker 13). The 
“split,” in this iteration, is an event with far-reaching implications for both suffragism and the 
larger freedom movements of the period—it signals a new era, but one that is figured by loss, 
damage, and weakness.  
Likewise, another narrator sets up the trajectory by suggesting that the suffrage 
movement was optimistic, productive, and decidedly on the upswing prior to the “split.” This !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 While here I trace the trajectory of decline because of its prevalence in the historiography, 
as I show in the previous section, the work of Ellen DuBois constructs a trajectory of growth 
and progress out of the “split” that is an exception worth noting. As I note in my close 
reading of her split-narrative, for DuBois, the “split” is an event that allows the movement to 
“move beyond” the old era toward a future in which “the woman suffrage movement could 
grow” (Feminism and Suffrage 77). This narrative construction presents the reader with 
considerably different affective choices, but as in narratives of decline, the “split” remains a 
controlling event in suffrage (and feminist) history.  !
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was a movement in motion—“woman’s rights, including the right of suffrage, had swept the 
land”—but this forward-momentum is brought to a halt when “[t]he ideologically driven but 
politically unwise actions of one wing of suffragists caused the woman suffrage movement to 
all but founder in the 1870s” (Kerr 62, 63). The kind of narrative momentum created in this 
iteration is a common way to indicate a coming decline post-1869—the period before the 
split, according to another history, was one of “vigorous agitation,” a time when suffragists 
across the country “had been optimistic” and “grew more hopeful” (Scott, Natural Allies 
134). According to this iteration, “In one state after another new suffrage organizations…had 
begun to appear” and success was imminent (Scott, Natural Allies 134, 135). The description 
of the period before the “split” is fueled by optimism, instructing the reader to envision the 
suffrage movement at this point as productive, dynamic, and on the rise. This hope, however, 
is not capitalized on but rather dashed with the “split” of the movement, an event that 
“prevent[ed] women in places like Iowa and Ohio from taking advantage of the promising 
fluidity of the immediate postwar period” (Scott, Natural Allies 135). The “split” becomes 
the agent that precipitates a loss of this optimistic and productive period—because of it, the 
golden age is squandered, the momentum is stymied, the promise is lost.  
When a narrative creates a trajectory of decline out of the “split,” the reader is urged 
to disavow the choices of particular suffragists in order to set feminism’s path aright. One 
narrative suggests that the “split” ended a political “unity” that eventually “would have 
rebounded to the benefit of woman,” something that Stanton and Anthony and their “side” 
could not understand (Aptheker 49, 50). The narrative evokes nostalgia and regret in the 
reader: “had this unity not been broken” the civil rights and feminist campaigns would have 
been more successful and “the betrayal of Reconstruction would have at least been tempered 
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by an organized opposition” (Aptheker 50). The reader is encouraged to wish for that world 
in which the unity of the two movements has been restored, to be able to change the painful 
course of Reconstruction. This regret simultaneously requires the disavowal of Stanton and 
Anthony: if not for their actions, we might have had that world. Even as the narrator tells us 
that “the point is not to defend or excoriate Stanton or Anthony” but to “learn what we can 
from their experience and process,” we are reminded that it is Stanton and Anthony’s “deep 
form of white chauvinism which requires attention” (Aptheker 51, 52). The real purpose of 
uncovering the racism at the root of the “split” is to “learn” from it, to recognize that the 
mistakes of the past have perpetuated and created injustice, and to translate this educational 
narrative into political action in the present day, action that avoids these mistakes and thereby 
avoids the disappointments, setbacks, and conflicts of the past. By disavowing one “side” of 
the “split” and its racism, the narrative employs the past as a method for both guiding and 
shielding the present. The reader must identify with the correct “side” of the “split” and its 
historical interpretation in order to secure an antiracist feminist position in the present and 
thus be a part of the kind of feminism that has learned from its past and therefore moved 
beyond it. 
Other narratives of decline produce fear instead of regret or nostalgia to construct 
cautionary stories for present day feminism and feminist readers. For instance, one narrator 
suggests that the “split” is not simply something to regret or wax nostalgic about, but is 
actually dangerous; the theoretical problems it represents are not safely kept in the past, but 
can seep into the present endeavor of historical writing (and reading) as well. The “split” 
“posed serious problems for woman suffragists then, and for women’s historians now,” and 
unless we produce the right kind of history, “we are at risk of replicating the mistakes of 
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those whose political misalliances and poor judgment led to a brief-but-regrettable period of 
egregiously racist and elitist conduct” (Kerr 63-64). History is a risky business in this 
iteration: if the “split” is interpreted the wrong way, if it is suggested to be a matter of 
“federal versus state suffrage work, or radical versus conservative ideologies,” for example, 
then “we risk perpetuating a means-and-ends argument that fails to take into account the 
political exigencies of a particular historical moment” (Kerr 71, 64).  
The “split” takes on the role of litmus test; if a historian makes an interpretive misstep 
in constructing it, she is guilty of ignoring the racism of the past and risking contamination in 
the present through the original historical event. This warning extends to the reader as well—
she is encouraged toward the “proper” side of the “split” and just as historians are urged to 
write the “split” correctly, readers are urged to read it right. The “consequences” of the 
“split” “furnish a cautionary tale to those who continue to work for full equality today”—
ultimately, the reader is instructed that “ignoring what is painful in woman suffrage history 
diminishes the capacity to build on its strengths by learning from past mistakes” (Kerr 77-
78). The reader needs to not only disavow one “side” of the “split” but also learn from that 
disavowal—we do not want to repeat the mistakes of the past or “diminish” the capacities of 
feminism in the present, and therefore, we are encouraged to align ourselves with the right 
suffragists and the right narrative of the historical event, the one that enables us to properly 
understand it and thus inoculate ourselves against the danger of contagion. This is a process 
of fear—fear of not only being a bad feminist subject (by not choosing the correct side) but 
of risking the future of feminism more generally (by repeating the mistakes of the past).  
Each of these iterations produces forms of inheritance narratives that are 
simultaneously educational narratives; readers are urged to be the kind of feminist who can 
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learn from the lesson of history and ensure a healthy future for feminism. If we learn it 
properly, we can unhinge feminism from its tainted past and project it into a future that is 
free of its problematic, traumatic history. And if we do not learn the lesson, then this 
narrative formula suggests that we are then doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past, 
remaining mired in the ugliness of an intractable history of racism. The process of 
constructing the “split” around racism and then deploying it to organize feminist history and 
the reader’s affective relation to that history is, in Joan Scott’s terms, a way to “evoke, erase 
and resolve” the origin of racism within feminism (290). The “split,” like Scott’s female 
orator or the maternal figure, could be considered in terms of feminist fantasy—it 
consolidates the historical moment, creating what Scott calls a “commonality,” or what 
Hemmings calls a “consensus” out of an event. We “know” something called the “suffrage 
split” is about white suffragist racism, and we “know” that this then explains the history of 
suffragism as well as U.S. feminism. The “efficacy” of this process has been to allow 
feminists to locate racism elsewhere, to rhetorically cordon it off, and in doing so protect the 
present-day movement from the mistakes of the past. These narratives encourage the reader 
to locate racism within feminist history in order to inoculate herself (and contemporary 
feminism) from implication in present-day racism.  
But of course, this “origin” is never resolved—nor could it be. We are left instead to 
interpret the consequences of such reiteration. We have seen what the “split” produces, but 
what does it obscure? 
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The Effects of the “Split” 
The suffrage “split” performs a significant amount of work within feminist 
historiography: it organizes and manages eras, creates trajectories out of those eras, and 
cultivates readers’ affective responses toward the feminist past and present. These narratives 
deploy the “split” in various ways, but the reader is always encouraged to understand it as a 
governing event, as the fissure that has a dominant impact on the future of feminism. Readers 
must identify with the “correct” side of the suffrage divide in order to be proper feminist 
subjects—sometimes this means repudiating one group such as the NWSA, sometimes it 
means repudiating the past more generally, sometimes it means celebrating suffragists’ 
achievements while parsing their faults; but in each iteration, the stakes are big for present-
day feminism—correctly understanding the event is required to understand how feminism is 
to move forward and progress. Ultimately, the “split” produces proper feminist readers who 
can read the past in such a way that an antiracist future of feminism is secured. It’s not that 
this isn’t a laudable goal; it’s that this narrative practice allows readers to distance themselves 
from the very object that is never elucidated. White suffragist racism is made the cause for 
lasting failure and permanent crisis in feminism, but in its repetition in split-narratives, it is 
never explored in the complexity of its history. The historiography of suffrage relentlessly 
produces this story, and reproduces it so well, in fact, that it is the de facto, shorthand way of 
explaining where racism in the U.S. feminist movement originates.27 In this practice, 
however, racism becomes a method for explaining an event, a trajectory, a feminist past and 
present, rather than a historical structure in need of explication itself. Racism is transformed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 See Valenti 168-169 for a popular version of this kind of “shorthand” understanding of the 
suffrage “split.” 
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into a trope in these narratives, and as effective as that trope is for constructing feminism’s 
past and readers’ affects toward that past, it is not very good at historicizing racism as an 
inseparable part of that past. The “split” instead performs a metonymic function, in which 
narratives of racism stand in for the complex politics of race, gender, and class in the 
nineteenth-century suffrage struggle.  
By critiquing these narratives, I do not mean to suggest that there exists a neutral way 
to narrate this event, one that is not always embedded within the perspective of the narrator 
or her search for what feminist historians call a “usable past.”28 But my examination of the 
narrative production of this canonical event provides the opportunity to not simply consider 
what those narratives ask of readers, or produce for feminism, but also the opportunity to 
figure the period again, differently, not just as a “corrective” or a way to fill in the ever-
present gaps of history, but as part of the process of refiguring feminism’s timeline, its major 
events, figures, and problems. How else could the story of this period within suffrage be 
told?  
According to Hemmings, telling other stories, what we might call the non-canonical 
narratives of feminism’s past, cannot intervene in the power of dominant feminist narratives. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Indeed, split-narratives themselves should be read as embedded in their own historicity, 
one in which they can be seen as working against conceptions of hegemonic feminism by 
“correcting” a critical impulse to develop a “sisterhood” on exclusively, and 
unacknowledged, white terms. In “How Does Asia Mean?” Sun Ge writes of the critical 
tendency to critique historical actors without attention to the contexts in which those actors 
are produced and constrained. As she puts it, “We tend to easily criticize our predecessors for 
the limitations of their thinking while neglecting the rationale peculiar to the historical 
context against which the thinking takes its form, hence we also fail to see the possibility of 
the growth of knowledge. All this makes it too easy to delude ourselves into thinking that we 
are breaking new paths” (41). This point, in my view, applies not only to nineteenth-century 
suffragists, but also to those scholars of suffrage and feminist history who circulate split-
narratives. 
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I, however, am convinced by feminist scholars who insist that the feminist past is “never 
exhausted” but rather is “always capable of giving rise to another reading, another context, 
another framework that will animate it in different ways” (Grosz 1020).29 In her recasting of 
“second wave” feminism from the perspectives and experiences of women of color, historian 
Becky Thompson produces a “second wave” narrative that is markedly different than the one 
we think we know so well. Thompson’s purpose is to intervene in the process of feminist 
storytelling by “interrupt[ing] normative accounts before they begin to repeat themselves, 
each time, sounding more like ‘the truth’ simply because of the repetition of the retelling” 
(350). Like Thompson, I want to employ the understanding of how split-narratives work to 
self-consciously intervene in the narration of this period in feminist history. By remaining 
critically moored to the problem of race-versus-gender, split-narratives prevent a 
contextualized analysis of the complexity of white suffragist racism at the same time that 
they whittle down black women’s activism to one “side” or another, to their having to choose 
between their race or their sex, as it is often put. In encouraging feminists to secure our own 
progressive subject positions, these narratives end up obscuring the complicated subject 
positions of past activists. Making these subjects central to a telling of this historical period 
interrupts canonical split-narratives and refigures their critical problems—not in the name of 
producing a “settled alternative,” but in unsettling what we think we know.  
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 See Barlow 421-422 and Burton 67 for similar exhortations.   
CHAPTER 2 
 
White Suffragist Dis/Entitlement:  
The Revolution and the Rhetoric of Racism 
 
There is a paradox in the way the U.S. woman suffrage movement and its most 
famous figures have been canonized. While Elizabeth Cady Stanton is arguably the 
movement’s most recognizable symbol, historians Ellen DuBois and Richard Cándida Smith 
have recently pointed out that “little of her writing has been easily available” and she is 
“known today for only a handful of pieces” (“Introduction” 1). Even as Stanton is the focus 
of numerous biographies, documentaries, and scholarly studies, her large body of work is 
simultaneously overlooked.1 One reason for this contradiction, as DuBois and Smith note, is 
that Stanton never wrote one big book that would allow future historians and critics to 
synthesize her contributions. Instead, much of Stanton’s work is divided among speeches, 
pamphlets, and newspapers, and while many of these pieces have been anthologized, these 
collections simply cannot represent the sheer volume and sweep of her oeuvre, which runs to 
thousands of pages.2 As a result, our acquaintance with Stanton’s writing is rather shallow 
even as Stanton’s identification as a symbol of U.S. woman suffrage has become ubiquitous; 
one of the most canonical figures of the movement is, strangely enough, also relatively 
unknown. 
                                                
1 For recent Stanton studies, see DuBois and Smith, eds; Ginzberg; Davis, The Political 
Thought of Elizabeth Cady Stanton; Gornick; Wellman; and Kern. 
 
2 See Gordon, The Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony; 
DuBois, The Elizabeth Cady Stanton-Susan B. Anthony Reader; and Buhle and Buhle, eds. 
  76 
This paradox is mirrored in the critical focus on racism within white suffragism. The 
historiography of U.S. suffrage of the past 25 years has documented the many forms of 
bigotry embedded within the movement and espoused by its central figures; Stanton in 
particular has been fully and frequently established as a looming figure of racism in U.S. 
feminism’s past.3 In a recent collection of essays on Stanton’s work, historian Ann Gordon 
points out that the “luster” of the infamous co-founder of the nineteenth-century woman’s 
rights movement has been “dimming” in recent years because of the “close scrutiny” now 
given to the racialized rhetoric in her speeches and writing (“Stanton and the Right to Vote” 
111). Study after study documents Stanton’s use of racial slurs, the racial constructions her 
thought relied on, and the bigotry behind her blind-spots—as Gordon notes, Stanton’s 
“failures are now well established” (124). 
Well established, but not well understood. White suffragist racism is rarely explored 
or explicated in these works, only confirmed. As with our acquaintance with Stanton herself, 
this racism is now notorious even as it remains obscure. As I demonstrate in the first chapter, 
scholars have persistently produced this racism as the reason for a “split” within the suffrage 
movement over whether to support or oppose the Fifteenth Amendment and the 
enfranchisement of black men before women, but in doing so have made that racism into an 
explanation for an event, a way to understand the fissures and failures of the movement. This 
critical desire has represented an important intervention in feminist historiography, but one of 
                                                
3 See Dudden; Ginzberg; Stansell; Mitchell, “‘Lower Orders’”; Newman; Kerr; Caraway; 
Andolsen; Aptheker, and Davis Women, Race & Class, esp. 70-86. The emphasis on the 
racism of white suffragists is not confined to this body of work, but can be seen in generalist 
and popular works of feminist studies as well, in which white suffragism is often determined 
as an originary site of racism within the feminist movement; see Valenti 168-169 for a 
representative example. The uncovering of racism within the white woman suffrage 
movement has been a significant recovery in the field of U.S. women’s history; my analysis 
is not meant to discount the important contributions of this work, but to build upon them.  
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its effects has been to convert white suffragist racism into a shorthand way to understand 
how the suffrage movement “split in two” in 1869. I am suggesting that the critical tendency 
to always-already understand this historical moment as an originary site of white feminist 
racism has paradoxically resulted in the obfuscation of the ways that racism functioned. 
White suffragist writing is thus in the peculiar position of being canonized and overexposed 
and at the same time under-considered.4 Gordon points to this problem when she suggests 
that documenting Stanton’s bigotry and elitism is an important task, but “[n]onetheless, the 
exploration of what [these things] signify needs better tools and maps than are currently in 
use” (“Stanton and the Right to Vote” 124).  
This chapter seeks to contribute to this exploration through a tracing of white 
suffragist writing in the short-lived periodical, The Revolution. The critical paradox of 
Stanton’s work and white suffragist racism are, I argue, bound up with the pervasive critical 
bypassing of this important text. Published from 1868 to 1870 in New York under the 
editorial leadership of Stanton and Anthony,5 the newspaper is in many ways ground zero of 
the canonical construction of “the split”—it was expressly created by the most canonical 
figures in the suffrage movement as a vehicle to disseminate their ideas, the racist content of 
many of its editorials are some of the most frequently cited and denounced writings within 
suffrage historiography, and its very existence is often included as one of the reasons for 
                                                
4 Indeed, historians often protest that too much work focuses on figures such as Stanton and 
Susan B. Anthony at the expense of lesser-known, marginalized figures of the movement; see 
Farrell 46 and Kerr 71 for two examples from the historiography that call for more attention 
to alternate suffrage figures and less attention to Stanton and Anthony. 
 
5 Anthony sold the paper to Laura J. Bullard in May of 1870 due to its increasing financial 
difficulties (most of which Anthony took on herself, leaving her with substantial debt). 
Bullard would only be able to keep The Revolution in publication for another two years, until 
allowing it to be merged with the New York Christian Enquirer. 
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growing animosity within the suffrage movement.6 Indeed, Stanton and Anthony’s foray into 
the world of publishing would pave the way for a competitor in the American Woman 
Suffrage Association’s Woman’s Journal, a more popular and enduring periodical that would 
eventually contribute to The Revolution’s demise. In looking for the ways that the 
canonization of “the split” consolidates the historical events, ideas, and materials it deals in, 
The Revolution provides a prime venue; it lies at the heart of “the split” and yet I argue it also 
demonstrates the ways in which the historical moment in suffrage exceeds its narrative 
construction. But interestingly, Stanton and Anthony’s newspaper has not been given much 
focused critical attention, despite the incessant, obsessive focus on “the split” within 
suffrage.7 While much of the evidence of Stanton and Anthony’s racism comes from 
                                                
6 Feminist historiography often constructs the advent of The Revolution as a precursor to the 
Fifteenth Amendment debates and the eventual “split” in the movement. Eleanor Flexner 
writes that “Even before the Fifteenth Amendment had begun deepening the rift between the 
two camps in the women’s movement, Mrs. Stanton and Miss Anthony had found a new 
friend…None roused a greater outcry than their brief but lively association with George 
Francis Train” (150) and then suggests that Train’s support of The Revolution helped to bring 
about division in suffragism. Other histories place The Revolution more directly at the center 
of the divide. For instance, Bettina Aptheker describes the paper as the catalyst for “the 
split,” writing that its “main editorial thrust was its opposition to the Fifteenth Amendment” 
(46). See also Giddings 66 for a representative critique of the paper’s racism and its role in 
the “break-up” of the movement. 
 
7 While The Revolution would gain notoriety, at least in part, for its connection to Stanton and 
Anthony, it was certainly not the first newspaper to take on the issue of women’s rights. That 
distinction generally goes to The Lily, an eight-page periodical founded by Amelia Bloomer 
and published monthly from 1849 to 1858. The Lily was originally conceived as a forum for 
women’s opinions on temperance, but Bloomer came to realize early in her tenure as editor 
that to discuss the effects of men’s alcohol use on women’s lives necessarily broached other 
questions about women’s broader rights in society. The other major pre-Civil War periodical 
devoted to women’s issues was The Una, a sixteen-page monthly publication funded and 
edited by Paulina Wright Davis. This newspaper, which ran from 1853 to 1855, is in many 
ways more of a precursor to The Revolution, given its focus on the principles of women’s 
rights rather than the practicalities that The Lily tended to cover. Davis would later help fund 
The Revolution. See Russo and Kramarae for a more in-depth account of early women’s 
rights journalism. See also Solomon for overviews of the woman’s suffrage press. 
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Revolution editorials, in the historiography, this evidence is used as an end in itself—as an 
explanation for why the suffrage movement “split in two”—rather than as a text to be 
explicated or explored. While “the split” has dominated discussions of suffrage and feminist 
history, The Revolution has been relatively ignored.8  
In this chapter I draw from this neglected body of suffragist work to call attention to 
the specific ways that racism functioned within white suffragist rhetoric to mediate the 
subject positions of white, middle-class women during Reconstruction. The Revolution 
writings demonstrate that the racist representation of black women positioned white woman 
suffragists as victims of male privilege, on the one hand, and inheritors of white privilege, on 
the other—as both oppressed and oppressing. The figure of the black woman becomes a 
means of negotiation of the white suffragist’s contradictory identity; racially and 
economically empowered by the racist and male-dominated political system, these women 
were nonetheless subjugated by that system because of their gender. The Revolution shows 
how suffragists negotiated this web of conflicting inheritance through the appropriation of 
the black female figure, using black women’s racial and class differences to manage white 
women’s gender difference.  
My rehistoricization of white suffragist writing seeks, then, not to dispute the 
historiographical consensus about white suffragist racism, but to give a closer account of it, 
its complexities, and how it operates. Stanton, Anthony, and other U.S. suffragists without 
doubt relied on a variety of racist and racialized rhetoric as they lobbied for their cause, and 
The Revolution writings verify these forms of bigotry in a host of ways. But beyond simply 
                                                
8 The neglect of this text is certainly at least in part due to its lack of availability. While it can 
be found on microfilm at most major research libraries, the periodical has not been digitized 
in any form. 
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providing evidence of racism, this work can yield a more nuanced sense of how this racism 
functioned within the larger discursive fields in which suffragism was embedded, revealing 
how white woman suffragists constructed and deployed the figure of the black woman to 
mediate the liabilities of gender in order to legitimate their claims in a hostile and volatile 
public sphere. Tracing the complexity, multiplicity, and contradiction within white suffragist 
writing shifts the critical focus from a desire to document and lament white suffragist racism 
to the consideration of the rhetorical and political contexts in which that racism is embedded. 
Ultimately, this rehistoricization demonstrates that taking white suffragist racism as a starting 
point, rather than a conclusion, opens up unexplored critical terrain in American literary 
studies. Re-reading The Revolution allows us to read the complexity back into this historical 
moment, a process that opens up a larger textual field in which we can understand the 
political failings of historical figures and movements not only as warnings or warrants for our 
critical interventions, but also as symptoms of a political discursive arena that systematically 
produced fissures between oppressed groups by circumscribing both their rights and the 
discursive contexts in which they were engaged to win them.  
 
The Figure of the Black Woman in Feminist Historiography 
 In the previous chapter I argue that twentieth- and twenty-first century feminist 
historiography of suffrage privileges “the split” and narrates its origins in the competing 
priorities of race and gender in the face of the Fifteenth Amendment. This privileging 
produces stories that are consumed with racism and yet strangely oblique when it comes to 
understanding how racism functions in relation to gender. This, I argue, is one effect of 
deploying racism to explain “the split,” rather than as a phenomenon that warrants 
  81 
exploration as a critical object itself. There are, however, moments in this body of work that 
gesture toward this kind of complexity without actually dealing in it. Following Clare 
Hemmings, I use the term “traces” or “hauntings” to describe these moments, but one might 
just as well turn to the Marxian concept of simple abstraction to do the same sort of work. 
Michael McKeon explains this concept as a “deceptively monolithic category that encloses a 
complex historical process”—the gist is that a simplified term, or figure, or idea is made to 
stand in for a decidedly not-simple process, and is made to do so in such a way that the 
process is both contained and obscured (20). The fleeting references to black women in split-
narratives function in much the same way—they reference a figure or class that appear to 
have what McKeon calls a “givenness” without explaining the category, its history, or its 
deployment. Black women are present in many of these narratives, but they exist as figures in 
their margins, and even when these figures are directly referenced, they appear oddly blurred, 
never quite in focus, a thing to be assumed in a story rather than a figure to be explored in the 
history.9 
                                                
9 Two other narrative traces in the historiography that I think would prove especially 
promising to excavate are the repeated use of the catch-all term “other issues” to gesture 
toward emerging differences among suffragists without having to explicate them, and in a 
similar vein, the deployment of the nebulous idea of “political reality” to explain suffragist 
actions and ideologies. For instance, Aileen Kraditor uses the term “other issues” as a way to 
succinctly signal that “the split” was not only about the Fifteenth Amendment or one group’s 
racism, but never explores what they might be, instead using the phrase to move from one era 
to another: “Some of them, including Miss Anthony and Mrs. Stanton, thought it would be 
better if the amendment were defeated, while others, including Mrs. Stone, argued that if 
women could not win their political freedom, it was well that Negro men could win theirs. 
On this and other issues the suffragists found they could not agree. In 1869 two separate 
organizations came into being…The split lasted until 1890 when the two factions merged 
into the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), and a new era in 
woman suffrage history began” (3-4, emphasis added). As for “political reality,” Suzanne 
Marilley deploys the idea in ways that make one wonder who, exactly, constructs that 
“reality”—for instance, in a characteristic use of the term, she writes, “Inclusive equality as 
pictured by the Garrisonian’s liberalism of equal rights conflicted with the reality of post-
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 For instance, in her narration of the 1869 “split,” historian Aileen Kraditor focuses on 
the debate over which group ought to take precedence in the suffrage struggle. She sets this 
struggle up in such a way that it is clearly between (white) women and black men: “[m]any 
women” “declared their rights deserved priority” (167). Kraditor’s explanation for this 
demonstrates that the “women” in her formulation are by default, white; according to 
Kraditor’s narrative, these women believed they deserved the vote more than any other group 
“first, because women were half the population whereas Negroes were only a small minority 
and, second, because in their opinion, after the Civil War the Negro man was in many ways 
better off than any woman, black or white” (167-168). The modifiers in the second part of 
Kraditor’s statement mark her earlier use of “women” as reflexively white. But by the end of 
the sentence, the modifier appears, and the black woman partially emerges—even as her 
representation is erased between Kraditor’s formulation of “women” and the “Negro man,” 
the reader is reminded of her presence. The figure of the black woman appears, and not 
coincidently, in my view, as Kraditor attempts to describe women’s sense that their status 
was more vulnerable than black men’s, who were “better off” after passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Black women are represented in the narrative just as white women’s status as 
                                                
Civil War political life” (76). This construction has the effect of covering over significant 
antisuffrage influence, obscuring agents of deeply antifeminist ideologies. There are 
abundant examples of these two traces throughout the historiography of suffrage; not only do 
they offer different starting points for an analysis of how feminist historiography constructs 
the suffrage movement, but my larger point is that they demonstrate that the interpretive 
opportunities within this body of work are certainly not exhausted by my exploration of one 
of these traces. 
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victims becomes salient.10 Here, on the periphery, they are not quite visible and yet not quite 
concealed.  
 Other split stories contain similar narrative hints of the figure of the black woman 
without ever fully delineating that figure’s role in the suffrage debates. Andrea Moore Kerr 
does this by first specifying that the debate over the Fifteenth Amendment hinged on the 
“rights of two groups—in this instance, black males and white women” coming into 
“conflict” (63-64). But directly after this description of the conflict, she narrates the problem 
in a rather different way: “In the years after the war, the rights of women—black and white, 
former slaves and free—came to be counterpoised against the rights of newly emancipated 
black males and free southern black males” (63-64). In the first instance, black women are 
not left out due to the default use of “women,” as in Kraditor, but they are still expressly 
removed from the conceptual problem as Kerr tells it. In the second iteration of the debate, 
black women make it into the picture—it is their rights as well, along with the rights of white 
women, which are at stake in the fight over the Fifteenth.  
 Even when black women are not directly referenced in a split-narrative, their 
representation is hinted at in more oblique ways. When Suzanne Marilley writes that the 
racism of suffragists ultimately “divided political action that ironically undermined their own 
project of generating solidarity among women as women” (186) the reader is reminded, 
without ever being directly told, that one of the consequences of white suffragist tactics was 
to alienate black women from the cause. Even more implicitly, we might look to Ellen 
DuBois’s formulation of the pair “blacks and women” to describe the divide created by the 
                                                
10 This point will become more pertinent in the next section, where I argue that this 
representation of black women is a common technique used by suffragists in The Revolution 
to buttress white women’s claims to their own oppression.  
  84 
Fifteenth Amendment. DuBois reminds readers of black women’s salience to the suffrage 
story when she notes that their “double disfranchisement” alters the conceptual framework of 
the Fifteenth Amendment debates, a reminder that is highlighted when black women are then 
obscured when the divide is described (Feminism and Suffrage 68).11 It is “women and the 
freedmen” who are juxtaposed, over and over (68), or, alternately, it is “[b]lacks and women” 
who end up as “enemies of each other’s enfranchisement” (96). Black women are broached, 
only to recede into the background as women again become white in order to demonstrate the 
divide in the movement.  
 One might argue that none of these histories make black women central to their 
narratives, and that indeed, this lack of historical representation was one of the many 
problems addressed in “second wave” black feminist work. But even here, I wonder whether 
shifting the focus to black women as historical actors changes the impulse toward narrating 
“the split” as a matter of “priorities” and racism. For instance, Angela Davis’s Women, Race, 
and Class offers a wide-ranging examination of black women’s long-ignored roles in U.S. 
history, culture, and politics, and yet in this exploration she constructs a split-story that is 
strikingly similar to that of the historiography outlined above. In Davis’s telling of it, white 
suffragists’ criticism of the Fifteenth Amendment “exposed the tenuous and superficial 
nature of their relationship to the postwar campaign for Black equality” (76) and is the root 
of the “schism” in the Equal Rights Association (82). She cites and agrees with Frederick 
                                                
11 DuBois writes that “The most creative response of equal rights leaders to this contradiction 
in their midst was to turn their attention to black women” but then notes that this attention 
was “more rhetorical than real” (Feminism and Suffrage 68, 69). She continues: “As the 
possibilities for a joint struggle for black and woman suffrage evaporated, and as the woman 
suffrage forces became increasingly independent of abolitionism, the image of the black 
woman—for she had never been much more than an image—receded into the background” 
(71). This recognition of the rhetorical function of the figure of the black woman emphasizes 
that figure’s absence in DuBois’s construction of the divide in the movement.  
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Douglass’s argument that black men needed the vote more than women because of economic 
deprivation and continued racial violence in the postwar South, calling his case “logical and 
compelling” (79) and juxtaposing it with the rather comfortable situation of white women, 
who “could not claim that their lives were in physical jeopardy” in the same way (79). 
Ultimately, these white women “were not, like Black men and women in the South, engaged 
in an actual war for liberation” (79).  
In Davis’s narrative, “the split” is again a matter of white feminist racism that puts an 
end to the “potentially powerful” alliance between the abolitionist and women’s rights 
movements (84). And again, as in the other histories, it is Douglass who represents black 
interests against this racism. Here the narrative shifts, however, and Davis’s reminder that it 
is black men and black women who are still fighting for their freedom, still the victims of 
horrific violence, stands in contrast to Douglass’s larger argument for the enfranchisement of 
black men alone. Black men are tacitly shifted into the position where black people have 
been described. While Davis presents Douglass’s claims approvingly, the rhetoric used to 
support these claims covers over this shift. As in the examples above, black women are only 
hinted at in this narrative, despite the fact that much of the larger work of which it is a part 
expressly takes black women as its focus. It would seem that “the split” does not yield itself 
to an exploration of this figure, and yet, it cannot seem to be told without her completely. 
 Other black feminist historiographies of the suffrage era note this absence of black 
women in the history. Rosalyn Terborg-Penn points out that while the topic of Black men 
tends to dominate the discussion of the suffrage “split,” “the literature on the schism rarely 
refers to African American women, and when it does they are mentioned in passing” (African 
American Women 27). Terborg-Penn’s African American Women in the Struggle for the Vote, 
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1850-1920 (1998) aims to address this absence, but as the quote above indicates, the closer 
consideration of black women does not preclude the construction of the historical moment as 
one of “schisms,” “splits” and divided priorities. Not only does the “split” still play an 
important role in the figuring of the history, but the event is still narrated in terms of the same 
white suffragist racism that we see in the historiography that ignores black women all 
together. She writes that the “split” “divided the universal suffrage movement into two 
camps, those who felt that Black men needed the vote even more than women, and those who 
were unwilling to postpone woman suffrage for the sake of Black males” (8). This 
unwillingness, according to Terborg-Penn, is a result of “pitt[ing] Black men against women 
in a racist way” and as a result, black women “were often torn between identifying with 
racial priorities or with gender priorities” (27). While Terborg-Penn gives close attention to 
the reactions of black women activists such as Sojourner Truth and Frances Ellen Watkins 
Harper in explicating this dilemma of competing priorities, the “split” remains a surprisingly 
stable construction that is once again explained by white suffragist racism.12  
 Indeed, it appears that a sustained focus on black women can provide a stronger 
warrant for the consolidation of the historical moment; black woman suffragists’ perspectives 
can be employed to, among other things, foster affective reactions and historical judgment 
toward the “split” and the figures who precipitate it. For instance, Paula Giddings’s When 
and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black women on Race and Sex in America (1984) 
constructs the suffrage “split” in the familiar way: “As both the race and feminist issues 
intensified in the 1840’s and 1850’s, it was inevitable that Black and White women 
                                                
12 I take up the representation of this “choice” between race and gender for black woman 
suffragists at greater length in the next chapter. For now, however, it is enough to point out 
that even when black women are represented in split-narratives, their activism and ideas are 
not allowed to refigure the historical moment, but instead, are subordinated to  “the split.”  
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abolitionists would come to a parting of the ways. The parting was due not only to White 
racism, but also to the primacy of race or sex as issues in their respective struggles” (55). In 
discussing black women who supported the Fifteenth Amendment and the AWSA “side” of 
the “split,” Giddings deploys the position of these women as a way to buttress the 
commonsense judgment of the event. Writing of Frances Ellen Watkins Harper and her 
expression of support for enfranchising black men ahead of women, Giddings makes it clear 
that black women knew which “side” was ultimately right: “Harper and others understood 
that the rights of Black men had to be secured before Black women could assert theirs. If the 
race had no rights, the women’s struggle was meaningless” (68). This statement of plain 
fact—in Giddings formulation, it was obvious to black women that race must come before 
gender—lends the interpretation of the “split” rhetorical influence; black women, who were 
uniquely positioned at the nexus of the “choice” between race and gender, chose race, and 
readers are encouraged to understand the “split” in the same terms. My point is that even 
when black women are made central to a narrative of this suffrage era, their historiographical 
presence is often employed in ways that solidify the familiar construction of the “split.”13  
 Reading the historiography of the suffrage “split” for the ways it alternately 
represents, obscures, and deploys the figure of the black woman is related to, but distinct 
                                                
13 There are, of course, examples of black feminist historiography that seek to uncover black 
women’s political activism in ways that are not connected to the national suffrage movement 
on which the history often focuses. For instance, Elsa Barkley Brown’s “To Catch the Vision 
of Freedom: Reconstructing Black Women’s Political History, 1865-1880”  (1997) traces 
black women’s postwar political activities without a single reference to the suffrage “split,” 
instead considering how black women engaged in activities that were not traditionally 
considered “political” and yet were experienced as political nonetheless. In the process 
Brown asks us to reconsider how politics might look different in black female communities. 
In a different vein, Janice Sumler-Edmond (1997) explores a similar timeframe by analyzing 
black women’s experiences in the court systems through postwar case law. As in Brown’s 
essay, Sumler-Edmond manages to never reference the suffrage “split” even as her study 
covers the infamous year of 1869.  
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from reading this body of work for the inclusion (or exclusion) of black women as historical 
actors. Although the revision of the feminist historical record to include black women’s 
histories has been a scholarly and political project of enormous value, my interest in this case 
is in the way the figure of the black woman emerges as a textual representation within 
narratives of the “split.” It would seem that whether this figure is mostly elided or centrally 
positioned, these histories reliably produce a story of the divide that is committed to an 
interpretation of white suffragist racism as its governing explanation. In their incessant focus 
on explaining how the movement was divided, these histories home in on the Fifteenth 
Amendment debates as an interpretive ground zero, and in doing so, tend to obscure the 
figure of the black woman or alternately deploy this figure as a means of underwriting an 
explication of the “split.” My point in finding the figure of the black women in these 
histories—a task that is easier to do in some than in others—is to draw attention to the sheer 
narrative staying power of the “split,” its intractability. Exploring the deployment of this 
figure without an overriding focus on the “split” can help develop a more specific explication 
of the white suffragist racism that split stories rely on but never elucidate. 
 
The Lost Revolution 
The Revolution has been all but ignored as a text in itself, despite the fame of its 
founders.14 When the text is cited, it is most often in connection with Stanton’s criticism of 
the Fifteenth Amendment and her anger over women’s exclusion from Reconstruction-era 
                                                
14 There is very little literary criticism on The Revolution, or for that matter, suffragist writing 
more generally. Studies that employ the newspaper as evidence for white suffragist racism 
exist primarily in the areas of history, historiography of feminism, and biography; see note 3. 
Studies that take The Revolution as a central object of study are confined to a handful of 
edited volumes and essays in Communication Studies; see Solomon for a single essay on The 
Revolution, and Rakow and Kramarae for an edited selection of Revolution articles.  
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constitutional revision. Through this focus, the newspaper has gained notoriety primarily as 
evidence for Stanton’s racism, rather than as a text worth exploring in its own right. 
Scholarship often skips the original Revolution text all together, in favor of citing from 
anthologies or Stanton and Anthony’s History of Woman Suffrage, which compiled many of 
the periodical’s editorials. To take a representative example: as she sets up her history of 
white suffragist racism, historian Louise Michele Newman employs an infamous Stanton 
quote to undergird her narrative: “‘Think of Patrick and Sambo and Hans Yung Tung,’ 
Stanton proclaimed in 1869, ‘who do not know the difference between a monarchy and a 
republic, who can not read the Declaration of Independence or Webster’s spelling-book, 
making laws for Lucretia Mott, Ernestine L. Rose, and Anna E Dickinson’” (qtd. in Newman 
5). Newman takes this passage from Mari Jo Buhle and Paul Buhle’s The Concise History of 
Woman Suffrage (1978) but the original text of the quotation was published on the editorial 
page of The Revolution on December 24, 1868, in an article entitled “Manhood Suffrage.”15  
Indeed, “Manhood Suffrage” is the original source of some of the most frequently 
cited passages in critical work on Stanton and U.S. suffrage, but the original text is often 
ignored; historian Sue Davis cites this piece in her analysis of Stanton’s racism, but again, 
her footnote leads to an anthology of Stanton’s papers edited by Ann Gordon (The Political 
Thought of Elizabeth Cady Stanton 147).16 Similarly, Paula Giddings quotes from Revolution 
articles but the footnote leads not to the original text, but to the work of Terborg-Penn 
(Giddings 66). My point is not that this form of citation is somehow faulty; it is that this 
common and useful way of citing historical sources carries with it certain consequences. In 
                                                
15 See Buhle and Buhle, eds, 254. 
 
16 See Gordon, The Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, vol. 2, 196. 
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the case of The Revolution, those consequences amount to the canonization of a source that is 
simultaneously lost; the reiteration of anthologized material produces the impression that we 
“know” this text even as it reduces that text to a few notorious lines. 
Even when work does cite directly from The Revolution, extracts are most often 
deployed as evidence of racism within white suffragism, rather than as significant parts of a 
larger object of analysis that warrants examination. In a typical instance, one scholar cites a 
series of derogatory statements about black men directly from The Revolution to demonstrate 
the increasingly vitriolic form of racism Stanton and her supporters espoused; when the 
newspaper “stepped up its anti-black rhetoric, making references to the ‘barbarism,’ ‘brute 
force,’ and ‘tyranny’ of black men,” the rift between Stanton and her abolitionist allies grew 
(Kerr 70). Likewise, when historian Eleanor Flexner explains the widening divide between 
white suffrage leaders, she employs quotations from The Revolution to explain the “split” in 
the movement: “Mrs. Stanton made derogatory references to ‘Sambo,’ and the 
enfranchisement of ‘Africans, Chinese, and all the ignorant foreigners the moment they touch 
our shores’” (144). Stanton biographer Lori Ginzberg employs a similar tactic, pulling 
directly from The Revolution to accumulate evidence for the “Reconstruction-era schism” 
between suffragists who supported the Fifteenth Amendment and those, like Stanton, who 
opposed it (130). In each of these cases, the text provides evidence for a growing “split” 
within the suffrage movement over the Fifteenth Amendment and Stanton’s racist opposition 
to it. The Revolution is reduced to a method for explaining an event in the movement, a use 
that covers over the text’s illumination of the shifting discursive relationship between racism, 
race, and gender and the circumscription of that relationship in the public sphere.  
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The Revolution is thus simultaneously overexposed and relatively unknown, a 
combination that neatly mirrors white suffragist racism more generally.17 While at its height 
The Revolution never gained more than 3,000 subscribers (although its actual circulation is 
assumed to be much larger than that, as it was loaned, borrowed, clipped, and disseminated 
in a host of other ways through communities of women across the U.S.), this periodical 
provides a prime venue for reading the racism that has become so ubiquitous to our 
understandings of white suffragism.18 While the historiography of suffrage pins Stanton and 
Anthony’s reaction to the Fifteenth Amendment to a narrative of increasing, and increasingly 
vitriolic, racism and its large and lasting effects for U.S. feminism, this racism is not taken as 
an object of study, never explicated with any specificity, and instead functions as an 
originary moment of trouble for the future of feminism. Drawing attention to the Fifteenth 
Amendment writings in The Revolution can help historicize the object of racism that has 
gone under-analyzed in split-narratives. In tracing these pieces across its two years of 
                                                
17 While my focus here is on a single topic across one periodical, it would be productive to 
undertake similar studies of other newspapers of the era. In particular, the Woman’s Journal, 
founded by Lucy Stone and Henry Blackwell in 1870 and a direct competitor of The 
Revolution, would be an important text with which to continue the rehistoricization of white 
suffragist racism. Like Stanton, Stone’s work is often compressed down to her stance on the 
Fifteenth Amendment (she strongly supported it) and her role in the “split” of the movement; 
see Flexner 145 and Scott, Natural Allies 135 for representative examples. An analysis of 
Stone’s periodical could provide welcome context to this common reading of Stone and her 
representation as the head of the “non-racist” suffrage wing. My hope is that the current 
analysis demonstrates the interpretive possibilities that suffragism more generally—its 
associated print culture, oratory, and activism—offers for scholars of U.S. literature and 
culture. 
 
18 Nineteenth-century newspapers played an important role in creating links between 
disparate groups of women across geography and class, and likewise, those connections 
provided routes for the dissemination of these publications’ ideas. This symbiotic 
relationship helped strengthen the nascent woman’s rights movement; see Jerry 27 and 
Rakow and Kramarae 4-9 for analyses of the circulation of newspapers among women in the 
nineteenth century. 
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publication, what emerges from this feminist periodical is an evolving response to a similarly 
changing political landscape—what the historiography makes static and rigid, The Revolution 
shows to be dynamic and flexible.19 The arguments white suffragists employed shift in 
accordance with the shifting politics of the era, and while they never shift out of a racist 
mode, I think we can be more specific about how this racism functions. Suffragist opposition 
to the Fifteenth Amendment becomes not simply increasingly racist but a lens for analyzing 
the operations between race and gender and their embeddedness within the era’s politics. In 
particular, white suffragists deploy the black woman as a representational figure to perform a 
number of rhetorical and strategic functions in negotiating their ambivalent positions in 
relation to the racist and patriarchal postwar political system.  
  
                                                
19 Tracing a particular idea or set of responses across a wide span of issues of this periodical 
is one of at least two possible methodologies for this sort of project. I choose this method in 
this chapter because it can yield an alternate way to think about white suffragist opposition to 
black male enfranchisement, an opposition that I note above is constantly changing and more 
unstable than split-narratives recognize. The other method, however, would be to do a close 
reading of a single issue in which a response to the Fifteenth Amendment is only a part. This 
kind of synchronic approach, while unable to produce a long-view evolution of suffragist 
rhetoric, could produce something else quite valuable: a sense of how suffragist debates were 
in dialogue with multiple other debates, political topics, and cultural texts, all at the same 
time. This technique, one that takes into consideration the whole periodical, from masthead 
to back-page advertisements, would interpret what Jean Marie Lutes has recently termed a 
“daunting miscellany within the object itself” that “frustrates attempts to synthesize its 
content, while its unmistakable contingency demands more attention than we are usually 
willing to pay to the nuances of specific social and political environments” (339). Similarly, 
in their recent survey of the field of periodical studies, Latham and Scholes celebrate the 
“fascinating intertextual connections” within single issues of periodicals, noting that 
“Magazines and newspapers, in particular, create often surprising and even bewildering 
points of contact between disparate areas of human activity” (528). While I do not use it here, 
this methodology strikes me as a particularly promising way to think about the suffrage 
debates in 1869, one certainly worth pursuing. The juxtaposition of disparate subject matter, 
genres, and authors allows for a consideration of the radical embeddedness of the Fifteenth 
Amendment debate within a larger field of current events, political tactics, and feminist 
issues. See Lutes and Latham and Scholes for overviews of the field of periodical studies and 
its place at the nexus of literary criticism, journalism, and cultural studies.  
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Managing Multiplicity 
The debate over the Fifteenth Amendment begins to appear in the pages of The 
Revolution in the middle of 1868; as Congress was lobbied to pass the amendment, Stanton 
and Anthony went on record opposing it. One of the first traces of this opposition comes in a 
response to a reader’s letter to the editor in the April 9 issue of the newspaper. The letter-
writer, Jane Elizabeth Jones, a prominent activist in the temperance, abolitionist, and 
woman’s rights movements, takes Stanton, Anthony, and The Revolution to task for not 
supporting black male enfranchisement. While Jones expresses respect for the women and 
their journalistic enterprise, she is concerned that they have lost their way, their commitment 
to equal rights: “But what means this new system of ethics of Mrs. Stanton—protesting 
against the enfranchisement of another man, black or white, until woman is enfranchised? I 
have not thus learned reform. I have not thus learned christianity. If I am a slave, heaven 
forbid that I should desire any other being in the universe to share my degradation” (Stanton, 
“Sharp Points” 212). Jones makes clear that opposition to the Fifteenth Amendment goes 
against the tenets of both abolitionism and Christianity, and more, that the oppressed should 
naturally want to see others free, even if they themselves are not. Her letter suggests that if 
women fear that black men will use the vote to keep women in subjection, then they must 
“trust in the progressive and regenerating spirit that emancipated them” and have “faith in 
those eternal principles of justice” to eventually grant women the ballot as well (212). 
Ultimately, Jones’s letter represents an appeal to the universal rights platform that Stanton 
and Anthony had advocated for years. She expresses dismay that the former-abolitionists 
seem to be turning away from “principle”: “if it be an effort to establish a just government, 
do not let us violate its fundamental law by demanding the continuance of bondage for any 
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one subject, or any class of subjects, until another class can be enfranchised. This is to me 
absurd” (212).  
 Stanton’s reply to this letter provides an excellent entry into an analysis of white 
suffragist racism and its rhetorical functions. In her response, she draws on a number of 
rationales for enfranchising women along with black men. First, she suggests that it is in “the 
best interests of the race” for women to be granted the vote, since this will “restore” the 
“equilibrium of sex” in the realm of politics (212).20 Indeed, Stanton writes that women’s 
enfranchisement would “do more to hasten the onward march of civilization” than any other 
reform, whether it be the spread of religion, temperance, or granting black men voting rights 
(212). Stanton’s discourse of civilization, which runs throughout the response, is rooted in 
the rhetoric of women’s cultural and spiritual superiority to men: according to Stanton, “the 
men at the helm, lacking the spiritual intuitions of women by their side, are steering without 
chart or compass” and therefore women’s voice is desperately needed to right the course.21 
Women’s different, and in Stanton’s view, better, perspective is vital for the “nation’s life” 
(212).  
 Stanton combines this discursive thread with a second: the representation of black 
women as the ultimate victims of the Fifteenth Amendment. She argues that “as an 
                                                
20 It appears that in this instance Stanton is referring to “the human race” rather than “the 
white race,” although her category of “the human” certainly universalizes whiteness.  
 
21 The discourse of civilization, as Gail Bederman argues in Manliness and Civilization: A 
Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917 (1995), was a potent 
tool for a number of conflicting ideologies. Bederman traces its use across the work of four 
turn-of-the-century figures—Ida B. Well, G. Stanley Hall, Charlotte Perkins Gilman and 
Theodore Roosevelt—to demonstrate the ways that male dominance was tied to racial 
dominance. Adding Stanton to this list of figures would certainly enrich any consideration of 
the deployment of “civilizing” tropes for political and ideological purposes. See Newman, 
Chapter 2, for an exploration of suffragist rhetoric that examines the trope of “civilization.”  
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abolitionist we protested against the enfranchisement of the black man alone, seeing that the 
bondage of the women of that race, by the laws of the south, would be more helpless than 
before” (212). Taking on the mantle of abolitionism, Stanton reminds readers that adherents 
to the anti-slavery cause should be wary of any political solution that excludes black women. 
“What to her the loosing of the white man’s chains, if the ignorant laborer by her side, who 
has learned no law but violence, her equal to-day, is henceforth to become her master? To us 
the black women of the south are as precious in the scale of being as the men” (212). 
Stanton’s implication of black male violence is repeatedly cited in the historiography of 
suffrage as evidence of her racism, but here the text allows us to be more specific, to read 
Stanton’s racism as inextricably bound up with misogynistic public discourse; in this 
instance, she deploys the image of the violent, “ignorant” black man to intervene in the 
rhetoric of male protection that antisuffragists espouse.22 Stanton suggests that if anyone 
should be ashamed of their stance on the Fifteenth Amendment, it is abolitionists, who seem 
to have forgotten that if black men need the vote for protection, then black women must need 
it as well. 
 This argument leads Stanton to delineate the sufferings of black women, who 
experience a “degradation man can never know”:  
The strongest appeals made by abolitionists in the past against slavery have 
been on woman’s wrongs, and now, when the day of emancipation comes, 
shall man enter into all the rights, privileges and immunities of citizenship 
while the woman by his side is left without that scepter of power, the ballot, 
for her protection? Wendell Phillips says that emancipation is mockery to the 
black man without the ballot? Have not the women of this nation suffered 
                                                
22 I use the terms “antisuffragist” and “antisuffrage” to denote the political figures who 
opposed women’s enfranchisement and the ideology deployed with this aim (rather than, say, 
those figures and ideologies that opposed black suffrage). This is in keeping with the 
historical use of the term. Those who opposed women’s suffrage were often simply referred 
to as “Antis.” 
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enough from man’s unjust legislation, to know that such emancipation as he 
offers the black woman is a mockery also? Those slaves have worked and 
suffered side by side, shared each other’s sorrows, fears, and anxieties through 
centuries of heathenism and bondage; and now shall abolitionists consent that 
another race of men shall find their liberties over this fresh holocaust of 
womanhood? (212)   
 
Stanton represents the black woman as a rebuke against abolitionists who claim they are 
serving the best interests of the former-slaves by enfranchising black men. White women, 
like the author herself, are invisible in this argument, replaced by the abject figure of the 
black woman, who, after suffering the horrors of slavery, must surely deserve, and 
desperately need, the franchise as much as black men. This substitution, black women for 
white, becomes an important tool with which to critique abolitionist support for the Fifteenth 
Amendment; Stanton suggests that abolitionists attack her now because she sees “their 
vulnerable points”—the hypocrisy in arguing for individual and natural rights during the anti-
slavery movement when now, by arguing for black male suffrage alone, “they compromise 
the best interests of the race they would serve, throw over board one-half ‘their clients,’ 
stultify their past declarations, and prove false to their education and high calling, as the 
statesmen of the hour” (212). By drawing on the image of the vulnerable black woman, 
Stanton beats back the letter writer’s criticism that she has betrayed her equal rights roots, 
and instead, pins that accusation squarely on the abolitionists themselves.  
 This discursive deployment of black women leads directly into a third thread of 
Stanton’s argument: her insistence that she is, in fact, arguing an equal rights platform, in that 
she wants women and black men enfranchised at the same time. She exhorts readers to 
remember that “[t]his is not with us a question of personality as between the individual black 
man and Saxon woman, but a principle of government” and that the question of “who goes 
first” is unnecessary, a Republican distraction: “If people were enfranchised by car-loads at 
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the Capitol of the nation, it might be a question who should go first, but suffrage for all in 
this hour of reconstruction could be more easily and logically secured than for a new class” 
(212). In this formulation, the black woman reverts to the white woman again, and after this 
rhetorical substitution is made, universal suffrage is once again urged: “Our demand has long 
been suffrage for all, white and black, male and female, of legal age and sound mind” (212).  
 In the course of her response, however, Stanton drifts away from this equal rights 
assurance to address the letter’s idea that a slave ought to rejoice at seeing anyone freed—
Stanton disagrees, but not without first shifting white women into the position of the slave: 
“We believe that woman’s first duty is to herself and God, then man. If you are a slave, it is 
your first business to break the yoke that galls your own neck; you are to accept slavery or 
degradation at no price, from no mistake notions of white men’s rights or black men’s 
wrongs” (212). Stanton again makes a substitution, this time with white women taking the 
place of black female slaves, in order to argue that the oppressed should necessarily be 
selfish and fight for one’s own rights. The substitution is fused to Stanton’s insistence that if 
it is a matter of “who goes first”—and she insists it is not—then women ought to take 
precedence: “The most pitiful spectacle this country presents, is that of educated American 
women consenting, in this hour of our country’s danger, to this incoming tide of ignorance, 
poverty and vice, from every quarter of the globe, to legislate for them at the polls, without 
demanding that it be outweighed with the wealth, virtue and intelligence of their own sex” 
(212). Of course, Stanton now means “white women” when she writes women—the figure of 
the black woman she utilizes above disappears, to be replaced with the racialized language of 
education, class, and purity. 
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This exchange, one of the first instances of Fifteenth Amendment debate within the 
pages of The Revolution, demonstrates the wide assortment of arguments deployed against 
the amendment and the context within which those arguments are made. Stanton moves 
between the ideas of women’s difference and superiority, black women’s victimization, equal 
rights philosophy, and racist educated suffrage rhetoric with curious ease; in her attempt to 
address her interlocutor’s arguments, she does not limit herself to one rhetorical thread or 
technique and instead employs a host of them. Stanton juggles arguments, not as a catchall 
technique or measure of desperation, but in response to a specific letter-writer, and more 
widely, past critics, and more widely still, readers and politicians who she wants to influence 
with her ideas. What seems vertiginous, then, can be read as a supple single response to 
multiple contingencies in an intersecting network of public discourse.  
This tactic makes for disorienting reading, to be sure, but I am struck by the 
multiplicity of Stanton’s rhetoric—the sheer breadth and restlessness of her response calls for 
an accounting of the way her racist rhetoric operates, which is exactly what we do not get 
when scholarship uses this racism as a method for explaining tensions within the movement 
or its subsequent disappointments and failures. When suffrage histories rely on racism as 
their interpretive warrant, they wind up unable to read the very object that they put at the 
center of their accounts. Unpacking this racism, on the other hand, offers a more specific 
understanding of the white suffragist position and the way it is managed through the 
exploitation of racial difference.  
 This multiplicity of Stanton’s reasoning, the management of varied arguments and 
rhetorical threads, is facilitated by the figure of the black woman. Stanton is able to move 
from one line of argument to the next by shifting the suffrage subject from white woman to 
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black woman and then back again. When a universal category of “woman” is needed to shore 
up the claim of female cultural superiority, the suffrage subject is implicitly white; when the 
argument turns to abolitionist hypocrisy, however, that subject must now be black in order to 
rail against the charge of racism, of forgetting her equal rights roots. When the argument 
turns to the need for the protection of the vote, the black female figure does nicely—her 
wrongs delineated, her abjection decried, her victimization is without question. Once 
established, this figure’s victimization is transferred to the white female subject through the 
likening of women’s subjugation to slavery in order to argue the universal suffrage position, 
and, by the conclusion of the piece, the figure of the black woman is again invisible, replaced 
by the signifiers of whiteness in a call for educated suffrage. The representation of the black 
woman manages the multiplicity of this response; she is a cipher that allows Stanton to shift 
back and forth between varied and conflicting ideas and arguments.   
 
Shifting Suffrage Subjects 
This technique turns out not to be isolated to this single response, but is employed, in 
various ways, throughout the Fifteenth Amendment debate in The Revolution.  For instance, 
another letter-to-the-editor published on June 18, 1868, suggests that The Revolution’s 
association with George Francis Train, the racist eccentric Democrat and advocate for 
woman suffrage who originally financed the paper, called into question the editors’ 
commitment to an equal rights platform. In their response, the editors move directly from 
defending the financing of their paper to a critique of the Fifteenth Amendment that hinges 
on their unwillingness to “forget” black women; they ask, “Is it not perfectly consistent with 
the record of the editors of “The Revolution” to remember the two million black women in 
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the land of bondage, when abolitionists threw them overboard?” (“What the People Say” 
374)  
The accusation of racism by association is immediately deflected through the 
representation of black women and their “betrayal” by abolitionists. Not only were black 
women “forgotten,” but the editors imply that they were the reason that “the word ‘male’ was 
introduced” into the Constitution in the Fourteenth Amendment in the first place—an action 
performed “expressly to avoid the calamity of enfranchising all the black women of the 
south” (374). Unlike abolitionists now calling for women to wait their turn, the editors claim 
their “love to humanity” is not “circumscribed to black men” (374) but instead is borne of a 
love for all people:  
We have demanded his rights, not because he was a man or black, but because 
he belonged to the human family; and the same love of the race impels us to-
day to demand the same rights for the woman by his side, for the multitudes of 
young girls in all our cities asking for work and wages, and widows and 
orphans struggling for a foothold in this whirlpool of vice and corruption with 
no strong arm to shelter or protect. (374)  
 
Here again the figure of the black woman provides rhetorical cover for an equal rights 
argument. The black man is linked to the black woman, who is then linked to working class 
women of the North, and then linked further to an abject class of widows and orphans who 
desperately need the protection the vote could give them. Conspicuously missing from this 
lineage are middle and upper-class white women such as Stanton herself. Ignoring this 
constituency, the editors instead choose to highlight their magnanimity against abolitionists’ 
narrowness, who they call “so sectarian” that they can only recognize “that small fraction of 
humanity, the ‘black man’” and choose to “ostracize” anyone who seeks to widen the sphere 
of the “human family” (374).  
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In this formulation, the figure of the black woman becomes a symbol for both failed 
abolitionism and principled feminism—the representation enables the authors to defend 
themselves against charges of political compromise (in the form of taking money from Train 
for The Revolution) and shift those charges onto antisuffragists instead. It is the suffragists 
who oppose the Fifteenth Amendment who are, in actuality, remaining true to the spirit of 
abolitionism in their unwillingness to “forget” the black woman. On the other hand, it is this 
representation of the black woman that simultaneously forms the base of a wronged class—a 
class that sufficiently embodies the kind of vulnerability and victimization that elite white 
women lacked—and thus could more convincingly argue for suffrage rights. It is the figure 
of the black woman, the “woman by his side,” who links white working class women’s need 
for the vote to black men’s need of it—a need that was widely agreed upon, repeatedly 
emphasized, and considered beyond question by abolitionists in their campaign for the 
Fifteenth Amendment. In representing black women as the bridge between black men and 
white working class women, the authors are able to solidify their own beneficence while at 
the same time constructing the basis for their own enfranchisement—the figure of the 
middle-class white woman disappears here, but her interests are well-represented through the 
deployment of the black woman as a mediator between a universal rights paradigm and one 
based on the needs of an injured class.  
 Employing black women as a transferable symbol of victimhood develops into a 
highly portable strategy, one that is used repeatedly in the columns of The Revolution to beat 
back antisuffragist criticism and argue for the recognition of white women’s rights. In 
Stanton’s lead column in the Dec. 3, 1868 issue, she critiques Massachusetts Senator Henry 
Wilson’s speeches at the November Woman Suffrage Convention in Boston by homing in on 
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the concept of a “negro’s hour”: the need for women to wait until the black man is safe 
before pressing her cause. She points out that while Wilson believes in woman’s suffrage, 
“he thinks it is not the time to make the demand,” a tactic Stanton lambasts as “one of the old 
arguments used by politicians from the beginning” to avoid doing what is right (“Hon. Henry 
Wilson” 338). Stanton reminds readers that the term “negro’s hour” only stands for black 
men: “Women must wait until the calling and election of the negro are first made sure! The 
negro man! we should have said, for the negro woman, who drank the deepest, bitterest dregs 
of American slavery, is to have no hope or life in this first resurrection, for republicans and 
abolitionists alike tell us that emancipation without the ballot is mockery” (338, emphasis in 
original). Stanton puts herself in the position of the “savior” of black women, both 
rhetorically and materially—if the concept of the “negro’s hour” erases black women and 
their experience in slavery, then by pointing out the false universal, Stanton makes black 
women visible again. Representing black women, in this instance, is both a technique with 
which to bludgeon the political opposition, and a method of building up the author’s 
character and credibility. Rendering black women visible becomes a concise way to point out 
abolitionist hypocrisy and its juxtaposition with suffragists’ steadfast loyalty to this group.  
Black women are made visible, however, in a very specific way: as the supreme 
victims of the atrocities of slavery. The image of the suffering black woman becomes one of 
the most powerful tools with which to argue against the Fifteenth Amendment. They are the 
ones who “drank the bitterest dregs” of slavery, a formulation repeated time and again in The 
Revolution.23 Indeed, the degradation of black women proves eminently useful in attacking 
                                                
23 Examples of this rhetoric abound in the pages of The Revolution, some of which I will 
analyze in more detail below. But pointing to additional instances of this depiction can 
perhaps help illustrate the frequency and vehemence with which the figure of the black 
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black male enfranchisement. In an editorial responding to abolitionist Gerrit Smith’s refusal 
to sign an equal suffrage petition, the authors argue that “[e]very argument for the negro is an 
argument for woman and no logician can escape it” but they cement this point by again 
shifting from the general term “woman” to the degraded figure of the black woman:  
[Smith] would undoubtedly plead the necessity of the ballot for the negro at 
the south for his protection, and point us to innumerable acts of cruelty he 
suffers to-day. But all these things fall as heavily on the women of the black 
race, yea far more so, for no man can ever know the deep, the damning 
degradation to which woman is subject in her youth, helplessness and poverty. 
(“Gerrit Smith on Petitions” 24)  
 
Again, black women are deployed as the ultimate victims of slavery. They have not only 
suffered, but suffered more than black men, in particular gendered ways so horrific that men 
cannot even comprehend them.24 But by the end of the passage, the author is back to 
                                                
woman is called upon: for instance, in an editorial entitled, “The Fifteenth Amendment,” 
Parker Pillsbury writes that black women are “the more wretched and helpless” of all 
disenfranchised people, and describes this figure as the “most helpless, abject, miserable 
being of human kind” (408). Similarly, in a reprint of suffragist Phoebe Couzins’s speech to 
the NWSA, black women are constructed as the exemplar class of victims who “are, and 
always have been, in a far worse condition than that of the men,” “subjected to greater 
brutalities, while compelled to perform exactly the same labor as men, toiling by their side in 
the fields, just as hard burdens imposed upon them, just as severe punishments decreed to 
them, with the added cares of maternity and household work; their children taken from them 
and sold into bondage, and no man can measure the depths of a mother’s love; suffering a 
thousand fold more than any man could suffer, because no man can realize the depth of 
humiliation to which a woman can be thrust” (Couzins 12, emphasis in original). These 
examples are representative of a host of other similar descriptions of black female abjection 
in The Revolution. 
 
24 These repeated references to the “bitterest dregs” and “damning degradation” of black 
women are almost certainly referring to the rape of black women by white masters under 
slavery. While articles in The Revolution rarely invoke the term “rape,” they point to it in 
multiple ways, often as they critique arguments about miscegenation. For instance, in an 
editorial by Parker Pillsbury in the Aug. 6, 1868 issue, the author critiques those who feign 
horror at miscegenation when the real horror lies in the crimes committed against black 
women by white men; the “co-mingling” of the races is the result of “that horrible havoc of 
colored female virtue by white men (or monsters) which has been perpetrated for almost a 
hundred years!” (“More Unsatisfied” 72). Likewise, in a brief article on the reaction to an 
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referring to a more general class of women—the young, the abandoned, the poor. The shift is 
slight and rather ambiguous—after all, Stanton began the sentence referring to the “women 
of the black race” and could be referring to young, vulnerable, and impoverished former 
black female slaves by the sentence’s conclusion—but it is the ambiguity and slipperiness of 
the rhetoric that make it effective for Stanton’s ends. The shift from black women to non-
black women is almost imperceptible, but ultimately lends legitimacy to the call for all 
women to be enfranchised—the victimhood of black women is transformed to stand in for 
the victimization of all women.  
 
Suffrage and Selfishness 
 But again, the white, female, middle-class subject, the one often penning these 
editorials, is markedly absent in these formulations. She is not the young, abandoned, or poor 
woman referred to in the above passage. Where exactly, then, is she? And why is she made 
invisible in these arguments? As The Revolution continues its fight against the Fifteenth 
Amendment, the reasons for this subject-shifting become more clear: the figure of the black 
woman allows white suffragists to toggle between the requirements and opportunities 
presented by nineteenth-century domestic discourse and its attendant charges of female 
selfishness.25 In her “Editorial Correspondence” on Jan. 28, 1869, Stanton refers to the 
                                                
Arkansas law that enforces equal rights in public places for blacks and whites, the authors 
mock the “crying out on every hand, ‘here we have the first step towards miscegenation’” by 
retorting: “Slavery survived until, through some cause or other, very few purely black skins 
were found in the south. Had the white people anything to do with that horrible and 
wholesale ‘miscegenation’? Answer, who dare!” (“Equalizing the Races” 17) 
 
25 Indeed, suffragist writing would be a promising ground for the investigation of the varied 
discursive deployments of domesticity. Like my discussion of The Revolution, much of the 
scholarly work on domesticity attempts to unpack its discursive effects in ways that do not 
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dilemma; in a moment of conciliation, she notes that it has been difficult for her to witness 
the “antagonism with men whom we respect, whose wrongs we pity, and whose hopes we 
would fain help them to realize” (49). She then acknowledges that it might not look 
particularly magnanimous for elite white women to argue against the Amendment: “When 
we contrast the condition of the most fortunate women at the North with the living death 
colored men endure everywhere, there seems to be a selfishness in our present position” (49).  
Stanton then shifts, however, to argue that in fact, what “seems” to be “selfishness” is 
actually an act of selflessness—white women are fighting for black women, not merely 
themselves: “But remember we speak not for ourselves alone, but for all womankind, in 
poverty, ignorance and hopeless dependence, for the women of this oppressed race too, who, 
in slavery, have known a depth of misery and degradation that no man can ever appreciate” 
(49). The linkage is reversed in this instance—the middle-class white woman is connected 
through “all womankind” first to poor women and then black women—but the technique 
produces the same subject-shift to answer antisuffrage criticism. Stanton becomes the 
benevolent ventriloquist, speaking for those whom she claims cannot speak for themselves, 
for those who are too poor, too dependent, too oppressed to fight for their own rights. Rather 
than argue an equal rights platform—that is, that suffrage should be granted to all as a 
universal and unalienable right (an argument often utilized in The Revolution, by Stanton and 
others), here Stanton attempts an alternate strategy in which she positions herself as the black 
                                                
simply ascribe to it complete liberation, on the one hand, or total subjugation, on the other. 
Domesticity instead “necessitates a method of analysis responsive to privileges that do not 
amount to dominance and disenfranchisements that do not constitute powerlessness” 
(Romero 10); this seems to me to parallel the current project in that my point is to show how 
white suffragists negotiated the contradictions of their own privileges and 
disenfranchisements. For discussions of domesticity, see Kelley, Romero, Tonkovich, and 
Sutton-Ramspeck. 
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woman’s protector while the black woman simultaneously becomes white women’s 
protection against antisuffrage critique.26  
 In “A Pronunciamento” on July 15, 1869, Stanton even more directly addresses this 
charge of “selfishness” and pinpoints the hypocrisy of abolitionists who level it. She quotes 
Wendell Phillips at length to demonstrate the opposition’s argument: he writes that he is “not 
much surprise[d]” by woman’s rights activists’ opposition to the Fifteenth Amendment, but 
that “[i]t is sad indeed” (qtd. in “A Pronunciamento,” 24). Sad, in Phillips’s view, because of 
the self-serving nature of the woman suffrage movement, which he deems “essentially a 
selfish one” in comparison to the “disinterested” spirit of abolitionism: “[Woman suffrage] is 
women contending for their own rights; the Abolitionists toiled for the rights of others. When 
women emphasize this selfishness, by turning aside to oppose the rights of others, it is, in 
truth, no generous spectacle (qtd. in “A Pronunciamento,” 24). The opposition Phillips 
creates between a “disinterested” and self-interested political movement performs a number 
                                                
26 In fact, it seems worth pointing out that universal suffrage rhetoric is far more prevalent 
than calls for educated suffrage in the pages of The Revolution. For instance, Stanton 
frequently writes of the “natural” right of suffrage and the necessity for its universality: “So 
we say, to-day, to the abolitionists and republicans, we cannot accept your platform, because 
it is not based on the idea that suffrage is a natural right, we admit that ‘negro suffrage’ is a 
step in the right direction, but to educate the people to this partial demand even, we need the 
enthusiasm of a principle, which you do not proclaim, so long as you ask simply the 
extension of suffrage to two million men, instead of its universal application to every citizen 
of the republic” (“Going Over to the Copperheads,” 361). Similarly, in an editorial entitled 
“Universal Suffrage,” Stanton debunks the arguments for a variety of voting qualifications 
and argues, one by one, that they are inimical to democracy; as for the qualifications of color 
and sex, she writes: “neither time, money or education, can make black white, or woman 
man; therefore, such insurmountable qualifications, not to be tolerated in a republican 
government, are unworthy our serious consideration” (57). She then specifically rejects the 
idea of educated suffrage: “If property and education were a sure gauge of character, if 
intelligence and virtue were twin sisters, these qualifications might do: but such is not the 
case…if a man cannot read, give him the ballot, it is school-master. If he does not own a 
dollar, give him the ballot, it is the key to wealth, education and power” (57). While there are 
many more examples of universal rights rhetoric in The Revolution, these two demonstrate 
that this position was certainly well-represented at times in the periodical. 
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of tasks: first, it obscures the role of black men and women in the abolitionist cause, who not 
only fought for the freedom of others, and the right to freedom more generally, but also 
specifically for their own freedom. There is no space for these subjects in Phillips’s 
formulation, and instead, abolitionists are by default white and benevolent. Abolitionism is 
presented as a completely self-effacing movement whose only concern is the protection of 
others. This mantle of altruistic protection, however, is withheld from woman suffragists—
Phillips’s contention that (white) women are dishonorably fighting for their own rights in 
their opposition to the Fifteenth Amendment erases black women and instead constructs the 
image of the selfish white suffragist, unreasonable, unbecoming—a “spectacle” to behold.  
Phillips’s argument puts the white suffragist in the difficult position of needing to 
respond on two fronts at the same time: she must argue against the gendered edict that 
women should necessarily be selfless because they are women, while simultaneously 
demonstrating that the charge of suffragist-selfishness is an example of the abolitionist 
refusal to recognize black women in their quest for black men’s rights. This is no easy task, 
requiring one to argue “we’re not selfish” on the one hand, and yet, “why shouldn’t we be?” 
on the other.  Stanton’s response shows how she performs this rhetorical balancing act: 
We should like to know why a movement among women for the outraged and 
oppressed of their sex is more selfish than that of man for his sex. Is not the 
philanthropy of Paulina Wright Davis pleading for the enfranchisement of the 
black woman of the south as pure as that of Wendell Phillips pleading for the 
black men, or of Frederick Douglass for his own race? (24) 
 
Again, the figure of the black woman is shifted into the object of the suffrage fight; in an 
attempt to pierce the universalism of the male category, Stanton points out that white men are 
fighting for black men in the same way that she claims white women are fighting for black 
women.  
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 Stanton then turns to dismantling the notion that a “disinterested” politics is the most 
effective or truest form of politics by reminding readers that abolitionists’ commitment to the 
cause was forged in their own “persecution”—it “strengthens reformers in their positions and 
makes their philanthropy, however disinterested in starting, in time, more or less a personal 
matter” (24). Why shouldn’t politics be personal? Stanton suggests that the standard for a 
“pure” politics lies not in its impersonality, but in its adherence to principle: “The same clear 
perception of the beauty of a principle, the same essential elements of heroism, are shared by 
all those who advocate reforms in advance of their day and generation, whether affecting 
their own class or another” (24). To match Phillips, Stanton employs two types of 
arguments—she reminds readers that white women are fighting for the “outraged” black 
woman, while at the same time suggesting that woman suffragists (and all political activists) 
should not be held to a false standard of selflessness.27  
If it seems like this is a case of wanting to have it both ways, I think that is precisely 
the point—the doubleness of Stanton’s rhetoric in this piece, as elsewhere in The Revolution, 
demonstrates the demands of the political context in which it seeks to intervene. Stanton’s 
insistence that white suffragists are not selfish because they are fighting for the forgotten 
black woman pivots into an insistence that selfishness should not be anathema to politics—
Stanton fights to make black women visible as the victimized subjects deserving the vote 
while simultaneously challenging the patriarchal notion of self-sacrificing womanhood. She 
                                                
27 The exchange between Phillips and Stanton is a good example of how the so-called “cult 
of true womanhood” functioned as both a limiting and empowering discourse for white 
woman suffragists; see Welter; Lerner, “The Lady and the Mill Girl”; and Smith-Rosenberg, 
Disorderly Conduct for early considerations of the “cult of true womanhood.” This highly 
generative concept has been reformulated, expanded, and critiqued over the past forty years 
by scholars interested in tracking not only the historical phenomenon it attempts to describe 
but its contemporary critical deployment; see Kerber, McCall, Helley and Reverby, Kaplan, 
Davidson and Hatcher, and Rupp. 
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is developing both offensive and defensive strategies to respond to a conflicting web of 
political discourse, both engaging with that discourse and attempting to transform it.  
This multiplicity is on full display in Stanton’s May 20, 1869 editorial, “The Fifteenth 
Amendment.” Stanton protests not only the amendment, but the American Equal Rights 
Association’s official stance on it, which she claims stifles women’s own political work, 
using evidence from the proceedings of the May AERA convention. “With men in our 
associations, in our committees, to-day managing our conventions, the women’s thought is 
practically oversloughed, and no resolution that is in conflict with republicans and 
abolitionists, can be presented on our platforms” (313). Stanton suggests that just when a 
possible Sixteenth Amendment should be the focus of the organization, the “warp and woof 
of our speeches and resolutions,” the Association instead wastes time passing resolutions of 
support for the Fifteenth Amendment:  
Yet we are required by black men, alike in Washington, Boston, and New 
York, on Woman Suffrage platforms, not only not to oppose the Fifteenth 
Amendment, but to pass resolutions rejoicing in its adoption, which is 
practically rejoicing that every shade and type of manhood, however ignorant 
and degraded, whether native or foreign, shall henceforth make laws for us 
and our daughters to the third and fourth generation, compelling us, too, to 
stultify ourselves as abolitionists, and rejoice in the fact that 2,000,000 of 
black women at the south are simply to change their form of slavery from 
white to black masters, under the same code of laws we have been repudiating 
for ourselves for the last twenty years. (313)28 
                                                
28 The resolution Stanton is referring to was published in the May 27, 1869 issue of The 
Revolution as part of a three-part printing of the proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the 
American Equal Rights Association. The transcript reads as follows: “Fred. Douglass said 
that as there is a most important question submitted to the American people, he wanted to 
have a vote upon it from that audience. He then read the following resolutions: Resolved, 
That the American Equal Rights Association, in loyalty to its comprehensive demands for 
political equality of all American citizens, without distinction of race or sex, hails the 
extension of suffrage to any class heretofore disfranchised, as a cheering part of the triumph 
of our whole idea. Resolved, therefore, That we gratefully welcome the pending fifteenth 
amendment, prohibiting disfranchisement on account of race, and earnestly solicit the State 
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This passage makes what could seem like a bizarre and schizophrenic set of claims; how are 
we to read the scathing racism of such an argument, on the one hand, with the claim to 
abolitionism, on the other? The first half of this response hinges on the racist anger at being 
prioritized behind “ignorant and degraded” black (and foreign) men, while the second half 
expresses indignation that black women are left behind. Blackness, in Stanton’s formulation, 
is both an advantage (for men), and a source of victimization (for women).  
In arguing against the amendment, Stanton again uses the figure of the black woman 
to solidify her commitment to equal rights, while equating white “masters” to newly-freed 
black men, eliding both the history of slavery and the differences in power between the two 
groups. Black men, at this juncture, are not experiencing the “living death” that Stanton 
previously acknowledges, but instead, armed with the vote, are catapulted to a position of 
superiority in the U.S. political system. Stanton’s expression of victimization by this 
development is channeled through the black woman, yet again—unable to sufficiently 
embody a credible victim, Stanton must position the black woman to do this rhetorical work 
for her. This, I think, is the source of the confusion in such an argument, the method by 
which Stanton can in one breath produce a litany of racist laments and in the next claim the 
mantle of noble abolitionism. Shifting the suffrage subject to black women becomes a mode 
of transition between the doubled-arguments Stanton employs between universal rights and 
rights based on the qualifications of class injury. 
 
 
                                                
Legislatures to pass it without delay” (“Annual Meeting of the American Equal Rights 
Association: Second Day’s Proceedings” 321). 
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Turning the Tables 
 A final example from The Revolution demonstrates the degree to which the 
representation of black women becomes a device within white woman suffragist rhetoric. In 
an editorial entitled “The Fifteenth Amendment: The Tables Turned,” Stanton constructs an 
imaginary world in which white women rule in political, economic, and social terms, and 
where men are utterly without rights. Hoping to “enable our masculine law-makers to take a 
feeling view of the situation,” Stanton depicts men as a feminized-class that has been 
systematically deprived of “inalienable rights to person, property, wages, [and] children,” 
who are “weary and heartsick of their oppressed, down-trodden condition” (56). The 
miserable situation comes to a head when “the country was in such a terribly disorganized 
condition” that changes had to be made (56): 
The women naturally enough thought that the extension of suffrage to all their 
sex might bring about the much needed reform; so a great discussion arose all 
over the country, on the general question of suffrage, as to whether it was a 
natural or political right, and if natural, then black women, no one thought of 
men, as well as white should share its privileges. Accordingly it was decided 
to enfranchise the black women, and the proposition was received with wild 
applause from Maine to California, and after much debate in Congress and out 
an amendment to the Constitution was submitted, demanding ‘womanhood 
suffrage’ in every state in the Union. (56) 
 
In Stanton’s vision, men begin to “pric[k] up their ears” at this development and question 
whether adding more women to the ranks of voting citizens will improve their dire 
situation—if the best “native born women of property and education” have proven 
“tyrannical,” why should the addition of “all the ignorant, degraded types of womanhood” 
make that situation any better? (56) The men come to the conclusion that this idea is 
“preposterous” and demand that if anyone is to be enfranchised, it should be the tax-paying, 
educated, (white) men, rather than black women (56). 
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 But just as the (white) men begin to clamor for their rights in Stanton’s imaginary 
world, just when “their enthusiasm was at white heat” and they are ready to seize what is 
rightfully theirs, they are admonished by a “silver tongued orator” who lambasts them for 
making political claims at such a precarious time:  
“Down, you ignorant, narrow, selfish men, you besotted democrats, 
masquerading in the garb of human rights! had you been educated in my 
school, you would not stand here to-day clamoring for your own rights nor 
those of your race or sex, but you would make angels weep with your 
eloquent appeals for the black women of the south, the most peeled and down-
trodden of all God’s creatures!" (56) 
 
The men are properly “charmed” by this argument, and they are almost swayed to begin 
chants of “Womanhood Suffrage!” and “This is the black woman’s hour!” when the figure of 
Mr. Phillips intervenes to tell the men they are about to be deceived—he asks: “What 
assurance have you that the ignorant hordes you are now marshalling into the political citadel 
will not be the first to pull up the draw-bridge and bar the gates?” (56) Phillips suggests that 
the result of black women’s enfranchisement would be “national suicide” and expresses 
disbelief that (white) women would have the gall to “regard the opinion of the most ignorant 
of their own sex as of far more value than the wisest from man!” (56) Stanton pithily 
concludes her scene with a request that “readers make the application” to present-day reality, 
“for this is the way the case stands to-day for women” (56).  
 This is the most conspicuous example of white suffragists’ rendering of black women 
as a rhetorical tool to engage their political opposition—in Stanton’s imaginary, they are 
shifted into the black man’s position to demonstrate the absurdity of the antisuffrage 
abolitionist argument. Clearly, one of Stanton’s “lessons” is that white men would never 
think to prioritize black women ahead of their own rights. And yet, black women are still, as 
always, constructed as the definitive figures of abjection; even as they embody the black 
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male subject position, they retain this victimized status as the most “down-trodden” on earth. 
This deployment of black women is perplexing; we could read it as an indictment of 
abolitionist hypocrisy, as yet another way of highlighting black women in a debate that often 
obscures them. This is no doubt one effect of Stanton’s narrative; she “rescues” the black 
woman again, placing her in a central rhetorical position—rather than existing on the 
margins, she is the focus of this fantasy creation. This is further emphasized by the 
invisibility of black men in the narrative—“no one thought of [them]”; their conspicuous 
absence in the story demonstrates the incongruity between black men’s and black women’s 
real-world political positions.  
On the other hand, what kind of rescue is this if black women are simultaneously 
denounced as “ignorant hordes” who will bring about national ruin? Yes, black women are 
shifted into the subject position of black men in the rhetoric of the story, and therefore this 
slur is supposed to describe the men and not the women. But Stanton’s racism bleeds through 
both the imaginary and the reality; as you read it becomes almost impossible not to begin 
questioning who is supposed to represent what. Do we read this reversal as a subversive 
highlighting of black women, or is it, alternately, a racist threat against them? The 
doubleness of Stanton’s story represents an attempt to again deploy black women in multiple 
positions and in varied ways—it is this shifting multiplicity that drives the narrative and 
holds together Stanton’s rhetoric.  
It is also the representation that again allows Stanton to represent white women’s 
victimization. This imaginary role-reversal, oddly enough, takes place through the 
representation of white men. The story elevates black women with enfranchisement, which 
we are told is deserved because of their suffering, while white men are left behind and made 
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to wait. But white men are imagined to represent another form of victimhood, and their 
suffering is juxtaposed with black women’s; the same words are used to describe both 
groups—white men too are “down-trodden” and oppressed. Through this juxtaposition with 
black women, they come to realize that they should not have to wait for their rights; the 
elevation of black women is the catalyst for Phillips’s plea. Stanton places her adversary in 
her own subject position, again ventriloquizing, imbuing his “character” with her own 
thoughts and words, giving her the kind of control over her opposition’s political rhetoric that 
she cannot possess in political reality. His “eloquence” and desperation are her own. White 
men become the ultimate victims of the story, demonstrating the lengths to which elite white 
women could go to represent their own wrongs without ever representing themselves.  
 
Representing White Woman Suffragists’ Contradictory Inheritance  
 Stanton’s attempt to “turn the tables,” and the multiple shifts in subject positions that 
this entails, suggests that the figure of the black woman is wielded as an incredibly 
malleable, eminently usable tool with which to represent white women’s claims to suffrage. 
The deployment of this figure in the Fifteenth Amendment debates in The Revolution 
demonstrates the ways that suffragists used black women’s racial difference to manage 
gender difference. When the category of “women” is not recognized by antisuffragists as a 
group needing the vote, that category is raced to make women visible, to make their 
victimization seen. When white women are boxed in by the ideals of true womanhood and 
their prohibition on unseemly political behavior, racial difference is used to provide evidence 
that suffragists did indeed fit within the parameters of female goodness. When political 
adversaries ignore the universal rights platform they once advocated, white women remind 
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abolitionists of their hypocrisy through the lens of race in the form of the black woman. 
Racial difference is not simply feared or reviled, then, but also used strategically to highlight 
and mitigate gender difference and shield white women from its proscriptions. The 
relationship between racial and gender difference that emerges within The Revolution is not 
only an antagonistic or exploitative one, though it certainly is both of these things; it is a field 
in which the political and ideological vulnerabilities of gender are translated through race in 
order for white woman suffragists to become more deserving, more palatable, or more 
visible.  
 But it might seem strange that white woman suffragists would need to find ways to 
gain this kind of recognition—after all, they were some of the most privileged women in the 
country—or that they used the figure of the black woman, a figure who represented less 
power and privilege, to make these claims. This dissonance, however, can be read as an 
indicator of the contradictory inheritance of white suffragists, who were both privileged and 
subjugated by the political system they were embedded in and fighting against. Entitled and 
yet disenfranchised, both empowered and oppressed, suffragists such as Stanton represent the 
conflicting nexus of the racialized, classed, and gendered political identity of the white 
middle class woman. The doubleness of this position—its inherent contradiction and 
friction—is reflected in the shifting, inconsistent and at times paradoxical rhetoric seen in 
The Revolution, and undergirded by the figure of the black woman. White woman suffragists 
repeatedly construct and exploit this figure to negotiate the complexities of their subject 
positions and their circumscription by Reconstruction political discourse; tracing this figure 
demonstrates the ways in which white suffragist racism represented a form of management of 
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this conflicting inheritance, both of an embodied subject position and a discursive field not of 
their own making.  
When split-narratives overlook a text like The Revolution, or use it solely as 
confirmation of white suffragist racism, this kind of complex operation is covered over; in 
losing the text, the interpretive opportunities to elucidate the operations of racism and their 
relations to a web of political and social discourses are lost as well. Relying on racism as a 
form of evidence, as a way of understanding something else rather than as an object in need 
of explication itself, produces a critical gap that engulfs the very movement and leaders that 
have been painstakingly canonized over the past fifty years. Tracing the figure of the black 
woman in white suffragist writing offers a way to read this racism and in doing so, read some 
of the complexity back into a history that is drained through the process of our coming to 
know it so well. 
 Calling attention to the representation of black women demonstrates that not only do 
split-narratives not do a very good job of explaining the operations of racism (preferring to 
instead use it as a trope and the reason for “the split”) but that these stories seem oddly 
attached to an empty explanation even as they weight that explanation with significant 
meaning for both the history and present of U.S. feminism. That this process comes at the 
expense of an analysis of the operations of race and gender should be read as a sign of just 
how important “the split” is for building a past that can be used for feminism’s present. The 
divide must be maintained as the central moment of suffragist history in order for feminism 
to understand its trajectory, its present problems, and its future. How this process manifests 
in the concept of feminist “waves” is a topic I take up in the final chapter.  
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But before looking to the wide-ranging feminist circulation of split-narratives and 
their attendant charges of racism, I want to turn to the other side of the canonization problem, 
moving from representations of black women in white suffragism to black women’s own 
representation of the historical moment, to the sort of non-canonical material that rarely 
makes an appearance in split-narratives. While in this chapter I have been concerned with the 
work of canonized suffrage figures and their negotiation of their contradictory subject 
positions, in the next chapter, I look to non-canonical black woman suffragists to explore 
how their accounts might intervene in the privileging of the suffrage “split.” How do 
readings of black women’s suffragist writing reorient our suffrage narratives, and what do 
they produce for our understandings of the movement? In constructing a second story of 
suffragism, I hope to emphasize that there are multiple possibilities in rehistoricization that 
can produce valuable readings of what we have come to take for granted in feminism’s 
history.  
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Frances Harper’s Feminist Deconstruction of the Suffrage “Split”  
 
“Talk of giving women the ballot-box? Go on. It is a normal school, and the white women of 
this country need it. While there exists this brutal element in society which tramples upon the 
feeble and treads down the weak, I tell you that if there is any class of people who need to be 
lifted out of their airy nothings and selfishness, it is the white women of America.” 
 
—Frances Ellen Watkins Harper (Foster, A Brighter Coming Day 219) 
 
With this rebuke, Frances Ellen Watkins Harper concluded her speech to the Eleventh 
National Woman’s Rights Convention in May 1866. It was her first on the woman’s suffrage 
platform, and would be one of only a handful of her speeches recorded in that forum. We 
know that the major white figures in the suffragist movement were present—Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Lucretia Mott, to name a few—but there is no record of their 
reactions to Harper’s speech, only the cryptic, suggestive “[Applause]” inserted into the 
proceedings, an invitation to speculate on the predominantly-white audience of woman 
suffragists’ reactions to such a thorough critique of their movement. Scholars routinely 
suggest that Stanton and Anthony were less than pleased with Harper’s speech, noting that 
they refused to include it in their massive History of Woman Suffrage, still the largest 
collection of U.S. suffrage documents and commentary to date. It was, as Nell Painter puts it, 
“too strong for those soon to be the country’s leading woman suffragists” (Sojourner Truth, 
225).1 But the above excerpt and the remarks that precede it are far more complex than a 
simple take-down of white suffragist racism. What does Harper mean by her comparison of 
                                                
1 See Peterson, “Doers of the Word” 257 for a similar interpretation. 
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voting rights with teacher training? Why would suffrage be more necessary for white women 
than black women, who Harper specifically leaves out of this formulation? And what might 
the ballot have to do with white women’s class position, or their selfishness? Harper’s 
conclusion, with its harsh criticism of the movement’s leaders, might at first glance be the 
most striking aspect of the piece, but her speech as a whole prompts a consideration of 
Harper’s configuration of the suffrage question and its place within the post-war struggles for 
racial and sexual equality.   
 Indeed, Harper began her speech in a rather different vein, not critiquing the suffrage 
movement, but instead telling her audience how she came to understand the need for women 
to join together in the struggle for equal rights. She admits that she has been more 
preoccupied with “wrongs” instead: “Born of a race whose inheritance has been outrage and 
wrong, most of my life had been spent in battling against those wrongs. But I did not feel as 
keenly as others, that I had these rights, in common with other women, which are now 
demanded” (217). It was not until her husband had died, and a state administrator had taken 
her home, sold her belongings, and forced her to leave the state—not until then did Harper 
understand the difference that being a woman made. “Had I died instead of my husband, how 
different would have been the result! By this time he would have had another wife, it is 
likely; and no administrator would have gone into his house, broken up his home, and sold 
his bed, and taken away his means of support” (217). Not until then did she realize that 
“justice is not fulfilled so long as woman is unequal before the law” (217). 
 Harper’s moment of conversion to a woman’s rights platform, however, comes with a 
stipulation: that this platform be expansive enough to hold all oppressed classes. Moving 
from the personal realization to the idiom of collective politics, from the language of “I” to 
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the rhetoric of “we,” Harper shifts what women’s equality might mean: “We are all bound up 
together in one great bundle of humanity, and society cannot trample on the weakest and 
feeblest of its members without receiving the curse in its own soul” (217). Woman’s rights 
become meaningless if those rights cannot encompass racial justice too. But on the heels of 
this expansive notion, Harper shifts again, this time to the language of “you”: “You tried that 
in the case of the negro. You pressed him down for two centuries; and in so doing you 
crippled the moral strength and paralyzed the spiritual energies of the white men of the 
country” (217). Harper’s shift to the second-person is jarring, and jolts her audience out of 
the lofty collective sentiments just uttered and into a reality in which women, the collectivity 
just called upon, are divided. 
 Harper’s rhetorical shifting between personal, cooperative, and divisive language 
continues throughout her remarks; just when listeners are lulled into a sense of 
uncomplicated collectivity, she jars them awake with a reminder that this collectivity is 
fraught, fragile.2 She talks of her desire for a day when America has “no privileged class, 
trampling upon and outraging the unprivileged classes, but will be then one great privileged 
nation,” but follows this national ideal with a statement of what separates its constituents: 
“You white women speak here of rights. I speak of wrongs. I, as a colored woman, have had 
in this country an education which has made me feel as if I were in the situation of Ishmael, 
my hand against every man, and every man’s hand against me” (218). The national collective 
                                                
2 Shirley Wilson Logan notes the ways these interchanges move between tactics of 
association and dissociation in order to persuade Harper’s audience with what Logan calls 
“strategic shifts from ‘apart of’ to ‘apart from’” that “allow [Harper] first to build 
community, then to point out weaknesses in its construction” (47). See Logan, We Are 
Coming, Chapter 3, for a discussion of Harper’s rhetorical strategies, and especially 57-59 for 
an analysis of Harper’s 1866 speech. Elizabeth Petrino also examines the language of this 
speech for the links it constructs across race and class, creating “solidarity” between the poor 
white working class and the freedpeople; see “We Are Rising As a People” 136. 
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cannot be achieved without recognition of the injustices perpetuated against its individual 
parts. From “you” back to “I,” Harper notes her personal experience on the street cars of 
Philadelphia, where she is often humiliated by being relegated to the smoking car, or simply 
refused altogether. “They did it once, but the next time they tried it, they failed; for I would 
not go in. I felt the fight in me; but I don’t want to have to fight all the time” (218). Harper 
uses her personal experience with the humiliations of travel to connect her experience with 
that of another black woman, Harriet Tubman. For Harper, Tubman is a “Moses” figure 
“who was brave enough and secretive enough to act as a scout for the American army” and 
yet, this courage and service does not save Tubman from the same indignities and violence 
that Harper encounters while travelling. According to Harper, the last time the two met, 
Tubman’s hands were “all swollen from a conflict with a brutal conductor, who undertook to 
eject her” from her seat on a train (219). The injustice Harper experiences is not only a 
personal, individual matter, but one that black women, both formerly enslaved and free, in 
the North and the South, faced daily.  
 This brings Harper to the conclusion of her speech, where she shifts back into 
language that marks the divide that exists within the category of “women,” calling the vote a 
“normal school” that white women desperately need to be educated in. In light of the 
rhetorical strategy Harper maps throughout the speech, this final shift and its juxtaposition of 
a collective of black women who have served, sacrificed, and experienced daily injustice 
with a class of white women who need the vote in order to be shaken out of “their airy 
nothings and selfishness,” takes on a different tenor (219). Harper is not simply calling out 
white women for their racism or their lack of interest in the world around them; the vote, in 
Harper’s terms, is a form of education that can open up those who exercise it to the diverse 
   
 122 
social world in which they live. Harper turns the discourse of “educated suffrage”—the idea 
that education should be a qualification for the ballot—on its head, transforming the vote into 
a source of education itself. In this reversal, black women are more educated than white 
women—they are the class who know the world better and understand the injustices and 
oppression that need remedies. Suffrage, in its educational sense, is superfluous to black 
women—it cannot teach them what they already know. Voting rights, in this formulation, 
will not change the world, but instead, will expose that world to a new class of people, 
constructing a new perspective from which to view the nation. Harper limits what suffrage 
can accomplish, but she also expands it as an act that can instruct citizens in the “brutal 
element in society” and through that standpoint of awareness, effect social change. Suffrage 
is both smaller and bigger than her white colleagues imagined; it is not simply a right to be 
granted, but a method of understanding oppression.  
 Harper’s reconfiguration of suffrage through the “normal school” trope has been 
ignored in the historical archive. While historians often note that Stanton and Anthony erased 
Harper’s 1866 speech from their suffrage records, the erasure of this speech, and its revision 
of suffragism, is mirrored in the historiography of suffrage that constructs and examines the 
1869 “split.” While Harper herself is often represented in this body of work, albeit in a 
limited way, these narratives largely pass over “We Are All Bound Up Together.” This 
omission is striking. Given that the “split” is constructed around white suffragist racism, one 
might expect Harper’s speech to serve as evidence of black women’s indictment of white 
suffragist bigotry. But Harper’s speech is absent, even as its most available reading seems 
tailor-made for the “split.” Why might this be?  
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This chapter focuses on the relationship between Harper’s work, the historiography of 
suffrage, and feminist studies. The historiographical construction of, and obsession with, the 
1869 “split” creates a critical dichotomy wherein scholars focus on a rupture between two 
“sides,” use evidence to assign historical figures to one side or the other, and then articulate 
whether or not these figures were “correct” in their political choices. This structure pairs 
Frances Harper with another activist of the era, Sojourner Truth, as black women who had to 
“choose” between their race or their sex in the face of the Fifteenth Amendment and the 
debates it sparked in the suffrage movement. These figures are alternately assigned to the 
“race” side of the question—the pro-Amendment, American Woman Suffrage (AWSA) 
“side” that repudiated Stanton, Anthony, and the National Woman Suffrage Association 
(NWSA)—or the “sex” “side” represented by Stanton and the NWSA. But in either case, the 
“split” remains the governing framework by which the work of these activists comes to be 
understood, with consequences not only for the historiography of suffrage, but for the larger 
field of feminist inquiry. The “split” produces and proscribes positions for these black 
women as symbols in ways that foreclose the possibility of a more complex understanding of 
their negotiation of race and gender. As symbols, they are deployed to fulfill the logic of the 
“split” and become the means to endlessly reinscribing it. In the process, Harper becomes an 
important African American literary figure, disconnected from suffragism per se, while Truth 
stands “for” feminism, an iconic foremother of the movement. I argue that the critical 
attachment to the “split” and its attendant need to understand how historical figures reacted to 
the divide effaces Harper’s career as a writer-activist and the feminist theorizing that can be 
drawn from her work.  
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Race vs. Sex, Harper vs. Truth 
“As we know, in the emplotment or narrativization of any history, much depends on familiar 
vocabularies of reference—on the circulation of names, proper names, and some names are 
more proper than others.” 
 
—Deborah McDowell, “Transferences” 158 
 The name “Sojourner Truth,” according to Deborah McDowell, is one of those “more 
proper names” that circulate in critical and popular discursive arenas, a name to “drop” in 
order to flash what Nell Painter calls one’s “political correctness” when it comes to matters 
of feminism and race (McDowell 158; Painter, Sojourner Truth 273). Like McDowell and 
Painter, I am concerned with the effects of this kind of circulation, but I am simultaneously 
interested in thinking through the process of how one name becomes more “proper” than 
another. Why, for instance, can you go online in 2013 and buy a Sojourner Truth decorative 
throw pillow but not one for Frances Ellen Watkins Harper?3 In this section I sketch an 
answer to this question through an analysis of each woman’s discursive construction within 
the historiography of suffrage and feminist theory, ultimately suggesting that if Harper’s 
feminism is obscured, we might look beyond the logic of the “split” in order to recover it.  
 Sojourner Truth, as McDowell and Painter both attest, has attained an iconic status in 
both popular U.S. culture and scholarly work. She is among the most recognizable figures of 
feminism, and is arguably the most famous black female historical figure. She is most well-
known for the “Ain’t/Ar’n’t I A Woman?” speech at the 1851 Akron, Ohio Woman’s Rights 
Convention4—a speech that historians now know to be apocryphal, not because she did not 
                                                
3 See <http://www.cafepress.com/+sojourner_truth_throw_pillow,106290308> for the pillow 
in question.  
 
4 The title of Truth’s speech is most frequently referred to as “Ain’t I a Woman?” but the 
word “Ain’t” never appears in any of the three transcripts that have circulated since 1851; the 
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give a speech at that time and place, but because its most famous “transcription” was 
produced by a white feminist 12 years after the fact and differs widely from a much more 
brief transcript published by a journalist less than one month after the event. Frances Gage, a 
white activist, poet, and writer of the era, published the now infamous account of Truth’s 
speech in the National Anti-Slavery Standard on May 2, 1863. It was republished as a part of 
Truth’s 1878 edition of her Narrative, and again in Stanton and Anthony’s History of Woman 
Suffrage in 1881. The transcript now considered more accurate was published by Marius 
Robinson in the Anti-Slavery Bugle, June 7, 1851.5 In an analysis of the two versions, 
historian Carleton Mabee concludes that  
Gage, the poet, intended to present the symbolic truth of Truth’s words more 
than the literal truth; that Gage, the novelist […] felt pressed to make Truth’s 
story more compelling than it was; that Gage, the passionate advocate of 
blacks’ and women’s rights, embellished her report to strengthen the causes 
she favored, imposing her own ideas and expression on what Truth said. 
Disappointing as it may be, the comparison makes it unlikely that Truth asked 
the thrilling question, ‘Ar’n’t I a woman?’, the principal words by which 
Truth is known today. (80)6 
 
                                                
most popularized transcript repeats the refrain “Ar’n’t I A Woman?” (Gilbert 134). See 
Logan, With Pen and Voice 17-27 for two versions of this speech, one written in an 
exaggerated dialect of the plantation South, and one twentieth-century version with the 
dialect edited out. Neither of these transcripts represent Truth’s voice accurately (not that this 
is possible when there is no recording of her speech)—Truth was fluent in English and 
Dutch, born and raised in New York rather than the South, and thus unlikely to speak with 
any similarity to the imagined language of the Southern slave; see Haraway, esp. 97-98, for a 
discussion of the “counterfeit language” of these transcripts and the ways that their repeated 
comparison “retroubles the ear” and “makes us rethink her story” (97). See Peterson, “Doers 
of the Word” 47-55 for another analysis of the difficulty Truth’s figure poses for the 
historian. 
 
5 See Mabee, esp. 67-68 for a thorough analysis of these two “transcripts” of Truth’s speech. 
 
6 See also Painter, Sojourner Truth, esp. Chapter 14, and Painter, “Difference, Slavery, and 
Memory” for an analysis of Gage’s version and why it has retained such staying power.  
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And yet, Truth’s “words” continue to circulate in both popular culture and academic 
work: her image graces countless forms of merchandise and memorabilia and she has had her 
own U.S. postage stamp since 1986, while her name in feminist studies has become 
synonymous with the dual-challenges to misogynist notions of women’s inherent weakness, 
on the one hand, and the implicit whiteness of the category of “woman,” on the other.7 She is 
one of the most frequently cited historical figures of the abolitionist period, and scholars 
routinely refer to her “legendary status” and her position as the “best-remembered African 
American woman of the nineteenth century” (Peterson, “Doers of the Word” 24; Jones 106). 
Indeed, the frequency with which Truth is called upon in a variety of critical work has now 
become a critical curiosity of its own, with one scholar noting that Truth has become a 
“standard exhibit in modern liberal historiography” (Palmer 152).  
 Frances Ellen Watkins Harper, on the other hand, has not achieved this kind of 
legendary status in U.S. culture or its academic contexts. Not only are there no Harper 
bumper stickers or commemorative stamps, none of the popular culture references that 
circulate Truth’s name, but her recovery as a significant historical figure has been far less 
pronounced, taking place primarily through the revision of the literary canon, rather than the 
historiography of the women’s movement.8 This literary recovery even began rather late, 
relative to the recovery work done in the 1970s and early 1980s by feminist literary critics 
                                                
7 See Davis, Women, Race & Class 60-64; Giddings 54-55; Riley 1; hooks, Ain’t I A Woman 
159-160; White 13-16; and Haraway for examples.  
 
8 This discordance may be evidence of another “split” worth investigating: a disciplinary one 
between history and literary studies. As I detail below, black feminist literary critics are 
largely responsible for Harper’s recovery, and more, have used her literary works to generate 
feminist theory from their criticism (see Christian and Carby, Reconstructing Womanhood 
for early analyses). But these contributions, as well as Harper’s literary work, are virtually 
ignored in the historiographical archive. My point is that it is precisely these kinds of texts 
that can bring Harper’s contributions to feminist theorizing into focus.     
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interested in unearthing previously disregarded or unknown female authors. The primary 
work she is known by, the novel Iola Leroy (1892), only came out in paperback in 1987, and 
until Frances Smith Foster’s 1990 anthology of Harper’s work, many of her most important 
texts—including poems, short stories, and speeches—were unavailable. Foster went on to 
uncover three serialized novels by Harper, publishing an edition containing Minnie’s 
Sacrifice (1869), Sowing and Reaping (1876-1877), and Trial and Triumph (1888-1889) in 
1994. Since then, Harper has been established as a significant literary figure, one who 
traversed multiple genres and offers varied opportunities for revising the way critics view 
black women’s writing in the nineteenth century.  
Barbara Christian begins her 1980 study of black women novelists by showing how 
Harper’s Iola Leroy demonstrates the ways black women writers had to work within and 
against the representations and stereotypes that proscribed their worlds. According to 
Christian, the novel is important, “not because it is a ‘first’ or because it is a good novel, but 
because it so clearly delineates the relationship between the images of black women held at 
large in society and the novelist’s struggle to refute these images” (5).9 While she comes to 
different conclusions, Hazel Carby also looks to Harper’s novel to reassess how it changes 
the way critics understand the genre in the nineteenth century. In Carby’s view, Iola Leroy 
not only performs important political functions as a tool of social change, it also makes us 
reconsider several literary conventions critics thought they understood, such as the use of the 
mulatta figure, the dominance of female-authored texts by male frameworks, and the genre of 
                                                
9 For a significant part of the twentieth century, Iola Leroy was considered the first novel 
published by a black woman in the U.S. See Christian 253 and Carby, “Introduction” ix. As 
Carby notes, that distinction now goes to Harriet Wilson with the 1859 publication of the 
autobiographical novel Our Nig. 
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sentimentalism.10 After Christian and Carby devoted sections of their ground-breaking works 
to Harper, other literary critics followed suit, producing analyses of Harper’s novels, poetry, 
oratory, and rhetoric and justifying her inclusion in the canon expansion debates of the 1980s 
and 90s.11 These contributions demonstrate the symbiotic relationship between Harper’s 
work and black feminist literary criticism—as black feminist critics recovered Harper’s 
oeuvre, reevaluated it, and used it to challenge and transform the canon of American 
literature, this process in turn became an important method for the development of black 
feminist literary theory. While today there are few full-length studies of Harper’s work, and 
she is still primarily known as the author of Iola Leroy, she has certainly become if not a 
major writer, a significant minor figure in the widening sphere of U.S. literary studies. 
Harper’s canonization in literary criticism, however, has not translated into a 
similarly secure position as a major figure of U.S. feminism. This is surprising; Harper’s 
work not only deals in some of the most important questions of race, gender, and the work of 
                                                
10 Christian and Carby disagreed about Harper’s use of the mulatta figure in Iola Leroy; for 
Christian, Harper’s transformation of the mulatta from a tragic figure to one of hope and 
possibility represents a refutation of white stereotypes, whereas Carby sees Harper’s 
deployment of this figure as a method for exploring and juxtaposing two worlds, one black 
and one white. As Ann duCille points out, this distinction can be traced to a more general 
difference between the two critics: Christian reads Harper as far more conservative, more 
“accomodat[ing]” to white readers, whereas Carby, along with duCille, read Harper as more 
radical, producing a savvy figure that is “both a rhetorical device and a political strategy” 
(duCille 7). See also Tate 144-149 for a similar argument, in which the novel is read for the 
way it “uses the mulatto’s inherent transitional racial and class status to construct 
emancipatory resocialization, grounded in virtue, education, and hard work” (147).  
 
11 For general criticism of Harper, see: Nerad, Foster, “Gender, Genre, and Vulgar 
Secularism,” Robbins, Rutkowski, Boyd, Sorisio, Johnson, and Peterson, “Frances Harper.” 
For criticism of Harper’s oratory and rhetoric, see Stancliff, Logan We Are Coming, and 
Logan “Black Speakers, White Representations.” For criticism of Harper’s poetry, see 
Foster, Written By Herself, Petrino, “We Are Rising,” and Sherman. See Lauter for a 
discussion of the resistance to including Harper in the U.S. literary canon.  
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Reconstruction in the nineteenth century, but her wider career as an activist-intellectual 
offers considerable possibilities for feminist interpretation. Harper was one of the few black 
women of her time to go on the lecture circuit;12 she was deeply involved in the suffrage 
cause and worked within both white and black suffrage organizations;13 she travelled to the 
South to help newly freed people as they navigated the dangerous and difficult period of 
Reconstruction;14 and she expressed a particularly keen interest in helping the freedwomen as 
                                                
12 Harper began her work as an anti-slavery lecturer in Rhode Island in August 1854, and 
would continue her public speaking, in both the North and South, over the next three 
decades. While trained as a teacher, she was drawn to devoting herself full-time to the  
abolitionist cause when her native state of Maryland passed a law banning free blacks from 
entering the state. Harper heard the story of a man who had unknowingly violated this 
statute, was sold into slavery in Georgia, and later died during an attempt to escape back to 
the North. Her friend William Still recounts Harper’s declaration: “Upon that grave I pledged 
myself to the Anti-Slavery cause” (758). After making this decision, Harper moved to 
Philadelphia, where she lived at Still’s home, one of the major hubs of the Underground 
Railroad, and read as many abolitionist tracts and anti-slavery documents as she could in 
order to train for her new calling. See Still, 755-780 for an account of her early lecturing 
years and excerpts of her letters from the lecture circuit. See also Boyd, 119-125 for 
additional analysis of this period of Harper’s activism. 
 
13 Harper worked in a number of woman suffrage organizations, some specifically geared 
toward winning the vote and others more loosely affiliated with political reform: from 1866 
until the end of the century, she attended meetings or was a member of the Association for 
the Advancement of Women, the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, the Universal 
Peace Union, the American Woman Suffrage Association, and the International Council of 
Women. She was a co-founder of the National Association of Colored Women in 1896 
(Collier-Thomas 49). Within many of the organizations run by white women, Harper was 
“frequently referred to as the principal representative of ‘colored women’” (Collier-Thomas 
52).  
 
14 During Reconstruction, Harper made frequent trips to the South in the capacity of educator 
and lecturer. According to Still, Harper’s work during this period was extensive and varied: 
“For the best part of several years, since the war, she has traveled very extensively through 
the Southern States, going on the plantations and amongst the lowly, as well as to the cities 
and towns, addressing schools, Churches, meetings in Court Houses, Legislative Halls, &c., 
and, sometimes, under the most trying and hazardous circumstances; influenced in her labor 
of love, wholly by the noble impulses of her own heart, working her way along unsustained 
by any Society” (767). Still frequently references the danger of Harper’s travels, writing that 
“in no instance has she permitted herself, through fear, to disappoint an audience, when 
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they attempted to make new lives for themselves and their families after the war.15 These 
facts of Harper’s career make her relative obscurity in the feminist canon more peculiar.16 
Valerie Palmer-Mehta has recently noted this oddity in her critique of what she calls the 
“lacuna in contemporary literature regarding the contributions Harper has made to feminist 
theory” despite the obvious role Harper has had in the history of U.S. feminism (193).17  
While Palmer-Mehta does not speculate as to why this critical lacuna around Harper 
and feminist theory exists, Nell Painter has suggested that Harper has not gained feminist 
recognition because Stanton and Anthony did not emphasize her participation in suffragist 
organizations and omitted much of her presence in their History. As I noted earlier, none of 
Harper’s speeches on woman’s rights, suffrage, or Reconstruction politics are recorded in 
any of the anthology’s volumes. Painter contrasts Harper’s relative erasure with Stanton’s co-
optation of Truth, a figure more easily molded to the political discourse of the period. Truth, 
                                                
engagements had been made for her to speak, although frequently admonished that it would 
be dangerous to venture in so doing” and noting that despite these warnings, she travelled to 
all of the southern states except Texas and Arkansas. See Still 767-778 for excerpts from 
Harper’s correspondence during this period of travel.  
 
15 In a letter to Still, written when Harper was working in Greenville, Georgia in 1870, she 
tells of her particular interest in speaking with the black women of the South during her tours 
there: “I am going to have a private meeting with the women of this place if they will come 
out. I am going to talk with them about their daughters, and about things connected with the 
welfare of the race. Now is the time for our women to begin to try to lift up their heads and 
plant the roots of progress under the hearthstone” (Still 772). 
 
16 While notable biographies have been written about other nineteenth-century black feminist 
figures such as Truth, Harriet Tubman, and Ida Barnett-Wells, there is no major biographical 
work on Harper. 
 
17 Palmer-Mehta’s insightful piece looks at three feminist concepts and traces the way 
Harper’s work contributes to their development and understanding: her rhetorical connection 
of personal anecdote with political goals as a precursor to the “second wave’s” personal-is-
political mantra; the use of strategic essentialism; and a focus on broad-based social change 
over narrow legislative objectives. 
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as an ex-slave, could symbolize the horrors of slavery, an evil that all abolitionists could 
agree upon after the war; as Painter puts it, activists “agreed on slavery; it was 
Reconstruction that was tearing them apart” (Sojourner Truth 229). Truth became the 
“symbol of slavery” that could unite post-war abolitionists who disagreed about political 
strategy and priorities (229). On the other hand, Harper was born into a free family, was 
well-educated, and light-skinned. In this, she seemed too similar to white woman suffrage 
leaders to embody the kind of “black female authenticity that white audiences” saw in Truth 
and rallied around (224).18 Truth was the black woman white suffragists needed, and, 
according to Painter, their embrace of the woman in turn “produced a new symbolic Truth—
the Stanton-Anthony suffragist…[who] tends first and last toward women” (233). This 
symbolic Truth would come to “blot out” Harper’s contributions to the movement (233); 
Truth would take on the fame of the white suffragist leaders who wrote the history of the 
movement and thus assured her canonized status in the future of feminism.19  
                                                
18 Whereas Truth told and retold the story of her life both in and out of slavery, and published 
a version of it in her Narrative, the details of Harper’s life are relatively unknown, especially 
those of her early years. Almost all of the information we have about Harper’s life comes 
from Still’s The Underground Railroad (1871), which includes a number of excerpts of 
Harper’s personal correspondence. She was born free in Maryland Sept. 24, 1825, but her 
parents are unknown and her mother is thought to have died while Harper was quite young; 
she was cared for by an aunt and eventually attended the Baltimore school founded by her 
uncle, Reverend William Watkins, an academy known for an emphasis on the classics and 
biblical studies (Foster, A Brighter Coming Day 7). In 1850, Harper left the South and moved 
to Columbus, Ohio to take a teaching position at Union Seminary, and then moved again to 
Pennsylvania in 1852. According to Still, during this period Harper was unsatisfied with 
teaching, and began to write, a vocation that, along with lecturing, she would continue for the 
next fifty years (757). Harper was married in 1860 and had one child; she wrote extensively 
during her marriage and after her husband’s death in 1864 she immediately returned to the 
lecture circuit.  
 
19 bell hooks has written about white feminists’ expectations and proscriptions of which 
black women could constitute appropriate feminist allies, noting a similar phenomenon to the 
Truth-Harper dichotomy Painter points to. According to hooks, educated, middle-class black 
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Painter’s interpretation is convincing, and her pairing of Truth and Harper raises 
important questions about the ways that historical figures are symbolically deployed within 
history. But I want to expand Painter’s analysis of Truth, Harper, and feminism to suggest 
that the origin of the difference in feminist status between the two women can not only be 
traced to Stanton and Anthony’s approval and co-optation of Truth—although this is 
certainly a part of the story—but to the historiographical construction of the 1869 suffrage 
“split” more generally. It is not simply that Stanton and Anthony constructed a symbolic 
Truth that better served the purposes of their suffrage politics, or even that contemporary 
historians and critics have perpetuated the mythology around Truth and reinscribed her 
symbolic worth; it is that in constructing the “split” between two “sides” of the suffrage 
movement, scholars have assigned each figure to an allegiance to racial or sexual difference, 
and thus recapitulated the very problem they critique. To put it more simply, one might read 
the “split” as the critical object that vaults Truth to widespread feminist fame and relegates 
Harper to relative obscurity. Any historiography or criticism that deals in the “split” is bound 
to reinforce this dichotomy even as it attempts to temper Truth’s feminist mythology or 
                                                
women’s voices were often marginalized by white feminists more interested in hearing from 
black women who fit their imagined idea of what “blackness” looked and sounded like: “Our 
presence in movement activities did not count, as white women were convinced that ‘real’ 
blackness meant speaking the patois of poor black people being uneducated, streetwise and a 
variety of other stereotypes. If we dared to criticize the movement or to assume responsibility 
for reshaping feminist ideas and introducing new ideas, our voices were tuned out, dismissed, 
silenced. We could be heard only if our statements echoed the sentiments of the dominant 
discourse” (hooks, “Black Women” 37). See also Painter “Difference, Slavery, and Memory” 
for a discussion of the ways that Truth utilized white women’s stereotypes and expectations 
of black women to “guarantee her place in the history of antislavery feminism”; according to 
Painter, Truth “knew full well that her experience in slavery authenticated her being and 
reinforced her message” and used it to her advantage, “widening the distance between herself 
and her audiences” in order to take “maximum advantage of being exotic” (154). While it is 
clear that white suffragists represented her for their own ends, this relationship ran both 
ways. Truth was no mere “puppet,” but instead, as Painter notes, incredibly skilled in 
manipulating white ideologies to her own ends.  
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recover Harper’s feminist relevance. Painter, in my view, correctly assesses the problem 
when she notes that the symbolic Truth covers over Harper’s feminism, but she finds its 
origin in Stanton’s canonization of Truth and the way that subsequent scholars uncritically 
take up that figure, rather than in the critical attachment to the “split” to which her work itself 
contributes.  
In a wide array of historical and critical work, the “split” becomes an integral method 
of differentiating between Truth and Harper; it delineates “sides” and assigns these historical 
figures to one or the other. Its formulation often shows how black activists would duplicate 
the “break-up” of the predominantly white abolitionist-suffragist organization; as one 
historian puts it, “by 1870, African American activists, male and female, would split along 
the same lines that split apart the Equal Rights Association” (Jones 140). Painter’s history 
sets up the “split” in a similar way, as a central moment in delineating black women’s 
relationship to the cause: “Suffrage priorities—who should vote first—split reformers. From 
the breach emerged two competing woman suffrage communities, each seeking the blessing 
of Sojourner Truth” (Sojourner Truth 222). Rosalyn Terborg-Penn performs the same move, 
writing that “divisions among female suffragists affected black affiliation in the resulting 
suffrage associations. Hattie Purvis attended NWSA meetings, as did Cary. Harper affiliated 
with the AWSA. Sojourner Truth attended meetings of both groups” (Terborg-Penn, 
“African-American Women” 140). Three years later, Terborg-Penn would revise her division 
of black women’s affiliations: “Despite the assumptions modern-day writers have about 
Black women’s participation in the two groups, a larger number selected the AWSA than the 
NWSA. Of the known African American women who participated in the two national 
organizations during the 1870s, nine selected the AWSA and six selected the NWSA” 
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(Terborg-Penn, African American Women 42).20 She then appends two lists to illustrate the 
division of these women; this time, Sojourner Truth and Frances Harper are both placed on 
the AWSA side, along with a footnote that explains her latest research has contradicted the 
findings of others that Truth “sided” with the NWSA or took a middle position. While 
Terborg-Penn does not say precisely what this research is, my point is not to question 
whether she, or her colleagues, have correctly assigned Truth, Harper, or any other activist to 
their respective “sides” of the “split,” but rather to point out how central the “split” is to these 
narratives, and how it necessarily results in a formulation that requires this sort of list-
making, assigning these black female figures to one list or another.  
The “split” formulation creates a need to construct and choose “sides,” but in these 
narratives, those “sides” come to represent not only allegiance to one organization or another, 
but a larger allegiance to race or gender. For instance, when critic Carla Peterson describes 
the suffrage “split,” the account becomes an entry into black women’s identity “choices.” 
She first explains how the 1869 AERA convention  “split in two over the issue of black male 
suffrage and allegiance to the Republican party” (“Doers of the Word” 224) and then shows 
how black female figures reacted to the “split”: “It was at this convention that 
Harper…affirmed both her allegiance to ‘race’ over ‘sex’ and her distance from white 
women whose racism continued to oppress the black woman worker” (224). Peterson then 
describes the “striking contrast” offered by Sojourner Truth, who “chose to participate in the 
activities of Stanton and Anthony’s more ‘radical’ National Woman Suffrage Association” 
(224). Harper and Truth are represented as having to “choose” between not just the NWSA or 
                                                
20 While Terborg-Penn refers to this division as evidence that black women were more likely 
to “side” with the AWSA, it seems worth noting that a 9-6 ratio is hardly a decisive 
difference. I read this as yet another sign of the critical importance in maintaining the “split” 
at all costs, even when the evidence suggests a murkier history. 
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the AWSA, but the competing facets of femaleness and blackness; the women come to stand 
in for the respective “sides” of the “split” through the language of loyalty and identity.  
These figures are made to embody the inevitable “choice” between race and gender 
through the repetition of two quotations, one attributed to Truth, and one to Harper. Split-
narratives frequently explain Truth’s position through a statement she made at the 1867 
American Equal Rights Association (AERA) meeting in which she suggested she agreed with 
what would become the Stanton-NWSA position: that woman’s suffrage should not be 
prioritized behind black male suffrage. Shirley Wilson Logan provides a representative 
example of how this quotation is used to explicate Truth’s “choice”:  
Truth entered the debate over the proposed Fifteenth Amendment to grant 
black men but not women the right to vote. There she estimated the 
consequence of such a change on black women in particular: ‘There is a great 
stir about colored men getting their rights, but not a word about the colored 
woman; and if colored men get their rights, and not colored women get theirs, 
you see the colored men will be masters over the women, and it will be just as 
bad as it was before.’ (We Are Coming 11) 
 
Logan then juxtaposes Truth’s 1867 statement with Harper’s contrasting views: “Black 
women intellectuals like Frances Harper and, later, Ida B. Wells, while clearly supportive of 
women’s rights, considered it more important to align themselves with racial concerns than 
with cross-racial gender issues” (11). Truth’s statement is made to stand in for Truth’s 
“choice” between race and gender in the face of the Fifteenth Amendment. Over and over 
again, scholars deploy this statement to explain why Truth represents the black woman 
“choosing” gender over race when confronted with the “split.” Paula Giddings uses the 
statement to show the similarity between Truth’s position and Stanton’s and to demonstrate 
that Truth worried about black male dominance over black women: “Sojourner Truth took 
the position of not supporting the amendment. She was fearful that putting more power into 
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the hands of men would add to the oppression of Black women. ‘There is a great stir about 
colored men getting their rights, but not a word about the colored women’…” (65). Peterson 
deploys the “great stir about colored men” statement to explain Truth’s “striking” contrast 
with Harper, and to show the “complex ideological negotiations between the categories of 
race, sex, and class” (“Doers of the Word” 225).21 
 Harper, on the other hand, is represented through a very different statement, made at 
the 1869 AERA meeting, that depicts her as deferring her own rights in order for black men 
to win theirs first. Collier-Thomas employs this statement as a way of interpreting Harper’s 
“choice”:  
Harper agreed with Frederick Douglass, an ardent supporter of woman’s 
rights and friend of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, that black 
males must have the vote and that the plight of black women was more related 
to their race than to their gender. Taking a broad historical view of the role of 
race in American society, she argued that emancipation had not eliminated 
race as the major determinant of one’s status. ‘When it was a question of race 
I let the lesser question of sex go. But the white women all go for sex letting 
race occupy a minor position.’ (50)   
 
Harper is depicted here as understanding gender as a less significant “determinant” of 
identity within U.S. legal and social structures; her statement that “sex” is a “lesser question” 
is evidence of the “broad historical view” that oppression is racialized first, and gendered 
after. Harper’s quotation is relied on repeatedly to do this kind of organizing work in these 
narratives. Giddings deploys the statement to show the difference between Harper’s position 
and Truth’s, to show that Harper knew something Truth did not—that she “had much more 
faith in the abilities—and intelligence—of Black women, and Black men, than Sojourner 
                                                
21 For additional examples of the critical use of Truth’s statement, see Collier-Thomas 50, 
Davis, Women, Race & Class 83, Stewart xliii, Mabee 179, Painter, Sojourner Truth, 226 and 
Painter, “Voices of Suffrage” 46. As I discuss below, Davis, Painter, and Mabee all deploy 
the infamous Truth quote in much the same way but then attempt to distance her from the 
Stanton-NWSA position. 
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Truth did” (66). She quotes Harper’s “lesser question of sex” statement and then continues: 
“But Harper and others understood that the rights of Black men had to be secured before 
Black women could assert theirs. If the race had no rights, the women’s struggle was 
meaningless” (68). Harper’s choice is self-evident; according to Giddings, she understood 
that race necessarily preceded gender. Likewise, Painter uses the quote to illustrate Harper’s 
ultimate “choice” of race over gender: “Concluding that she must now choose between her 
identity as a woman and her identity as a Negro, she abandoned black women and rallied to 
the side of black men: ‘when it was a question of race, she let the lesser question of sex go’” 
(Sojourner Truth 231). Davis too shows Harper’s “choice” in these terms: “This outstanding 
Black poet and leading advocate of woman suffrage insisted that the enfranchisement of 
Black men was far too vital to her entire people to risk losing it at such a critical moment. 
‘When it was a question of race, she let the lesser question of sex go’” (Women, Race & 
Class 84). Over and over, historians and critics perform the same rhetorical move with 
Harper’s statement, making it clear that Harper was firmly on the “side” of race in the race-
versus-gender conundrum.22  
 The construction of the “split” creates a need to juxtapose Truth and Harper and 
distill their ideas down to the pith of two statements that can then stand in for both the 
difference between white and black woman suffragists, and the differences within black 
woman suffragists as a group. One effect of this dichotomy in these narratives is to 
recapitulate the same rhetoric of “choice” that the “split” fosters; black women symbolize the 
nexus of this choice, but they also, in “split” terms, must “divide” themselves so that we can 
understand how they relate to this governing moment within suffragism. The “split” is the 
                                                
22 For additional examples, see Aptheker 47, Boyd 128, Carby, Reconstructing Womanhood 
68 and Terborg-Penn, African-American Women 32.  
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controlling factor in the conversion of these black women into symbols within feminism; 
once the historical moment is depicted as a “split” in the movement and made central, the 
rest follows. 
As Terborg-Penn’s note makes clear, while Harper is always “assigned” to the 
AWSA “side” of the “split,” there appears to be some confusion about how to categorize 
Truth. For instance, Giddings puts Truth on the side of the NWSA, explaining that although 
“women like Sojourner Truth and Frances Ellen Watkins Harper held similar views about the 
rights of Blacks and women” they “came to different conclusions about supporting the 
amendment” (65), with Truth in support of Stanton and Anthony’s stance, and Harper 
disagreeing with it. Collier-Thomas concurs with these assignments; when “the issue of 
which should be first, woman or Negro suffrage” emerged, “the old abolitionist coalition, 
which included a racial and gender mix of key reform leaders, collapsed” with Harper in 
support of the AWSA. Truth, on the other hand, is “sided” with the other suffragist “wing”: 
“When this issue surfaced at the meeting of the American Equal Rights Association (AERA) 
in May 1869, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Frances Gage, and Sojourner Truth emphasized their 
support for universal suffrage. However, they indicated that if there were no other choice 
they favored enfranchising women, including black women, over black men” (50).  
What is striking, however, about these assignments of Truth to the NWSA “side,” is 
how much explanation it takes these historians to interpret her “choice”; Giddings quotes 
Stanton saying that black women would be better off the slave of an educated white man than 
a black male former slave, and writes that Truth “evidently agreed with this perspective, or at 
least with the idea that the White feminists were better informed than Black women” (65). 
Collier-Thomas notes that “Of course, Sojourner Truth regretted having to make a choice and 
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continued to emphasize that her first choice was for universal suffrage” (50). Angela Davis 
deals with the problem of Truth’s assignment by depicting her perspective as evolving over 
time: “Two years earlier Sojourner Truth might possibly have opposed the position of 
Frederick Douglass. At the 1867 ERA convention, she had opposed the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it effectively denied the franchise to Black women” but “By 
the final meetings of the Equal Rights Association in 1869, Sojourner Truth had recognized 
the dangerous racism underlying the feminists’ opposition to Black male suffrage” (83). 
Carlton Mabee performs a similar move, distancing Truth from Stanton’s “side” by degrees; 
Truth, in his view, could “reasonably be called radical in 1867 for insisting like Stanton and 
Anthony that suffragists should push for the vote for both blacks and women together” but 
“by 1869 and 1870 she was not as adamantly radical as Stanton and Anthony had become on 
this issue, because she did not join them in resisting the Fifteenth Amendment” and instead 
had “become more moderate and conciliatory, more like Lucy Stone and most other 
feminists, including the blacks Douglass, Charles Remond, Robert Purvis, and Frances 
Harper, who supported the Fifteenth Amendment even though it did not give women the 
vote” (180). Painter distances Truth from Stanton as well, using paragraph after paragraph to 
delineate the ways in which Truth’s views were different from Stanton’s in almost every 
way, even as they seemed to agree on the universal suffrage priority; Truth stood for a 
middle ground “when straddling was still possible in woman suffrage circles” (Sojourner 
Truth 229).  
The confusion and hedging over Truth’s “side” can be read as an index of scholars’ 
struggle with this “choice” between race and gender even as the “split” commits their work 
to a repeated reinscription of that choice. Truth “sided” with gender, but she regretted having 
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to “choose,” or she tempered that choice and became less radical, or she eventually came 
around to the other “side” in 1869 when the chips were down. In contrast, Harper’s “choice” 
does not seem to require as much critical intervention in order for it to be understood; her 
“siding” with her race is presented as more self-evident than Truth’s “siding” with her 
gender. This, in my view, is an effect of the “split” coming to stand in for white feminist 
racism: Truth’s agreement with the figures of that racism becomes problematic, whereas 
Harper’s apparent distancing herself from it appears natural and more politically progressive.  
As noted earlier, Painter has suggested that Truth, rather than Harper, was the black 
woman that white suffragists needed in the face of the Fifteenth Amendment debates. I 
would only add that if present-day feminists need Truth, they also need Harper in order to 
make sense of the “split” and the “choice” between race and gender. It is the pairing of the 
two women that is necessary to represent the split’s dichotomy, which helps explain why 
even though Truth did not attend the infamous 1869 meeting when the debates took place, 
she is still paired with Harper, who was present. Indeed, Truth’s “great stir about the colored 
men” statement so frequently used as evidence of her position on the issue is taken from 
1867, more than two years before these debates would come to a head. On the other hand, 
Harper’s “lesser question of sex” declaration is from the transcript of the contentious 1869 
meetings. This temporal asymmetry between the two women’s symbolic representation 
within the “split” suggests that two black women were needed to provide support for its 
dichotomy. One of these women was canonized, the other suppressed. That Truth was not 
present at the climactic moment of the “split” only makes it more clear that her canonization 
has much to do with the ways in which she can come to symbolize critical desires in ways 
that Harper cannot. It is easier to see Truth as what we want her to be, a critical problem that 
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is exacerbated by the fact that Truth, who is assumed to have been unable to read or write 
English, left no written work of her own behind, and whose statements and own narrative is 
always filtered through other, primarily white, historical figures.  
When Deborah McDowell writes of the ways that names such as “Sojourner Truth” 
are “dropped” in contemporary criticism, she is referring to this problem. For McDowell, 
Truth is a signifier at once empty and full, one that “seems to perform for some an absolution 
of critical guilt” even as the repetition of her name “makes no real difference”: “In dominant 
discourses it is a symbolic gesture masking the face of power and its operations in the present 
academic context. As a figure in remove, summoned from the seemingly safe and 
comfortable distance of a historical past, ‘Sojourner Truth’ can thus act symbolically to 
absorb, defuse, and deflect a variety of conflicts and anxieties over race in present academic 
contexts” (162). According to McDowell, the repetition of the symbol of “Sojourner Truth” 
becomes a method for gesturing toward race within feminism without actually dealing with it 
in any substantive way. McDowell refers primarily to the repeated reference to Truth’s 
“Ain’t I a Woman” speech, but her point can be extrapolated to help make sense of the ways 
that the “split” has worked to frame Truth as an iconic feminist figure and relegate Harper to 
relative anonymity. 
If Truth needs more interpretation in order to be understood, if her “choice” needs 
extra critical explication in order to be palatable for contemporary scholars, then why is she 
also simultaneously an iconic figure of feminism in ways that Harper simply is not? If, as I 
argue in Chapter 1, contemporary critics construct narratives of this historical moment in 
order to identify with the non-racist “side” of the “split,” one might expect Harper to be held 
up as the symbol of principled feminism. But this has not been the case. Truth appears easier 
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to name-drop, easier to shift into the critical position scholars need her to inhabit; her 
“choice” might require critical rationalization or even chastisement, but she is still converted 
into a metonym for loyalty to gender above all else. Harper’s “choice” of race, on the other 
hand, might be more legible, even praised, but it still is not represented as feminist—instead, 
it is represented as a refusal of white feminism. Leaving aside the fact that these positions are 
over-simplified, whittled down to their most portable and symbolic, my point is that split-
narratives implicitly define feminism as white, not only in their description of the historical 
moment, but in their narration of what that moment means in the present. As bell hooks has 
noted, to gain recognition in both activist and academic contexts, black women’s 
contributions and ideas must be correlated to those of dominant white feminists, rather than, 
say, allowed to reconfigure the theoretical and political problems they deal in or define new 
areas of debate (“Black Women” 37). I am arguing that split-narratives perform the same 
function by governing the logic through which we understand these actors as figures of 
feminism. Despite some critics’ attempt to work against this logic by explaining the context 
of the situation, or attenuating Truth’s choice, or emphasizing Harper’s activist work for 
women, the commitment to the “split” ties these narratives to a dichotomy that prescribes the 
parameters of the historical understanding of these figures from the outset. 
 The “split” thus makes Harper’s feminism difficult to recover by remaining critically 
moored to a white feminism that operates on the single axis of gender rather than imagining a 
feminism of critique that is intersectional, dynamic, and, importantly, not centered on the 
white female subject. It seems to me that the attachment to Truth in this instance is more 
about an attachment to the “choice” of gender over any other axis of identity, even as her 
“Ain’t/Ar’n’t I a Woman?” speech would suggest that Truth herself deconstructed this choice 
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long before the Fifteenth Amendment debates.23 The “split” dominates the telling of these 
women’s ideas and keeps scholars and readers tied to the problem of race-versus-gender even 
as we “know” better now. The fact that Harper is not broadly represented as an important 
figure for feminism or feminist theory suggests that critics cannot let go of the very thing 
they aim to critique.  
 
Harper’s Concept of Suffrage, Expanded  
 
“I cannot recognize that the negro man is the only one who has pressing claims at this hour. 
To-day our government needs woman’s conscience as well as man’s judgment. And while I 
would not throw a straw in the way of the colored man, even though I know that he would 
vote against me as soon as he gets the vote, yet I do think that woman should have some 
power to defend herself from oppression, and equal laws as if she were a man.”  
 
—Minnie to Louis (Harper, Minnie’s Sacrifice 78) 
 
 In the transcripts of the May 1869 AERA meetings published in Stanton and 
Anthony’s History, Harper’s contributions are never directly transcribed, and even those 
indirect statements that were included rarely capture much of the content of Harper’s words. 
The well-known “lesser question of sex” statement is just one such example, but we know 
that Harper spoke on other occasions during the three days of the event. This erasure had 
precedent; Harper’s 1866 speech to the Eleventh National Woman’s Rights Convention was 
compressed down to a mere mention between a list of other speakers and a note about 
                                                
23 While in the Robinson version of the text, Truth is never recorded as saying the phrase 
“Ain’t/Ar’n’t I a woman?” the transcript shows that Truth spoke about her equal ability and 
strength in terms of the work of slavery: “I am a woman’s rights. I have as much muscle as 
any man, and can do as much work as any man. I have plowed and reaped and husked and 
chopped and mowed, and can any man do more than that? I have heard much about the sexes 
being equal; I can carry as much as any man, and can eat as much too, if I can get it” 
(Painter, Sojourner Truth 125). Truth debunks the patriarchal notion of female frailty while 
simultaneously refusing to define the suffrage issue in terms of the white female domesticity; 
as a black woman, she is, as she puts it, a “woman’s rights.” 
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collecting contributions: “Mr. Beecher was followed by Wendell Phillips, Frances Dana 
Gage, Frances Watkins Harper; the Financial Committee meantime passed through the 
audience for the material aid to carry forward the work” (Stanton et al. 171). Similarly, 
Harper spoke to the assembly during the May 14th afternoon sessions of the 1869 
Convention, but the only note of this speech is an oblique reference: “Mrs. Harper spoke on 
matters concerning her own race” (399). This substitution not only stands in for the content 
of Harper’s speech, but it also tells us something about the reasons for its erasure. In 
narrating the history of this moment, the editors divide suffrage concerns from “matters 
concerning [race]”; while we do not know what precisely these “matters” were, it is clear that 
Stanton and Anthony viewed them as separate from the suffrage issues at hand.  
 When split-narratives reinscribe Harper’s suppression, they also reproduce the same 
division by which suffrage politics are separated from other forms of politics. What were 
these other “matters” that Harper spoke about in the midst of the Fifteenth Amendment 
debates? I suggest that we imagine how to fill in this historical gap through an examination 
of Harper’s 1869 fiction: the serialized novel Minnie’s Sacrifice, published in twenty 
installments over the course of six months in the Christian Recorder, and the short 
allegorical piece, “The Mission of the Flowers,” published as part of her 1869 poetry 
collection.24 These works, while very different—one is a sweeping narrative refiguring of the 
classic mulatta-plot, the other a brief symbolic sketch employing the conceit of the flower 
garden—offer a way to understand Harper’s suffrage views, and her feminism, as more than 
                                                
24 Harper contributed frequently to the Recorder, a weekly newspaper founded by the 
publishing arm of the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church in Philadelphia and aimed 
at a primarily black reading public. Its masthead defined its mission as the “dissemination of 
religion, morality, literature and science” (Lewis 756). See Cole, Lewis, and especially 
Kachun for interpretations of the importance of this periodical.  
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simply one side of the “split,” but as a radical expansion of the political boundaries of 
suffragism. Contrary to Stanton and Anthony’s attempt to cordon off  “matters of race” from 
the issue of suffrage, Harper’s 1869 pieces instead demonstrate a very different scope of 
suffrage, one rooted in the history and perspective of injustice. By expanding what split-
narratives compress, Harper’s 1869 fiction not only allows us to imagine an “outside” to the 
consuming binary logic of the “split,” but more than this, it provides an incisive critique of 
the “choice” between race and gender that split-narratives reinscribe.   
 Since its recovery in 1994, critics have frequently read Minnie’s Sacrifice in one of 
two ways: as a forerunner to Iola Leroy, with similar plots and characters, or as a novel of 
racial uplift, meant to educate Northern blacks in the importance of self-reliance and 
community-building.25 These interpretations have provided an important literary context for 
Harper’s work and have helped place her within the traditions of nineteenth-century 
American women’s writing and African American literature—crucial tasks in making black 
women writers visible in a discipline that often erased them in favor of black men or white 
women.26 There has not been much attention, however, to the ways the novel intervenes in 
                                                
25 For instance, Boyd writes that “Minnie’s Sacrifice is clearly a precursor of Iola Leroy” and 
that “In many ways the two works complement each other” through their “parallel” 
structures, similar characters, and “consistent” themes (170-171). See Griffin for a 
contrasting interpretation of the two works, in which the author sees Harper’s Reconstruction 
fiction as more radical than her later work. See Robbins, esp. 179-193 and Stancliff 62-80 for 
analyses of Harper’s rhetoric of uplift and education in the novel. For additional criticism on 
Minnie’s Sacrifice, see Toohey, Peterson, “Frances Harper” 44-50, O’Brien, and Lewis. 
Recently, critics have taken an increased interest in periodical studies and Minnie’s Sacrifice; 
see Cole for an example.  
 
26 Frances Smith Foster notes that while Harper has not been ignored in literary history or 
criticism, critics have often expressed an “embarrassment” over Harper’s chosen genre of 
popular and didactic literature and her middle-class sensibilities: “Many of us in African 
American literary studies, especially, have learned to privilege the extremes: to deify the 
modernists and the revolutionaries and to entertain the folk or primitive over the productions 
   
 146 
the suffrage politics of 1869. With the exceptions of the recent work of Martha Jones and C. 
C. O’Brien, this aspect of the novel has been under-considered, covered over by the critical 
need to develop literary relationships between Harper and other black women writers, on the 
one hand, or the need to place her within a tradition of nineteenth-century racial uplift, on the 
other.27 I argue, however, that we might read this novel as a suffrage-novel—which is not to 
say that the novel is limited to the issue of suffrage, but that it expands the concept of 
suffragism into something much more than the quest for voting rights. By drawing attention 
to white privilege and positing a black female perspective as Reconstruction’s ideal source of 
education, Harper’s fiction refuses the Fifteenth Amendment “choice” between race and 
gender and develops a suffragism, and a feminism, that places black women at the center of 
national development and the pursuit of social justice. 
 This reading of the novel is at first counterintuitive. Suffrage does not seem to be its 
central concern; the issue does not even appear until one of the last chapters. Indeed, the wide 
scope of the novel seems to dwarf the issue of suffrage with its sheer sweep over a period of 
                                                
that reflect the aesthetics and values of the churchgoing Christians or the black middle class 
and those who aspire to it” (“Gender” 49). Similarly, Carla Peterson argues against Richard 
Brodhead’s 1993 assessment that postbellum fiction became more cosmopolitan, more 
representative of “high-cultural literary values” by pointing out that this formulation obscures 
black women writers during Reconstruction, who were explicitly interested in combining 
literature and politics to effect social change; by organizing the period in such a way, 
Brodhead “profoundly misreads African American postbellum cultures of letters whose 
writers refused to disassociate literary career from political participation; they insisted 
instead that verbal creation could never be an autonomous cultural zone and that one of its 
current functions was to intervene in and comment on the politics of national 
Reconstruction” (“Frances Harper” 40). Like Foster, Peterson shows how Harper 
reconfigures the genres of domestic and didactic writing in order to make black women’s 
participation in the domestic household a “basis for inclusion in American society” (“Frances 
Harper” 58-59).  
 
27 See also Boyd 126-132 for an early but brief discussion of Harper’s literary work in 
relation to the suffrage question. 
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time filled with the characters’ deeply personal dramas and the era’s historically significant 
events. Minnie and Louis are both born in the South to enslaved mothers and fathered by 
white masters; each is sent North to be raised and educated as white rather than black. 
Minnie is taken from her mother and sent to live with Quaker abolitionists in Pennsylvania 
because she “looks so much like” her master that the master’s wife could not tolerate her 
presence out of social embarrassment. Louis, on the other hand, in a retelling of the Moses 
story, is born to an enslaved mother who dies during childbirth.28 The master’s white 
daughter, Camilla, begs to raise him as an adopted white child, a request the master 
eventually grants. The plot of the novel revolves around how each of these characters 
discover their pasts, and what they choose to do with that new knowledge—do they remain in 
the North, leading lives of relative luxury and passing as white, or do they embrace the racial 
heritage of their mothers and identify with the enslaved people’s struggle during the war and 
its aftermath? Minnie and Louis, who eventually meet, fall in love, and marry, both choose 
the latter, travelling South to work with the freedpeople after the war. They open a school 
and travel as speakers and teachers throughout the small towns of the South, but their lives 
are overshadowed by the threat of Klan violence, and at the novel’s end, Minnie is lynched. 
Louis is heartbroken but determined to honor her legacy by continuing her work as a friend 
and teacher to the former slaves they lived among. The novel ends with Harper’s conclusion, 
                                                
28 Harper’s interest in the Moses narrative is well-documented; one of her 1856 poems was 
entitled “The Burial of Moses” and in her 1859 essay “Our Greatest Want,” she writes that 
Moses is one of her favorite characters because he “would have no union with the slave 
power of Egypt” (Foster, A Brighter Coming Day, 136). She references Moses in her 1866 
speech to the National Woman’s Rights Convention when she speaks of Harriet Tubman, and 
in 1869, she published a long narrative poem entitled, “Moses: A Story of the Nile.” See 
Rutkowski and Foster, Written By Herself for interpretations of the 1869 poem and its 
relation to Harper’s biblical rhetoric.  
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in which she hopes that “the lesson of Minnie” might “have its place among the educational 
ideas for the advancement of our race” (90).29  
 The novel’s expansive scope initially might seem to dilute its intervention in the 
political questions of suffrage in 1869, but its textual representations of whiteness across a 
wide range of time expose the privilege that is masked by the race-versus-gender formulation 
of the Fifteenth Amendment debates. From the very beginning of the narrative, whiteness is 
shown to be a complicated signifier, both a type of property and a means of oppressing and 
abusing the property white masters had in their slaves. Both Louis and Minnie, white enough 
to pass, are saved from slavery and sent North by the white masters who fathered them—not 
because these fathers recognized the children as their own, but because other people 
recognized the likeness. Minnie, at the age of 5, is “mistaken” for the daughter of Le Grange, 
the white master who fathered her through the rape of one of his “favorite slaves,” Ellen 
(15).30 When Le Grange’s wife, Georgietta, invites several acquaintances to a luncheon, one 
guest, “calling the attention of the whole party to her” compliments the little girl, exclaiming 
that she is “the very image of her father” (16). When the mistake becomes clear, Georgietta is 
mortified as “the gentlemen exchange glances, and the young ladies screw up their mouths to 
hide their merriment”; she later fumes to her husband that rather than bear that sort of 
humiliation again, she plans to sell Minnie “as soon as a trader comes along” because she 
                                                
29 The recovered text of Minnie’s Sacrifice is missing several installments, including the 
pivotal scene of Minnie’s death. See Foster, “Introduction” xl-xliii for a discussion of the 
text’s archival discovery and her quest to recover Harper’s missing work.  
 
30 The terminology for the sexual exploitation of female slaves by white masters is fraught; 
the term “rape” is never used within the novel, and certainly there were gradations of sexual 
violence and exploitation within the slave system, but “consensual” relations lose meaning 
under the historical conditions of that system. See Spillers for a discussion of the 
impossibility of articulating black female sexuality under slavery in terms other than ones of 
violence and coercion.  
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could stand to buy a “new set of pearls anyhow” (16). As Georgietta relates the story to Le 
Grange, she is busy chopping off Minnie’s curls, punishment for the (mis)recognition of her 
as a white daughter of the family, rather than the black slave child of the plantation. Le 
Grange thinks of himself as “too humane” to sell the child who Ellen painfully reminds him 
is “his own flesh and blood”—he “winces” when he hears these words—but instead he 
arranges to have her sent North to Pennsylvania to live with abolitionists willing to adopt her 
(19). The set-up of the novel’s plot highlights the ways that whiteness both saves Minnie 
from a life of slavery while simultaneously tearing her from her mother, her only family. But 
in depicting this paradox, the narrative simultaneously emphasizes the role of the white male 
master and the sexual violence of the slavery system. Le Grange’s white male privilege 
allows him to exploit Ellen, his legal property, and then, congratulating himself on his own 
“humanity,” take the property produced by this exploitation away from her mother. 
 Louis’s origins are similar—the product of the sexual exploitation of a slave woman, 
Agnes, and a white master, Le Croix—except his mother dies during childbirth. Le Croix, a 
widower, is not forced to send Louis North because of a jealous wife, but because his young 
daughter Camilla is struck by the baby’s beauty; she wants to take him in because he is “so 
white, nobody would ever know that he had one drop of Negro blood in his veins” (6). At 
first Le Croix resists this request, but Camilla persists, waiting a few months and then noting 
again to her father that “it is a shame for this child to be a slave, when he is just as white as 
anybody” and that “[h]e is so beautiful, I would like him for my brother; and he looks like us 
anyhow” (8). Eventually, Le Croix acquiesces, and realizes that Camilla’s plan actually 
“rather suited him, for then he could care for [Louis] as a son, without acknowledging the 
relationship” (11). Again, whiteness pays the child’s way out of slavery while the role of the 
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white master/father is brought into relief. Both Louis and Minnie are born out of a context of 
sexual abuse, a narrative foundation that, as C.C. O’Brien puts it, “deflects the question of 
sexuality away from blacks and back toward white men who have the power to exploit 
women sexually” (609). By rooting the narrative in the unequal relationship between black 
female slaves and white masters, Harper draws attention to a history of victimization, one in 
which black women were systematically abused as the sexual property of white men.31   
 The narrative pairing of Minnie and Louis continues throughout the novel, each 
experiencing a climactic moment when their “true” parentage is revealed. These moments 
force each character to make a momentous choice: do they remain content to live as the white 
people they thought they were, or do they embrace their black heritage?32 For Minnie, this 
moment comes more than twelve years later when her mother finds her on a village street in 
                                                
31 Harper’s depiction of black female victimization in the novel is paired with an 
accompanying development of black women’s strength and unique point of view, a point I 
will discuss in more detail below. This combination differentiates Harper’s construction of 
the black female figure from Stanton’s use of that figure as a form of rhetorical management, 
the subject of the previous chapter. This dual-focus on black female victimization and 
development in Minnie’s Sacrifice is mirrored in Harper’s correspondence, in which she 
frequently writes of the need to help “our crushed and helpless sisters, whose tears and blood 
bedew our soil, whose chains are clanking ‘neath our proudest banners, whose cries and 
groans amid our loudest paeans rise” (qtd. in Still 759) while also commenting on the 
resilience, courage, and knowledge of the freedwomen she encountered in the South, such as 
a formerly-enslaved woman who  “took on her hands about 130 acres of land, and with her 
force she raised about 107 bales of cotton” (qtd. in Still 774). 
 
32 See Nerad for an interesting discussion of passing in which the author argues that critics 
ought to reconsider how they interpret characters who unintentionally pass, shifting to a 
focus on the legal fiction of race rather than the uncovering of a character’s “true” racial 
origins. For Nerad, “[t]exts of unintentional passing…destabilize notions of biologically 
constructed racial identity precisely because the passers are unaware that they are 
transgressing legal boundaries. The discrepancy between legal race categories and racial self-
perceptions reveals how race functions in the United States to maintain socioeconomic 
inequalities by controlling an individual’s sense of identity and her place within family, 
community, and nation” (814). Her point is that by taking the concept of passing at face 
value, critics “renaturalize the concepts of race that we conscientiously try to reveal as racial, 
and often racist, ideology” (814-815).  
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the Western part of Pennsylvania; Minnie is shopping with a white friend, and even though 
that friend abandons her once she understands the situation, Minnie takes her mother in and 
eventually accepts that she is her biological daughter. When asked about this choice later, 
Minnie responds with the admission that it was a difficult thing, to find out what she did, but 
that “there are lessons of life that we never learn in the bowers of ease” and that eventually 
she came to understand that she needed to embrace her new identity as a black woman in 
order to do her part in bringing peace and justice to an oppressed people. By claiming her 
black heritage, she could pay her mother back for all her hardship, “brighten her old age with 
a joy, with a gladness she had never known in her youth”—“And how could I have done that 
had I left her unrecognized and palmed myself upon society as a white woman?” (72). The 
wages of whiteness, in Minnie’s estimation, would not make up for “the loss of her self-
respect” if she did not try to do what she could for her “mother’s race” (72). “So, when I 
found out that I was colored, I made up my mind that I would neither be pitied nor patronized 
by my former friends; but that I would live out my own individuality and do for my race, as a 
colored woman, what I never could accomplish as a white woman” (72). Whiteness, in this 
instance, is represented as an impediment to education and change; the “bowers of ease” that 
whiteness provides are also the circumstances that keep Minnie from realizing her true 
potential as an actor for social justice. A white woman “never could accomplish” these 
things, and Minnie needed the revelation of her blackness in order to spur her on toward 
better, more important things. She has a choice, she acknowledges, but she chooses to live 
her life not just as a “colored person,” but, as she notes, a “colored woman” (72). Black 
womanhood, in this formulation, offers more hardship, but also greater access to knowledge 
and the opportunity for good than white womanhood.  
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 Black women in this novel are indeed the catalysts for transformation, action, and 
justice. Just as Ellen puts into motion the revelation that will change Minnie’s life and allow 
her to transform herself into the kind of figure she aspires to be, Louis’s own transformation 
is brought about by Miriam, his black grandmother. When Louis is about to join the 
Confederate army, Miriam tells Camilla that she must inform him of his past: “Miss, 
Camilla, I can stand it no longer;--that boy is going to lift his hand agin his own people, and I 
can’t stand it no longer; I’se got to tell him all about it. I just think I’d bust in two if I didn’t 
tell him” (57). When Camilla agrees and says she would rather see him know his heritage 
than “go against his country and raise his hand against the dear old flag,” Miriam emphasizes 
that “it’s not the flag nor the country” she cares about, but “that one of my own flesh and 
blood should jine with these secesh agin his own people” (58). When Camilla and Miriam 
confront Louis about his plans, Camilla attempts to tell him about his mother, but she 
hesitates, and it is Miriam who gathers the courage to tell him the truth, that “you, Louis Le 
Croix, white as you look, are colored, and that you are my own daughter’s child, and if it had 
not been for Miss Camilla, who’s been such an angel to you, that you would have been a 
slave to-day, and then you wouldn’t have been a Confederate” (59). This revelation, though it 
makes Louis feel as though he was a “mariner at midnight on a moonless sea…who had lost 
his compass and his chart,” sets Louis on a journey through which he comes to understand 
the plight of his mother’s race, the wrongs of slavery, and his own responsibility in “not 
join[ing] its oppressors” but in repaying the debt that he owed the black people of the South 
(61). Like Minnie, Louis chooses to embrace his black heritage and to learn from this 
blackness and from the collective experience of that oppressed people. White privilege, in 
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both cases, comes to symbolize a lack of perspective and an inability to act, deficiencies 
these characters address in embracing the blackness of their mothers.  
 Black women in the novel are the source of unique knowledge that allows them to, as 
Minnie puts it, “see clearer” (83). Their victimization at the hands of white masters has 
provided a perspective on the injustice of the slave system and patriarchy that they then use 
to teach others. Minnie’s mother, Ellen, repeatedly guides her when Minnie becomes unsure 
of her new path as an activist and educator in the South. Using storytelling and anecdotes of 
her religious faith, Ellen tells Minnie of black women’s perseverance during slavery, and the 
awareness that comes from the hardships of their oppression. It is Ellen’s storytelling that 
sustains Minnie when she feels that the violence and terror of the Reconstruction South is too 
much to bear. And when Minnie goes into the homes of the freedpeople, she not only 
educates them, but is educated by them as well. She might help them learn to read, or inform 
them of current political events, but her “scholars,” as she calls them, in turn help her to 
understand how to continue in the face of intolerable white violence and unbearable 
injustices. Her students live in shacks and sheds that viscerally demonstrate their poverty, 
and yet one family adds to their economic hardships by taking in “two orphans of their race” 
(83); another woman tells Minnie “how her child had been taken away when it was about two 
years old, and how she had lost all trace of him, and would not know him if he stood in her 
presence” and yet she perseveres with the idea that justice is possible in the face of this 
overwhelming past. Minnie comes to understand the symbiotic relationship she has with 
these women, that she “must learn from them” as much as they can learn from her (84). She 
is learning to be a black woman from other black women, and while she is inundated by 
accounts of cruelty and subjugation at the hands of white men, she is also shown how to not 
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simply continue on, but begin to transform that oppressive system.  These women are not 
only victims, then, but agents of education and change—actors who are not just determined 
by the system of oppression but who can intervene in that system through the education of 
others.  
   Harper’s concept of a standpoint is not, however, an essentialized notion limited 
only to black women, but a perspective that can be translated to others through narratives of 
injustice and the observation of its effects.33 The development of the character of Camilla, the 
white daughter who takes Louis in as her brother, demonstrates the way perspective is 
figured in the novel as dynamic and transferable. As a young girl, Camilla finds it 
inconceivable that a child “as white as [he is],” with beautiful blue eyes and golden hair, 
could be a slave: “She had heard that word before; but somehow, when applied to that fair 
child, it grated harshly on her ear” (4). She tells Miriam that she thinks “it is a shame for him 
to be a slave, when he is just as white as anybody” and that “if [she] had [her] way, he should 
never be a slave” (4-5). Miriam, in another instance of black women strategically wielding 
their knowledge and influence, encourages Camilla in her desire to see the child saved from 
slavery by subtly pointing out the girl’s powerful influence with her father: “And why can’t 
you have your way? I’m sure master humors you in everything” (5). Camilla reacts to this 
compliment by sketching out her plan in more detail: she would have Louis raised as her 
father’s adopted son, never telling him or anyone else that he was not white. Continuing with 
her strategy, Miriam challenges Camilla to actually put the plan into action by telling her, 
“Laws, honey, it would be fustrate, but your Pa wouldn’t hear of it” (5). Camilla, clearly 
                                                
33 See Lewis 762-763 for a brief yet incisive analysis of Harper’s development of the concept 
of “standpoint” in Minnie’s Sacrifice. See Hill Collins, “Social Construction” for a discussion 
of the black feminist standpoint and its theoretical and political implications.   
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incensed that her power could be considered so meager, insists that she will in fact be 
successful, and that she will immediately go to her father to prove it. When she submits her 
plan to him that afternoon, her father pleads that his hands are tied—after all, he tells her, 
despite the child’s appearance, “he belongs to the Negro race; and one drop of that blood in 
his veins curses all the rest” (7)—and calls Camilla his “little Abolitionist” (6). The girl 
vehemently rejects this label: “No, Pa, I am not an Abolitionist. I heard some of them talk 
when I was in New York, and I think they are horrid creatures” (7). She continues, however, 
to urge her father on, refuting his arguments that he would “lose caste” among his social 
circle and be subjected to “insult and injury” if he were to do such a thing; Camilla reminds 
him that he has never cared for socializing in the past anyway, and that it would not be 
difficult to keep the child’s racial origins from others: “I am sure that we could hide the 
secret of his birth, and pass him off as the orphan child of one of our friends, and that will be 
the truth; for Agnes was our friend; at least I know she was mine” (7). With Camilla’s 
persistent pressure, her father eventually agrees to the plan, and Louis is adopted and sent 
North to be educated.  
 The opening encounters between Camilla and Miriam, on the one hand, and Camilla 
and her father, on the other, show the white girl to have a sense of slavery’s injustice, but 
only as it applies to a child who looks like she does. She can only understand the slave 
system as oppressive when she imagines it applied to a white person. This consideration is 
enough to compel the girl to save Louis, but not enough to make her reconsider the system as 
a whole, or identify with the “horrid” abolitionists she has heard talk about the evils of 
slavery. Her perspective, however, continues to evolve when she travels to New York with 
her father once again. This time, when the two happen upon an anti-slavery meeting in the 
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city, Camilla intently listens to a formerly enslaved man tell of the horrors of slavery: how 
traders had taken his wife from him, how he had watched as his children were sold at the 
auction-block. The man’s story has a strong effect on Camilla, who “grew red and pale by 
turns, and clutching her little hands nervously together” asks her father to leave. Her father 
regrets having upset his daughter, and once home, apologizes for exposing her to the 
frightening scene, telling her he “didn’t believe a word that nigger said” (13). Camilla, 
however, does believe him, which is precisely the problem; she had heard similar stories 
from the family’s own slaves: “[O]ur Isaac used to tell me just such a story as that. If I had 
shut my eyes, I could have imagined that it was Isaac telling his story” (13). Recounting 
Isaac’s separation from his family on account of a master’s whim, Camilla begins to question 
the institution of slavery, again imagining it in personal terms: “Pa, I wonder how slavery 
came to be. I should hate to belong to anybody, wouldn’t you, Pa?” (14) As her father tries to 
assure her that the practice is just, Camilla repeats again that she “can’t understand slavery” 
and that “that man made me think it was something very bad” (14). While her father at this 
point cuts off the conversation, claiming that the little girl should not try to understand 
problems that the “wisest statesmen cannot solve” (14), she continues to ponder the matter:  
Camilla said no more, but a new train of thought had been awakened. She had 
lived so much among the slaves, and had heard so many tales of sorrow 
breathed confidentially into her ears, that she had unconsciously imbibed their 
view of the matter; and without comprehending the injustice of the system, 
she had learned to view it from their standpoint of observation. (15) 
 
If Camilla is first introduced to the wrongs of slavery through her likeness to a slave-child, 
what the narrator calls “her sense of justice” is piqued by the stories of hardship and 
oppression she is raised on at the plantation (15). The narratives of the slaves around her 
develop Camilla’s “standpoint,” allowing her to see the institution from a different vantage. 
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Camilla’s character, in this sense, becomes a demonstration of the effects that black 
storytelling can have in “awaken[ing]” white people to the injustices of the world around 
them. 
 The narrative development of this standpoint, however, is not complete—Camilla, 
who grows up to head her family’s plantation, eventually free her father’s slaves and support 
the Union’s cause in the South, does not come to understand racial equality, even as she 
learns to deplore the oppression of slavery and the evils of racism. When Louis brings 
Minnie to meet his half-sister, Camilla is pleased to welcome her. And yet, as the three of 
them head to Camilla’s house, Camilla is unsure how to understand this new social situation. 
Rather than join Louis and Minnie in his carriage, “Camilla follow[s], wondering how she 
would like the young wife. She had great kindness and compassion for the race, but as far as 
social equality was concerned, though she had her strong personal likings, yet, except with 
Louis, neither custom nor education had reconciled her to the maintenance of any equal, 
social relations with them” (69). Camilla might have been induced to take on black people’s 
“standpoint of observation” but she remains unable to imagine them as her peers. The novel, 
however, holds open the possibility that Camilla’s perspective will continue to evolve. Her 
standpoint has changed throughout the narrative, and when she meets Minnie, the reader is 
encouraged to see their interaction as yet another step in altering Camilla’s perspective. Upon 
meeting, the two “soon fell into a pleasant and animated conversation”; “[m]utually they 
were attracted to each other” (69). Minnie quickly feels “quite at home with Camilla” and 
Camilla, in turn, “gaz[es] with unfeigned admiration” at Minnie’s beauty, and “listen[s] with 
deep interest” as Minnie and Louis describe their pasts and their plans for the future. When 
Camilla asks Minnie how she came to accept her mission as a black woman in the South, 
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when she could have led a life of leisure as a white woman in the North, Minnie launches 
into a long monologue explaining her reasons for wanting to do what she could for the 
freedpeople. Minnie’s explanation represents yet another instance of black female instruction 
in social justice and civic duty; Camilla listens, the apt student, and responds: “I think I 
understand you” and then begins to apply Minnie’s lessons about the need for the more 
privileged to help those less privileged: “I feel we owe a great debt to the colored race, and I 
would aid and not hinder any hand that is ready to help do the needed work. I have felt for 
many years that slavery was wrong, and I am glad, from the bottom of my heart, that it has at 
last been destroyed” (73). The narrative ends soon after this conversation, but the reader is 
assured that Camilla’s perspective is not frozen or stagnant, but continues to evolve, this time 
through her interaction with the newest addition to her family, Minnie.  
 Harper’s development of a black female standpoint, and its transference to the novel’s 
central white female character, represents a stark reversal of the popular mid-nineteenth 
century notion that black female slaves learned from their white mistresses and thus would be 
more prepared for the duties of voting and citizenship than black men—what O’Brien calls 
the “logic of the ‘mistress narrative’” (612).34 In Minnie’s Sacrifice, it is white women, 
symbolized through Camilla, who must learn from the black women and men around them in 
order to develop new perspectives on the social world. Camilla is powerful, indeed—even 
when just a child, she has the influence to free slaves and dismiss overseers who she finds 
                                                
34 An example of this logic can be found in the transcript of the 1869 AERA meeting, in 
which Paulina Wright Davis worries that if the Fifteenth Amendment were passed without 
including woman’s suffrage, “woman would have a race of tyrants raised above her in the 
South, and the black women of that country would also receive worse treatment than if the 
Amendment was not passed.” She then notes that the country would be better off if black 
women were given the vote, rather than black men, because “The black women are more 
intelligent than the men, because they have learned something from their mistresses” 
(Stanton et al. 391).    
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excessively cruel, and as an adult, she uses her family’s wealth to support the Union and fight 
racial violence in the South—but she needs the guidance of the freedpeople in order to 
develop that power into a force for justice. As a child, she “can’t understand it,” and as an 
adult, she “think[s] she understands” it—a progression of development in her racial 
consciousness, to be sure, but one in which black women have played, and will continue to 
play, an integral role. This reversal of who would be educating whom in the postwar nation is 
echoed in Harper’s other 1869 work of fiction, the short allegorical piece “The Mission of the 
Flowers.” This story, in which a rose bush is granted the power to change an entire flower 
garden into roses, only to find that the garden’s beauty is diminished, can be read as a sort of 
companion piece to Minnie’s Sacrifice. The allegory offers a strong critique of white woman 
suffragists’ universalizing deployment of the category of “woman” and the damaging effects 
of their limited perspective.  
 Just as the character of Camilla can be read as a metonym for white women in 
Minnie’s Sacrifice, white women are again represented in “The Mission of the Flowers,” this 
time in the form of the rose tree.35 The story opens on a “lovely garden, filled with fair and 
blooming flowers,” in which the rose tree “was the centre of attraction” (230). Its flowers 
were widely admired and sought after, and the rose, who “was very kind and generous 
hearted” thinks it only natural that, “seeing how much joy she dispensed,” all the other 
flowers of the garden should be transformed into roses too (231).36 When a spirit emerges to 
                                                
35 “The Mission of the Flowers” originally appeared in Harper’s 1869 volume Moses, a Story 
of the Nile. All citations of the story here are taken from Foster’s anthology, A Brighter 
Coming Day (1990).  
 
36 As I read this story, there is more than a note of sarcasm in Harper’s figurative 
construction of the white woman who holds herself in such high regard and is so self-
absorbed that she cannot imagine others not wanting to be transformed into her likeness.  
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grant the rose her wish, she is humbled, and “bowed her head in silent gratitude to the gentle 
being who had granted her this wondrous power” (231). But the rose is quickly unable to 
appreciate the world around her—she “scarcely heeds” the stars in the sky, and “hardly 
noticed” the “gentle dews” which “kissed the cheeks of her daughters”—instead, she eagerly 
anticipates the beginning of her “work of change” (231). When the morning comes, she 
begins to transform all the other flowers in the garden into her likeness—tulips, verbenas, 
violets, and poppies are all converted into roses, and when her work is done, and the rose tree 
sits among the other rose trees, she realizes that something is wrong: “every flower was 
changed by her power, and that once beautiful garden had changed, but that variety which 
had lent it so much beauty was gone, and men grew tired of roses, for they were everywhere” 
(232). As she looks around in horror at the sea of sameness, where “the humblest primrose 
would have been hailed with delight,” the rose “wished the power had never been given her 
to change her sister plants to roses” (232). When it turns out that the rose’s assault on the 
garden had only been a dream, she is happily relieved: “she had learned to respect the 
individuality of her sister flowers, and began to see that they, as well as herself, had their 
own missions” (232).  
 It is a simple story on the surface, but when read as a theoretical counterpart to 
Minnie’s Sacrifice, the piece expands Harper’s critique of white women’s limited 
perspective. The rose is powerful, like Camilla, but again lacks perspective—she is unable to 
understand that the other flowers of the garden offer different talents and beauties, and that in 
turn, their individual missions together create a better garden. The violets are the first to 
bloom and “herald the approach of spring,” while the dahlias brightened the end of the 
season and “loved the fading year”; the tulips are bright and tall, while the snow drops are 
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small and enveloped in white (231-232). Together, the varieties of flowers create a 
harmonious scene that can be enjoyed any time; their diverse colors and blooming seasons 
meld to produce the beauty of the garden. The rose, however, thinking that she represents all 
flowers, does not understand this diversity or the way it works to produce the garden’s 
splendor; she has to learn this lesson when the garden is overrun by roses and loses its 
loveliness.  
 The story gives a detailed account of the negative effects of the lack of perspective 
that comes with privilege and power: not only is the garden worse off, but the other flowers 
deeply resent their transformations. Though they all eventually “submit” to this “unwelcome 
destiny,” they do so with “heavy hearts,” “bitter sobs,” anger, and indignation (231). The 
flowers look at their transformations as “doom” and with “tearful eyes and trembling limbs” 
and “quiver[s] of agony” they “shrank instinctively” from the rose’s power (231). Harper’s 
use of the language of dread and resentment makes clear that the rose is not only ruining the 
whole of the garden, but doing violence to her individual “sister flowers,” “whose mission 
she did not understand” (232). This is a powerful critique of the false universal of the 
category of “woman”—white women’s dominance not only shatters the individuality of all 
other women and squanders their talents and purposes, but also damages the world in which 
those women live. Much as the rose cannot stand in for all flowers, white women do not 
represent all women—the story exposes the limited perspective of privilege and its failure to 
produce a just world. Harper debunks the false universal of “woman” and replaces it with 
“women,” and her focus on a wide variety of difference suggests that she is not simply 
bifurcating the category in terms of race, but also by differences of class, education, and 
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location.37 White women are again figured as needing an education in standpoint—they must 
learn that their views do not stand in for all women’s views, and that their privilege obscures 
their perspectives in ways that damage the world they are trying to intervene in.  
 The education of white women, as theorized in both Minnie’s Sacrifice and “The 
Mission of the Flowers,” provides an important backdrop to Harper’s theory of suffrage. The 
issue of voting rights does not emerge in the novel until near its conclusion, and this narrative 
placement importantly frames the suffrage issue as part of a wider set of issues and a longer 
history. By the time woman’s suffrage is broached between Minnie and Louis, the narrative 
has brought white male sexual violence to the fore, underscored white women’s privilege, 
and emphasized the central role of black women in educating the public in a standpoint based 
upon a need to remedy racial and sexual injustice and oppression. From this narrative 
foundation, Minnie argues for women’s right to vote against a skeptical Louis, beginning 
with a broad argument for universal suffrage:  
“I think the nation makes one great mistake in settling this question of 
suffrage. It seems to me that everything gets settled on a partial basis. When 
they are reconstructing the government why not lay the whole foundation 
anew, and base the right of suffrage not on the claims of service or sex, but on 
the broader basis of our common humanity” (78).  
     
When Louis replies that the nation is “not prepared” for woman’s suffrage, echoing Wendell 
Phillips words, that “[t]his hour belongs to the negro” (78), Minnie responds: “But, Louis, is 
it not the negro woman’s hour also? Has she not as many rights and claims as the negro 
man?” (78). Louis concedes that this might be true, but that “you cannot better the condition 
of the colored men without helping the colored women”—an idea that Minnie dismisses, 
                                                
37 Indeed, the bulk of the brief story is taken up by the careful detailing of the differences in 
place, personality, and physicality between the flowers, creating a garden geography that 
represents a symbolic map of women’s differences.   
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claiming that black women need the protection of the vote just as much; she does not think 
that “the negro man is the only one who has pressing claims at this hour” (78).  
 Minnie’s argument for the need for woman’s suffrage is underscored by its narrative 
link to her death. The lengthy suffrage dialogue immediately precedes the foreshadowing of 
Minnie’s killing—directly following this conversation, the narrator informs the reader that 
“the pleasant home-life of Louis and Minnie was destined to be rudely broken up” (81). 
Interestingly, it is Louis who begins to receive anonymous threats, telling him he is a 
“doomed man” and to “beware” (81), but it is Minnie who is ultimately killed by the Klan. 
The chapter depicting Minnie’s death is missing, but the conclusion of the novel suggests 
that Minnie was lynched while out visiting her students on an evening when Louis has gone 
to lecture in another town. While it is Louis who repeatedly worries about the increasing 
levels of violence in the South in which the “Ku Klux spread terror and death around” (85) 
and who receives the threats and intimidation, it is Minnie who dies at the hands of this 
violence. The extant narrative only includes the aftermath of Minnie’s death in which the 
community comes to pay their respects to Minnie’s body before it is buried, but during this 
procession of visitors, the story of another black woman’s death is linked to Minnie’s. Louis 
overhears a conversation between two women who, contemplating Minnie’s body, relay the 
story of how one of their daughters was killed for saying she would like to marry one of the 
Union soldiers who came through the town during the war: “Now when Amy seed de sojers 
had cum’d through she was mighty glad, and she said ina kine of childish way, ‘I’se so glad, 
I’m gwine to marry a Linkum soger, and set up housekeeping for myself.’ I don’t spect she 
were in arnest ‘bout marrying de sojer, but she did want her freedom” (87). According to the 
woman, a white man hears the girl’s comment, has her beaten, “tried” by a mob of 
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Confederate soldiers for “saying ‘cendiary words,” and then hung (87).38 While the extant 
text of the novel does not provide us with the details of Minnie’s death, the story of Amy’s 
hanging stands in for it and provides a narrative double that underscores how we might read 
Minnie’s “sacrifice”—not as a black woman who sacrifices her rights for her husband’s, but 
as a black woman who is sacrificed to racialized and gendered violence because of her 
institutionalized inequality. Amy is hung for trespassing against the tenets of miscegenation 
and for approximating a female domesticity reserved for white women—for stating, if only in 
the future tense, that she possessed a social equality that she did not have. And she is killed 
for this inequality, for not having the protection of the law. Minnie, though she comes from a 
different class, well-educated and never enslaved, meets the same kind of death. Neither have 
the protection of the law, neither are seen as equal—not to black men, and not to white 
women; both are killed at the hands of white male violence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
38 The story of Amy’s death has its roots in an account Harper heard while lecturing in South 
Carolina in 1867. In a letter to Still, she writes, “Our army had been through, and this poor, 
ill-fated girl, almost a child in years, about seventeen years of age, rejoiced over the event, 
and said that she was going to marry a Yankee and set up housekeeping. She was reported as 
having made an incendiary speech and arrested, cruelly scourged, and then brutally hung. 
Poor child! she had been a faithful servant—her master tried to save her, but the tide of fury 
swept away his efforts. Oh, friend, perhaps, sometimes your heart would ache, if you were 
only here and heard of the wrongs and abuses to which these people have been subjected” 
(Still 768).  
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The Refusal of Race-versus-Gender and the Reformulation of Suffrage 
“[C]laims for justice against racism and claims for justice against both patriarchal and 
heterosexual privileges were made to compete with each other: this competition among 
harmed collectivities remains one of the major spectator sports of the American public 
sphere. It says volumes about the continued and linked virulence of racism, misogyny, 
heterosexism, economic privilege, and politics in America.” 
 
—Lauren Berlant, “The Queen of America Goes to Washington City” 98 
  
Minnie’s Sacrifice puts forth a concept of suffrage that is quite different from 
Harper’s 1866 speech in which she figures the vote as a method of educating white women in 
injustice, but this is precisely my point: Harper develops suffrage into a flexible, transitional 
concept that means different things to different groups. Indeed, in Harper’s formulations, 
suffrage becomes a proxy for understanding difference itself: it is not a universal or static 
idea but a partial and dynamic process for recognizing the differences between women and 
their changing needs within their social and political environments. Harper’s simultaneous 
critique of white privilege and development of a black female standpoint generates a more 
expansive theory of suffrage than the discourse of the “split” allows, one that is embedded in 
a complex history of injustice that cannot be parsed or remedied through a simple focus on 
white feminist racism, on the one hand, or male privilege, on the other. 
Harper’s larger body of Reconstruction work puts forth a view of suffrage that is 
quite far from the “lesser question of sex” line that her views are usually whittled down to in 
the historiography. Her expanded idea of suffrage roots the concept in both racial and 
gendered injustices that cannot be extricated from one another—black women’s inequality 
cannot be parsed as only a function of their race, on the one hand, or of their gender, on the 
other. We might imagine this narrative framing of the issue as a response to Frederick 
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Douglass’s 1869 AERA claim, in which he argues that black men’s need for the vote is more 
urgent than women’s:  
I must say that I do not see how any one can pretend that there is the same 
urgency in giving the ballot to woman as to the negro. When women, because 
they are women, are hunted down through the cities of New York and New 
Orleans; when they are dragged from their houses and hung upon lamp-posts; 
when their children are torn from their arms, and their brains dashed out upon 
the pavement; when they are objects of insult and outrage at every turn; when 
they are in danger of having their homes burnt down over their heads; when 
their children are not allowed to enter schools; then they will have an urgency 
to obtain the ballot equal to our own. (Stanton et al. 382) 
 
The transcript of the meeting notes that “A Voice” calls out from the audience: “Is that not 
all true about black women?” to which Douglass responds: “Yes, yes, yes; it is true of the 
black woman, but not because she is a woman, but because she is black” (382). Douglass’s 
view—that a woman’s identity could be parceled up and partitioned, with race on the one 
side pinned to oppression, and gender on the other, rendered insignificant—is thoroughly 
debunked in Harper’s fiction. In Minnie’s Sacrifice it is black women, not black men, who 
are depicted as the primary victims of white male violence. From the novel’s beginning with 
black female slaves who are raped by white masters, to its end with the violent murders of 
Minnie and Amy, the narrative demonstrates over and over black women’s need for the 
protection of the law. Were Agnes and Ellen raped because they were black, or because they 
were women? Were Amy and Minnie murdered because of their gender, or because of their 
race? Harper’s work points up the absurdity of such inquiries and the impossibility of ever 
“answering” those questions. These women’s identities cannot be divided up, and in 
establishing this point, the suffrage question is simultaneously framed in the same way: the 
need for the protection of the vote is rooted in both racialized and gendered injustices that 
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cannot be extricated from one another and instead must be understood as “bound up 
together,” but in different ways, with an eye toward multiple, and shifting, differences.  
 By developing the concept of standpoint, Harper’s work extends this critique of the 
“choice” between race and gender and instead draws attention to white privilege, male 
privilege, and their oppressive effects. Black female characters are used to highlight the 
narrowness that stems from the white perspective, their viewpoints deployed to educate white 
characters on the failures of a purportedly democratic nation. Harper’s work suggests that in 
framing the suffrage issue as a struggle between race and gender, white and male privilege 
are erased. Her 1869 texts can be read as a deconstruction of that choice and a shifting of 
focus to those privileges that the Fifteenth Amendment frame obscures, the ones she figures 
as the origins of oppression. By developing parallel lines of critique in 1869, in which the 
fallacy of the white woman suffragist universal is exposed, its oppressive and damaging 
effects highlighted, while demonstrating the need for women’s legal equality, Harper’s work 
constructs a complex suffrage stance, one that transgresses the borders of the black man-
versus-white woman debate and emphasizes the importance of the situational perspective of 
the oppressed. Harper’s black female perspective posits not simply the impossibility of ever 
discerning which facet of one’s identity is the source of one’s oppression, but that the 
framework of that question produces its own critical problems.  
Indeed, we can read Harper’s 1869 fiction as not just a deconstruction of the 1869 
“split” and its “choice” between race and gender, but as a representation of the ways the 
framework itself works to efface black women’s contributions to feminist theorizing. The 
critical circulation of the “split” as the primary way to understand the suffrage issue in 1869 
absorbs and reinscribes the historical race/gender “choice” in its own narrative construction. 
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Harper comes to represent a facile, race-is-greater-than-sex position, and while this position 
is critically lauded, often by black feminist critics, it elides the feminist theorizing that can be 
drawn from her work. The critical attachment to the split, in this instance, obscures Harper’s 
contributions to theorizing the historical moment—the persistent focus on white feminist 
racism compresses her work into a choice of her race over her sex, which drains her ideas 
down to a “side” of the split, ultimately reinscribing the same blindspots of the racism split-
narratives critique. Ironically, we might read this focus as the reason Harper is not a major 
feminist historical figure today, the “split” effectively blocking her from this status in order 
to critique white feminist racism—a doubling-down on the critical problem, in the name of 
its solution. The “split” renders us unable to read Harper’s suffrage ideas as feminism, and 
her critique of feminism as feminism, because its narratives are committed to an either/or 
paradigm through the idiom of “sides” and “choices.” Instead, the historical object these 
narratives describe—the “split’s” race-versus-gender conundrum—becomes the paradigm by 
which present-day feminism is articulated. Split-narratives and their rhetoric are enmeshed in 
the very problem they seek to intervene in, a recursive practice that produces Harper as a 
symbol of race-before-gender, and thus as the non-feminist to Truth’s feminist, all in the 
name of critiquing white feminist racism. When Nell Painter notes that the “symbolic 
Truth”—the Stanton-Anthony version of Truth who stood for sex over race—“blots out” 
Harper’s feminism, I think she is pointing up a symptom not only of the way that Truth has 
been canonized within feminism but to the way the “split” has dominated the telling of its 
history (233). It’s not the symbolic Truth that obscures Harper’s feminism, it’s the “split”—
and our understanding of both the suffrage question, and black women’s theorizing of it, is 
obscured in the process.  
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The critical attachment to the “split” is also an attachment to the historical moment of 
1869. While I have kept to the 1869 parameters in this chapter, and used it as a center-point 
in Chapter 2, in order to expose the ways in which that moment exceeds its future narrative 
construction, it is necessary to point out the simple fact that the “split’s” emphasis on this 
year as a sort of benchmark produces its own kind of effects. Most notably, the year “1869” 
comes to represent a watershed for U.S. feminism, one that formulates its history into periods 
of development and setback that are defined by racism and the race-versus-gender problem. 
“1869” becomes an organizing sign that feminist narratives must relate to, and return to, 
again and again. Deborah McDowell writes about the ways the critical repetition of Truth’s 
“Ain’t I a Woman?” amounts to a knee-jerk feminist reaction, one that does not “capture” the 
“immediacy” of the words in Truth’s time or “reactivate it for our own”; instead, McDowell 
suggests that the question “functions not to document a moment in a developing discourse 
but to freeze that moment in time” (163). McDowell’s formulation, which asks after the 
effects of the repetition rather than what it might mean to “capture” the historical moment’s 
“immediacy,” can be aptly applied to the discursive circulation of the suffrage “split,” which 
effectively freezes the historical moment of 1869 into a discrete and usable part. The 
temporality of the “split,” as Harper’s work suggests, produces a periodization of feminism 
that forecloses on black women’s activist and theoretical contributions.39 This problem of 
                                                
39 In her work on African American women’s public culture in the nineteenth century, 
Martha Jones notes that only a few years after the Fifteenth Amendment debates, black 
women were given an important political right, one that would be overshadowed by the 
critical focus on the “split” and the year of 1869: “In 1876, female members of the African 
Methodist Episcopal Zion (AME Zion) Church won the right to vote and to hold office 
within their denomination” (151). According to Jones, “If black women had largely ceded the 
reigns of party politics to their male counterparts, they simultaneously took up a new 
campaign grounded in the politics of race, as well as sex, to redefine their public standing” 
(152). Jones’s point is to demonstrate how history looks different when black women are 
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periodization, and its entanglement in critiques of feminist racism, are explored in the next 
chapter.  
 
 
                                                
made central and the temporal focus is unmoored from national events dominated by white 
women. For other analyses of the difference an attention to black women makes for the 
periodization of U.S. feminism, see Terborg-Penn, African American Women, Chapter 3; 
Barkley-Brown; and Thompson. 
CHAPTER 4 
 
Feminist “Waves,” the “Monster Ballot,” and the Politics of the Past 
 
“We are dedicated to a revival of knowledge about our forgotten feminist history, and to a 
furthering of the militant tradition of the old radical feminist movement. We define this 
roughly, as: The whole American Woman’s Rights Movement until 1869, the Stanton-
Anthony group thereafter (National Woman’s Suffrage Association) and much later the 
revived militant tradition associated with Harriet Stanton Blatch in the U.S. (the 
Congressional Union, later the Woman’s Party) and with the Pankhursts in Great Britain 
(The Woman’s Social and Political Union).” 
 
—New York Radical Feminists, “Organizing Principles,” 1969 (119) 
 
 So begins the founding document of the New York Radical Feminists (NYRF), 
calling forth a “new” form of feminism in 1969 by tracing a historical lineage of the 
movement back to the nineteenth century. The task to which founding members Shulamith 
Firestone, Anne Koedt, and Cellestine Ware dedicate themselves is a weighty one: if 
feminism has languished over the past 50 years, its true history forgotten, then this new 
group will devote itself to a “revival” of that lifeless past. This “revival,” in turn, provides the 
ground on which to build a movement in the present, one that is simultaneously “new” and 
“old,” steeped in tradition and yet radically contemporary. History, it is clear, is vitally 
important to the success of this new endeavor and would in fact be integral to the new 
group’s organizational structure, which the “Principles” describe as a system of “brigades”: 
small groups of women named after pairs of historical figures from the “old” movement, 
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each taking on group-determined tasks to further the feminist cause.1 More than a 
perfunctory process of paying homage through a namesake system, each brigade would need 
to put history at the center of its own formation through a program of self-education. The 
first task of the founding group, the Stanton-Anthony Brigade, was to develop a three-stage 
system by which each incoming group of women would become an official brigade, one of 
which was to devote “six weeks of intensive reading and discussion of feminist history and 
theory (preferably direct sources)” in order to “acquaint each member of the group with her 
own history and to give her a sense of continuity with the feminist political tradition” (120).2 
History is not just about the past, but is a part of the present as well: the NYRF training 
period would demonstrate to each new member that she already has a feminist history to 
connect with and carry into the future.  
 Firestone reiterates this call to history in the opening to The Dialectic of Sex (1970), 
published less than a year after the establishment of the NYRF, by invoking a feminism of 
the past to which the contemporary movement can link to across time. According to 
Firestone, “In the radical feminist view, the new feminism is not just the revival of a serious 
political movement for social equality” but instead, “is the second wave of the most 
important revolution in history” (15). The goal of this revolution is the “overthrow of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The manifesto defines a brigade as a “core group of five to eight people or more” and 
suggests that each brigade chooses a name that reflects the goals of the group: “Thus an 
analysis-oriented group would not choose Pankhurst Brigade, nor would an action-oriented 
group choose Gilman Brigade” (120-121).  
 
2 The concern with using original sources to acquaint feminists with the history of the 
women’s movement runs throughout radical “second-wave” texts; this could be read as a 
reflection of the lack of trust these activists felt for historians who had ignored women’s 
history for most of the twentieth century, but it is also a sign of the radical feminist desire to 
take control of the framing of that history and deploy it for its own purposes. See Sarachild 
14-15 for another example of this concern. 
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oldest, most rigid class/caste system in existence, the class system based on sex” that has 
been “consolidated over thousands of years” (15).3 She continues: “In this perspective, the 
pioneer Western feminist movement was only the first onslaught, the fifty-year ridicule that 
followed it only a first counteroffensive—the dawn of a long struggle to break free from the 
oppressive power structures set up by nature and reinforced by man” (15). As in the 
“Organizing Principles,” Firestone deploys history to not only “revive” feminism but to 
ground the “new” movement in a long and significant struggle to break free from oppression. 
Firestone’s “waving” of the movement calls forth a nineteenth-century feminism that 
dissolves into a “fifty-year” rut after woman’s suffrage is won and must be reconstituted by 
radical feminists in the present. That a “first wave” of U.S. feminism did not exist until a 
self-described “second wave” named it is one of the more peculiar hallmarks of the 
periodization of the movement. While nineteenth-century women’s rights activists such as 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony certainly saw their movement as historic, and 
famously wrote the history to prove it, these figures did not describe their work as the first of 
what they hoped would be many waves of a rising feminism washing over the nation.4 In the 
popular lexicon the 1963 publication of Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique often marks !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The use of superlatives such as “oldest” and “most rigid” is a common technique used 
across a variety of radical feminist texts to describe women’s oppression under patriarchy. I 
will discuss this practice and its effects in more detail below. 
 
4 In the Preface to the first volume of History of Woman Suffrage, the editors demonstrate 
that they are keenly aware that in writing the history of the movement as it unfolds, and 
writing themselves into history, they open themselves up to charges that they lack 
impartiality or are “egoistic” (8). They argue, however, that while “to be historians of a 
reform in which we have been among the chief actors, has its points of embarrassment,” it 
has more advantages: “those identified with this reform were better qualified to prepare a 
faithful history with greater patience and pleasure, than those of another generation possibly 
could,” and more importantly, the movement’s documents could be lost forever if they were 
not collected and published while the central figures of the movement were still living (7-8). 
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the beginning of the “second wave” of feminism, but it was not until the late 1960s and the 
advent of radical feminism by figures such as Firestone that the concept of feminist “waves” 
came into being.5 While Firestone never actually refers to a “first wave,” instead using the 
language of a “first onslaught” and “the dawn of a long struggle,” by defining her movement 
as a “second wave” she implicitly constructs a history that retrospectively calls forth the 
“wave” that came before. History is at the center of the “new wave,” the legacy of the past 
facilitating the production of a contemporary movement. !
But it is not just any feminist history, or even any nineteenth-century woman’s rights 
movement, that these texts evoke and emphasize; it is a particular periodization and lineage 
that is drawn in order to connect with the present, one that relies on a familiar date. In the 
“Organizing Principles,” it is initially the whole woman’s right movement of the nineteenth-
century that is established as the root of this lineage, but after 1869, it is only a part of that 
movement, the Stanton-Anthony group, that carries on the feminist tradition. Before this 
watershed year, the authors claim the broader movement was “militant,” but after, they only 
identify with one “side” and trace their heritage through it, rather than the movement in its 
entirety. While the term “split” is never used in this passage, it is implicit in the idiom of 
“wholes” separating into “parts” after the infamous year. By invoking the past movement, the 
NYRF establish a historical tradition that demonstrates that they are not the first group in 
history to fight for women’s rights, but by “splitting” that movement they cordon off one 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Firestone was not the first to use the “wave” metaphor to describe the feminist movement. 
Journalist Martha Weinman Lear’s March 10, 1968 article, “The Second Feminist Wave,” is 
the first published reference to feminist “waves,” although the concept almost certainly had 
been circulating in radical feminist organizations for months, if not years, before its 
publication. !
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“side” from the other, a strategy that performs a number of strategic tasks in bringing to 
“life” a new feminism one hundred years later in 1969.  
 In this project I have examined how feminist historiography has constructed 
canonical narratives of the 1869 suffrage “split,” producing and compressing that event in 
ways that subsume the complexity of white feminist racism and black women’s theorizing of 
the movement, all in the name of a progressive antiracist feminism in the present. It is not the 
referent of this story—the “split” itself—but the narrative practices through which this 
referent has taken on hypercanonical status that has motivated this exploration. The “split” 
articulated in foundational texts of women’s history of the late 1950s  and 1960s circulates 
widely across the historiography of the following fifty years, so widely in fact that it now 
stands as a shorthand reference to the struggle between race and gender. These narratives 
have deployed the past as a means for constructing the political agency of present-day 
feminism, the “split” underwriting the authority of contemporary iterations of the movement.  
This type of practice can also be seen in the historicizing gestures of the movement 
documents and manifestoes of radical feminism in the late 1960s and early 1970s.6 These !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!The term “radical feminism” is a contested one, both an ideological and institutional 
category, sometimes used in opposition to liberal, or cultural, or socialist feminism, 
sometimes used to differentiate between larger, national organizations and smaller, loosely-
affiliated, regional groups of feminist activists. In this chapter I use the terminology to refer 
to the latter; that is, I focus on the foundational texts of the small groups of the Women’s 
Liberation Movement (WLM), rather than, say, on the texts of the (liberal) National 
Organization for Women, or the (socialist) Women’s Liberation Union, or the (black 
feminist) Combahee River Collective. Not only were the early, self-defined radical feminist 
groups the first to publish movement documents and manifestoes that articulated the 
strategies and goals of radical feminism through the construction of a feminist past, they 
were the only vein of feminism to do so in terms of the 1869 “split.” Other feminist 
organizations and groups of the era do not reference this historical event as an important 
touchstone in building their movement. I use the term “radical feminism,” then, not as a 
normative practice but as a descriptive one meant to delineate a set of groups and their texts 
rather than suggest that other groups of the era were not “radical” or “feminist” in any sense 
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texts take up the “split” after it was delineated and discussed in Eleanor Flexner’s Century of 
Struggle (1959) and Aileen Kraditor’s The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement (1965) 
but before it had become a hypercanonical symbol through its reiteration in feminist 
historiography.7 This body of work constructs what we might call a non-canonical narrative 
of the “split”—the story of the nineteenth-century woman’s rights movement that did not 
become the dominant way for feminists to understand and use the past. In the previous two 
chapters, I have looked to other ways of understanding the era of the “split” without 
privileging the “split” itself; in this chapter, I am instead exploring a different itinerary of this 
discursive construct as another method for seeing around the hypercanonicity of the race-
versus-gender narrative. I track the 1869 “split” as it travels through this body of work, 
exploring how radical feminists construct a story of the nineteenth-century as a method for 
defining—and—claiming—feminism in the late-1960s and early-1970s. These movement 
texts produce their own kind of narratives that produce the “split” not in race-versus-gender 
terms, as the historiography does, but in terms of the radical and the conservative. Their 
narratives of the nineteenth-century woman’s rights movement, in turn, rely not on an 
opposition between race and gender, but on analogies between those two categories. This 
production of the past becomes a story by which radical feminists stake their claim as the true 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
of those words. See Echols for an understanding of radical feminism in opposition to what 
she calls cultural feminism. See King, Theory in Its Feminist Travels for a critique of these 
sorts of typologies, which she argues “giv[e] edges and borders to threads of connection” and 
thereby make static and rigid what she sees as fluid and shifting (10). !
7 The next major history of suffrage to appear after Kraditor’s was Ellen DuBois’s Feminism 
and Suffrage (1978). It was not until the 1980s that the “split” begins to circulate widely 
among a diverse set of texts of feminist history and women’s studies.  
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feminists of the “second wave,” defending their strain of the movement against liberal 
feminism, on the one hand, and radical leftists, on the other.8  
This body of work has been read as “reproducing” the same “troubling structure” of 
the “first-wave” feminists such as Stanton and Anthony, with critics suggesting that the 
radical feminists of the “second wave” revived and repeated the racist practices of the 
nineteenth-century movement (Henry, Not My Mother’s Sister 77).9 But I argue that the 
reiteration of the “second wave’s” failure on issues of race is a parallel narrative practice to 
the radical feminist construction of history, in which the feminist past is consistently 
retrieved and retold in order to bring about a new movement. That is, feminist 
historiographers and critics use the wave metaphor to reproduce the past in terms of its 
failures, but this practice might be read as part of the same narrative script in which feminist 
history is rendered in particular ways so as to produce the political agency of feminism in the 
present. The critique of the radical feminists has certainly been warranted, but it has 
contributed to an ahistorical canonized narrative that refuses the ways in which their texts can 
also be read as a story for understanding the political culture in which feminism is generated.  
 
“Waving” Radical Feminism 
 !Much like the canonical narrative of the Stanton-Anthony “side” of the nineteenth-
century suffrage movement, a standard story of the radical feminists of the “second wave” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 I use quotations around all references to the “second wave” and other “wave” language in 
what follows. My aim is to call attention to the constructed nature of the wave model and to 
resist the pull to reify the  metaphor.  
 
9 Although I do not intend to make a causal argument here, I suspect this has much to do with 
the way radical feminists read the “split” in fact; they identify with the wrong “side”—the 
Stanton-Anthony “side”—and are therefore rendered unusable by present-day critics for 
whom this “side” represents a symbol of white feminist racism.  
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has developed over the last thirty years. According to this narrative, the “second wave” of the 
U.S. feminist movement emerges out of middle-class white women’s myopic focus on 
gender at the expense of analyses of race and class.10 Critiques of the racist underpinnings of 
the “second wave,” and especially the tendency within the manifestoes of the movement to 
envision white women’s experience as women’s experience, exposed the false universals of 
the emergent feminism of the 1960s and demonstrated how they obliterated the experiences 
of women of color. Some critics focused on individual works of the early Women’s 
Liberation movement, like Hortense Spillers, whose incisive and at times scathing critique of 
Firestone’s Dialectic of Sex points up the myriad ways in which that work uses the term 
“woman” as a “universal and unmodified noun” to produce “an unrelenting ‘objectification’ 
of women and men of color” (159). !
Other critics focus less on individual texts and instead invoke the failures of a more 
general Women’s Liberation movement to see race and sex as intertwined forms of 
oppression. For instance, in her influential analysis of race in feminism Ain’t I A Woman 
(1981), bell hooks describes how she was “disturbed by the white women’s liberationists’ 
insistence that race and sex were two separate issues” and their refusal to confront the racism 
embedded in their thinking:  
The group of college-educated white middle and upper class women who 
came together to organize a women’s movement brought a new energy to the 
concept of women’s rights in America…Yet as they attempted to take 
feminism beyond the realm of radical rhetoric and into the realm of American 
life, they revealed that they had not changed, had not undone the sexist and 
racist brainwashing that had taught them to regard women unlike themselves 
as Others. Consequently, the Sisterhood they talked about has not become a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 This zero-sum reading—that to focus on gender oppression must necessarily entail a denial 
of racial or class oppressions—is one of the tropes that secures this narrative’s claim about 
the “second wave” and race. 
!! 179!
reality, and the women’s movement they envisioned would have a 
transformative effect of American culture has not emerged. (121) 
 
Without specifying it overtly, hooks takes the self-defined radical feminists of the “second 
wave” as the object of her critique; she does not invoke particular texts or writers, but it is 
clear that it is this emerging feminist work of the 1960s that is responsible for this failure. 
Rather than bring about a truly revolutionary movement that would eradicate oppression and 
discrimination for women and men, black and white, this group of feminists could only 
reproduce the same “hierarchical pattern of race and sex relationships already established in 
American society” (121).  
 One might read these influential critiques of the early Women’s Liberation movement 
as foundational for what would become a standard trope in the field of feminist studies. No 
where is this practice more apparent than in the literature of the “third wave” of feminism. 
While the radical feminists of the “second wave” might have established the wave metaphor 
as its guiding narrative trope, the model was taken up by a self-described “third wave” in the 
mid-1990s. Like the “second wave,” this new “wave” established itself not only through a set 
of “new” problems, issues, and styles of activism, but through the narrative construction of 
the “wave” that preceded it. In the primary texts of the “third wave,” the “second wave” is 
produced as a monolithic, static unit, one that not only resists dissent or change, but 
difference itself. In telling the “second wave’s” story, the “third wave” imagines a feminist 
legacy to connect with, and then deploys that legacy as a means of taking on the mantle of 
feminism. This narrative production of its predecessor creates an opening through which the 
“third wave” can tell its own story about feminism, one that uses the “second wave” as a foil 
to highlight the need for a new feminist politics that can address the problems of the past. In 
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this process, the contingency and context of the previous “wave” are obscured as a means of 
highlighting the superior clarity and clear superiority of a new feminist movement. 
 For instance, in Vivien Labaton and Dawn Lundy Martin’s “third-wave” collection 
The Fire This Time: Young Activists and the New Feminism (2004) the editors suggest that a 
new feminist movement is needed because the “second wave” has focused too narrowly on 
gender at the expense of other facets of women’s identities; in forming a “third wave” the 
writers suggest they primarily want to “split open” the “borders of feminism” “so that other 
identity claims of race, sexuality, class, nationality, and geography can move beyond being 
simply ‘tolerated’ or ‘included’” (xxvii). In this narrative, the “third wave” is borne out of the 
“inattentiveness to racial, cultural, sexual, and national differences” that the “second wave” 
failed to address (xxviii). This “third wave” will “g[o] beyond the rhetoric of inclusion” 
because they have “learned from the second wave’s faux pas” in regard to issues of race and 
class: the “feminist movement cannot succeed if it does not challenge power structures of 
wealth and race” (xxix). The “third wave” emerges and is defined through its difference from 
the “second wave” over difference—no reference to specific texts or activists of the “second 
wave” are needed in this narrative of feminist rejuvenation; feminist readers know this story 
by heart. 
My point is not to minimize or dismiss the critique of “second wave” feminism, but to 
show how that critique becomes an integral part of a feminist narrative in which the history 
of the movement is evoked and deployed in the idiom of failure so that a new movement can 
forge ahead. This story of “second-wave” feminism generates the basis of a new feminism 
that will be able to move beyond the mistakes of the past and bring about the revolutionary 
change that the earlier “wave” failed to produce. This narrative practice is so economical that 
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readers need not even be given a text or name by way of example of the failures the writer 
draws on; the connection between the “second wave” and the failures on race are so airtight 
that these citations are not needed. Indeed, by not citing specific texts from the previous 
“wave,” that connection is more firmly cemented as a form of common knowledge among 
feminist readers—the story is so well-established that it need not be documented.11 
 The work of the radical feminists of the “second wave” might be imagined as those 
missing citations in narratives like Labaton and Martin’s. As feminist historian Catherine Orr 
has suggested, the “third wave” tends to “flatten” what is a “very complex and contradictory 
social movement into a few shorthand caricatures,” allowing an “image of the monolithic, 
ideal, ‘mainstream’ feminism’” to emerge, an image that the “third wave” can then “battle” 
because it “is rarely examined as a representation; rather, it almost always is accepted as 
‘real’” (32). According to Orr, “the addition of historical nuance to this generation’s 
perspective” will not necessarily intervene in the storytelling process on the part of the “third 
wave.” Instead, she suggests that this form of narrative shorthand is “central” to the 
“reinvention process” of waves (32). Likewise, my point is not to validate or deny the “third 
wave’s” construction of the  “second wave” but instead to demonstrate how this “reinvention 
process” is emblematic of a feminist narrative practice in which the history of feminism—
and the failures of that history—underwrite the authority of successive iterations of the 
movement.   
The wave metaphor itself facilitates this process; it is through “waves” that 
feminism’s past is now most commonly organized and understood, in both popular and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See Hemmings, Why Stories Matter 110-112 for a discussion of the absence of citation in 
feminist theory, which she argues is “often more significant” than its inclusion for the ways it 
“both references and produces reflective agreement” in narratives of the past (110, 112).  
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academic contexts. In its classic form, this practice designates the “first wave” of feminism 
as the period between the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848 and the passage of the Nineteenth 
Amendment in 1920, the “second wave” as beginning in the 1960s, and a “third wave” that 
commences on the heels of the second in the mid-1990s.12 While the wave model has been 
tremendously influential in popularizing and promoting feminism and its history, its 
periodization popularizes and promotes a particular version of the feminist past, a singular 
and unified narrative that stands in for the multiplicity and contradiction of the history of the 
movement.13!!
 
Radical Feminism in History 
“There we were standing at the microphones, hands stretched up. [The chairman] rams 
[Murray’s] resolution through; refuses to call on us; as soon as the whole thing is over this 
little kid, smaller than I am, rushes in front of me to the microphone, raises his hand, is 
recognized and the first thing he says is ‘ladies and gentlemen, I’d like to speak to you today 
about the most oppressed group in America, the American Indian.’ Shulie Firestone and 
about three or four other people…were ready to pull the place apart. Then William Pepper 
patted Shulie on the head and said, ‘Move on little girl; we have more important issues to talk 
about here than women’s liberation.’ That was the genesis. We had a meeting the next week 
with women in Chicago.” 
 
—Jo Freeman, recounting her experience at the 1967 National Conference for New Politics 
(NCNP) (qtd. in Evans, Personal Politics 198-199) 
 
 In August of 1967, leaders of the Left held a meeting in Chicago to attempt to draw 
together the “increasingly fragmented” Movement, outline its goals, and nominate 
presidential and vice presidential candidates for the upcoming 1968 election (Evans, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 See Laughlin 76 for an example of this classic structure. For histories that rely on the wave 
structure more generally, see Echols; Legates; Rosen; Ezekiel; Dicker and Piepmeier; Evans, 
Tidal Wave; and Reger.  
 
13 See Davis, Moving the Mountain 11, Cobble 87, Garrison 238, Gilmore 105, and Aikau et 
al. 3 for descriptions of the utility of the wave metaphor for popularizing feminism in the 
public sphere.  
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Personal Politics 195). According to Sara Evans’s influential history of the period, this was a 
“parting attempt” by organizers to unify a large and diverse Movement that had been 
transforming into myriad movements with increasingly different focal points, aims, political 
strategies, and geographic locations over the past three years (196). Black Power and 
separatism had replaced the integrated movements Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) 
and Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) as the “touchstone of ‘true 
radicalism,’” leaving white leftist men in a position in which they “could only admire and 
emulate the black movement” (197). According to Evans’s history, the NCNP meeting 
became a space for these white men to “receive validation” from these black activists, and as 
delegates shouted “Kill Whitey!” and demanded that Black Power be given fifty percent of 
the conference vote and committee slots despite their numbers adding up to approximately 
one-sixth of the conference, white male leaders “applauded enthusiastically” and 
“capitulated” to the demands (197). According to Evans, the “pressing emotional needs” of 
these black and white male activists—anger and guilt—“proved far stronger than the desire 
for a strategic alliance” and the conference would fail to produce a unified front for the Left 
(197). 
 It would, however, produce the final incident of sexist treatment that would inspire 
many women to leave the Left and form an independent Women’s Liberation Movement. 
Watching the Black Caucus successfully assert their demands, a “radical minority” of white 
women, including Jo Freeman and Shulamith Firestone, began drafting their own resolutions 
to be read at the conference. Among these were demands for women to receive 51% of the 
vote and committee representation, condemnation of the media’s portrayal of women as sex 
objects, and the “revamping of marriage, divorce, and property laws” (Evans, Personal 
!! 184!
Politics 198; Echols 48). According to Evans, these women “had learned a lesson from black 
power and were demanding their rights without apology” (198) but had “failed” to foresee 
the “ridicule and dismay” that their resolution would produce in the male crowd (198). The 
resolution committee refused to give them the floor, and as Jo Freeman would recount later, 
the Chair told the women that the conference had “more important issues to talk about here 
than women’s liberation” (qtd. in Evans 199). Soon after Freeman and Firestone would 
convene groups of women in Chicago and New York that would form political strategies for 
women’s liberation that were independent from the Leftist groups from which they sprang.   
 This was not the first time this sort of dismissive tactic was deployed against women 
in the Movement. By 1967 there was already a history of women’s marginalization within 
the various civil rights and leftist groups, but this was, according to Evans, the event that 
“broke [the] dam” (201).14 The NCNP conference would result in the proliferation of small, 
independent groups of women committed to Women’s Liberation, many of which would 
declare themselves “radical feminists.” Some of the more active of these include the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 See “SNCC Position Paper (Women in the Movement),” written (at the time anonymously) 
by Mary King and Casey Hayden, reprinted in full in Evans, Personal Politics 233-235. In 
this paper, presented at the Nov. 1964 staff retreat of SNCC, the authors critique the male 
leaders of the organization for their unwillingness to see women as equals in terms of power: 
“it needs to be known that just as Negroes were the crucial factor in the economy of the 
cotton South, so too in SNCC, women are the crucial factor that keeps the movement running 
on a day-to-day basis. Yet they are not given equal say-so when it comes to day-to-day 
decisionmaking. What can be done?” (qtd. in Evans 234). The use of the analogy between 
race and gender would become a common technique for expressing women’s marginalization 
in later radical feminist documents, one that I discuss below. See also Hayden and King’s 
“Sex and Caste,” commonly referred to as the “Kind of Memo” from Nov. 1965, reprinted in 
Evans, Personal Politics 235-238, in which the authors expand their original critiques of 
women’s position in SNCC. 
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Redstockings, The Feminists, New York Radical Feminists, and Cell 16.15 These groups 
produced and published their own manifestoes, journals, and pamphlets and deployed a 
variety of political practices, including the now infamous consciousness-raising groups, sit-
ins, and zap-actions designed to gain mainstream media attention through outrageous or 
shocking tactics. While the groups differed in terms of membership, size, and political 
emphasis and strategies, they all defined their projects and goals in terms of a “radical” 
feminism. In what follows, I focus on the texts of these groups, most of which were produced 
between 1968 and 1972. We might imagine this archive of self-defined radical feminism as 
the silent stand-in when an amorphous, unarticulated “second wave” feminism is evoked by 
feminist critics or writers of the “third wave.” While the “second wave” of feminism can, and 
sometimes is, understood as encompassing a wide variety of feminisms across a longer 
period of time, its use as a discursive construct tends to flatten that field, with the work of the 
radical feminists delineated here functioning as a metonym for the entire “wave.” It is to this 
body of radical feminist work, in fact, that the ubiquitous wave metaphor for feminism can 
be traced back. 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Most of these groups were based in New York, but many smaller ones began in Chicago, 
including the Women’s Radical Action project, and later, would spread to Boston and other 
cities around the country. See Evans, Personal Politics 207-211 for descriptions of some of 
the smaller groups at the forefront of the movement. By the late 1970s, radical feminists 
would be responsible for setting up thousands of small groups committed to Women’s 
Liberation in some way or another (Evans 222). See also Echols 65-101 for descriptions of 
the early women’s liberation groups.  
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History in Radical Feminism 
“In short, feminism, which one might have supposed as dead as the Polish Question, is again 
an issue. Proponents call it the Second Feminist Wave, the first having ebbed after the 
glorious victory of suffrage and disappeared, finally, into the great sandbar of Togetherness. 
When I prepared to do an article on this new tide, I prepared also to be entertained; it is the 
feminist burden that theirs is the only civil-rights movement in history which has been put 
down, consistently, by the cruelest weapon of them all—ridicule.” 
 
—Martha Weinman Lear, “The Second Feminist Wave,” 1968 (24) 
 Lear’s 1968 New York Times article is the first known published reference to “second 
wave” feminism. Her description of both the history of the movement, and its status in the 
present day, suggests that this “new” feminism was rooted in the nineteenth-century suffrage 
movement, and shared with its forerunner the misfortune of not being taken seriously. The 
link between the “first wave” and the feminist “tide” of the contemporary moment is silent, 
but significant: Lear writes that the first “wave” “ebbed” after the vote was won and then 
“disappeared” into a “sandbar of Togetherness”—a reference to Betty Friedan’s critique of 
women’s domestic role in the early 1960s. Friedan’s prospectus for The Feminine Mystique 
was initially titled “The Togetherness Woman,” a critical reference to a popular advertising 
campaign that was running in various women’s magazines of the era.16 Lear’s evocation of 
“Togetherness” suggests that if the “second wave” does not include Friedan, it certainly can 
be traced back through this figure to the suffragists of the “first wave.” Indeed, the article 
begins with a lengthy section on the National Organization for Women—a group established 
in 1966 and of which Friedan was president—but midway through, Lear pivots to explore a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Friedan initially submitted “The Togetherness Woman” as an article to McCall’s, who 
promptly rejected it. She later submitted it to Ladies Home Journal, who agreed to publish it 
but not without editing it to make precisely the opposite point that Friedan had intended; 
Friedan refused to publish the edited version. She then sent the piece to Redbook, who 
rejected it as well, declaring that Friedan must have “gone off her rocker” (qtd. in Coontz 
146). For more on the publication history of Friedan, see Horowitz, esp. 197-223 and Coontz. 
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different group of feminists: “Not all of the new feminist activity is centered within NOW. 
To its left is a small group called Radical Women—young, bright-eyed, cheerfully militant—
which recently splintered off from Students for a Democratic Society” (50-51).17 These 
feminists, according to the author, are the “theoreticians” of the movement, as opposed to the 
NOW members who “attack concrete issues, tied primarily to employment” (51). Lear 
interviews a handful of these more radical activists, including Ti-Grace Atkinson, and 
determines that while they may be “atypical” they are at least “interesting” (51). After this 
foray into the “militant” part of the movement, a side that Lear says the more “conservative 
faction” of NOW views with a “certain ambivalence” (51), Lear gives Friedan the last word 
on feminism and its future, again evoking the radical/liberal divide: “We work with the 
realities of American life, and in reality our job now is to make it possible for women to 
integrate their roles at home and in society. But as to whether we will finally have to 
challenge the institutions, the concepts of marriage and the nuclear family—I don’t know. I 
just don’t know” (qtd. in Lear 56).  
 Lear’s representation of the second feminist “wave” popularized a lineage that radical 
feminists would dispute over the course of the next decade. It is clear that for Lear, the 
“wave” began with Friedan, and its precursors were the suffragists. “Radical” feminists are 
given their due, but primarily as outliers of the “real” movement that was interested in getting 
“concrete” things done. The effort to define the “second wave” was officially on, and the 
claim to feminism in the present would come to hinge on the representation of the past. A 
variety of radical feminist texts spanning the next five years construct an emerging narrative 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 See Barakso, esp. 11-38, for a history of the founding of NOW.  
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of the nineteenth-century woman’s rights movement that would play an integral role in 
defining the new “wave,” its goals, and its future.18  
 These writings represent the nineteenth-century woman’s rights movement as a lost 
past that must be uncovered and connected with for the “second wave” to commence. The 
New York Radical Feminists published its journal Notes from the First Year in 1968, and 
Shulamith Firestone’s lead essay establishes a historical context for the present-day 
movement. The history of the women’s movement is not what women had thought it was, 
according to Firestone. In “The Women’s Rights Movement in the U.S.: A New View,” she 
writes of a “suspicious blank in the history books when it comes to the WRM, one of the 
greatest struggles for freedom this country has known,” suggesting that this “blank” has been 
filled with a false image of the past: “Little girls are taught to believe that all their rights were 
won for them a long time ago by a silly bunch of ladies who carried on and made a ridiculous 
display, all to get that paper in the ballot box” (par. 6).19 Firestone sees the primary task of 
the “new” radical feminism—the work that must be done before any contemporary goals can 
be achieved—as filling in this “suspicious blank” by historicizing the movement.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 As the publication dates of these texts makes clear, in this chapter I am less interested in 
constructing a new periodization of feminism, one that alters its central figures or shifts its 
timeline, than I am in developing an understanding of how the “classic” or founding texts of 
this model exceed their narrative construction. I am in agreement, however, with scholars 
who argue that the wave model has highlighted the activism of white women while obscuring 
the work of women of color, and that shifting the periodization of feminist history allows for 
different issues and problems within feminism to emerge, indeed, allowing for different 
feminisms to come into view. See Springer and Thompson for two exemplary cases against 
the current wave model. 
 
19 Firestone’s article would be revised and republished a year and a half later in The Dialectic 
of Sex (1970). 
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This call to the past is repeated throughout the texts of the radical feminists. Judith 
Hole and Ellen Levine, authors of one of the first studies of the revival of the women’s 
movement and its origins, constructs this historical void too. In their 1971 essay, “The First 
Feminists,” they suggest that the proud history of the nineteenth-century movement “has 
been only cursorily discussed in American history textbooks” (5).20 This gap in history, 
according to Hole and Levine, must be filled in order for contemporary women to understand 
the origins of women’s liberation and the many parallels between the two eras’ movements. 
By constructing a narrative that fills this gap, the radical feminists of the “second wave” 
establish a connection to the past that allows them to place their movement within a longer 
historical trajectory. These historicizing gestures frequently rely on generational language to 
draw this ancestry, as when Firestone describes the contemporary radical feminist movement 
as “the direct descendant of the radical feminist line in the old movement” (Dialectic of Sex 
37). Like the contemporary radical feminists, this “old line” of feminism saw “feminist issues 
not only as women’s first priority, but as central to any larger revolutionary analysis” 
(Dialectic of Sex 37).21 The “new” radical feminism is both new and deeply rooted in this 
feminism of the past.22  
This drive to historicize their feminism appears contradictory for a movement often 
concerned with demonstrating the ways in which they are on the cutting edge of a new !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 This article first appeared in Hole and Levine’s Rebirth of Feminism (1971) and was 
reprinted the same year in the NYRF journal Notes from the Third Year (1971). 
21 See Sarachild 27 and Morgan, “Introduction” xxii for similar examples.  
  
22 While here I am interested in tracing how a “second wave” narrative of the nineteenth-
century woman’s right movement emerges, again it is worth noting the language of 
Firestone’s claim to the past: she insists that feminism must be the “first” priority of women, 
and that these issues are “central” to any larger social revolution, a rhetorical strategy that I 
will discuss in more detail below.   
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politics—why should they temper that edge with the historical knowledge that they were not 
the first, after all, to insist on women’s liberation? While these writers often relish their 
newness, in one sense, they also repeatedly insist that their radicalism had precedent.23 Hole 
and Levine put it this way:  
The contemporary women’s movement is not the first such movement in 
American history to offer a wide-ranging feminist critique of society. In fact, 
much of what seems ‘radical’ in contemporary feminist analysis parallels the 
critique made by the feminists of the nineteenth century. Both the early and 
the contemporary feminists have engaged in a fundamental reexamination of 
the role of women in all spheres of life, and of the relationships of men and 
women in all social, political, economic and cultural institutions. Both have 
defined women as an oppressed group and have traced the origin of women’s 
subjugation to male-defined and male-dominated social institutions and value 
systems. (“The First Feminists” 5)   
 
Contemporary feminism might seem radical, but it is a radicalism with a history, and 
therefore, perhaps not so radical after all. The radical feminists of the “second wave” were 
not the first to develop these lines of feminist analysis, and if nineteenth-century women 
were making many of the same arguments, how extreme could their demands really be? 
Radical feminism is at once defined as revolutionary and rooted in a long tradition. 
Stanton and Anthony’s History of Woman Suffrage becomes an important touchstone 
for this dual exercise in establishing a radical feminist history to connect with, on the one 
hand, and moderating “second wave” radicalism, on the other. In her essay, “The Power of 
History” (1975) Kathie Sarachild describes the importance of Firestone’s initial foray into the 
nineteenth century and specifically her recovery and rehabilitation of Stanton and Anthony’s 
major work: “Had we gotten any idea of what that work was all about—its purpose and the 
breadth of its contents and even its method—we would have been spared much of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 See Morgan, “Introduction” xxiii, Atkinson 32, and Willis “Women and the Left,” 56 for 
additional examples of writers claiming, and delighting in, their “new” radical politics.  
!! 191!
confusion about the historical ground on which we were standing and would have felt much 
stronger than we had known possible” (38).24 History of Woman Suffrage represents a form 
of knowledge production that the new movement could emulate; it demonstrates “the 
correctness and necessity of the ‘new’ movement’s writing its own history and writing it 
accurately” (38) and would allow “second wave” radical feminists to make crucial links 
between the problems both “waves” faced. According to Sarachild, “Many of the issues of 
history that have come up in our wave of the movement, Stanton, Anthony and Gage address 
as well” (38). The two movements are connected by the same kinds of issues; the “new” 
movement is not so much new as it is a continuation of a historical process begun more than 
a century before. The “first wave” provides a set of historical parallels that can both authorize 
and guide the radical feminism of the “second wave” as it establishes itself in the present. 
 And if the issues have not changed all that much, then how radical can the new 
movement really be? In establishing connections between the two eras, the use of History of 
Woman Suffrage as a grounding object in the construction of these historical narratives also 
stresses how old the problems facing women are. For example, the introduction to the 
anthology Voices of Women’s Liberation (1970) is drawn directly from Stanton and 
Anthony’s History; in the proceeding chapter, volume editor Leslie Tanner explains the 
editorial decision as a demonstration of the utter reasonableness of the radical feminism of 
the “second wave” and its necessity in the present: “If it could have been written today, how 
far have we come? Compared with Susan B. Anthony and other early feminists, are we so 
radical? A glance at the origins of our movement will show that we have a most radical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Sarachild’s essay appears in the Redstockings’ collection, Feminist Revolution (1975), of 
which she was also editor. Sarachild was a member of New York Radical Women in addition 
to Redstockings, and co-founded the New York-based feminist newspaper, Woman’s World. 
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heritage” (“Foreword” 25, emphasis in original). The radical feminists of the “second wave” 
cannot be too extreme because, after all, there is Stanton and Anthony’s History, able to 
stand on its own as a contemporary document even as it was a century-old text.25 But again, 
does this make the these “new” feminists verifiably radical, or does it just seem that way in 
comparison to a contemporary political culture uninterested in women’s oppression? 
Establishing a “radical heritage” paradoxically moderates contemporary radicalism. Tanner 
rejects the idea that women’s rights have progressed in any real way; her rhetorical questions 
posit a present-day feminism that cannot be asking for too much because it had all already 
been asked for before. The parallels between the two “waves” offer a way to root feminism 
in the past and at the same time temper its radical reputation in the present. 
 The contradiction in these texts—the desire to construct a radical feminist history 
while simultaneously declaring their contemporary politics not that radical—can be read as a 
strategy for the legitimation of radical feminism in the present. While on the one hand these 
writers construct a “first wave” that can be juxtaposed with their own to ground their claims 
and mitigate their perceived extremism, on the other hand they employ that construction to 
show precisely that feminist radicalism has a long history that should be respected. If 
feminism is not a serious movement on par with other civil rights movements of the period, if 
its demands have not been taken seriously, as Lear suggests is its hallmark, then perhaps 
establishing a radical lineage would shore up its claims to legitimacy. But this strategy 
requires a particular construction of their nineteenth-century counterparts. When Firestone !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Specifically, it is the “Introduction” from volume 1 of History of Woman Suffrage that 
Tanner uses as the Introduction to Voices From Women’s Liberation. The practice of 
including excerpts from nineteenth-century feminist works is quite common in these radical 
feminist texts; see Sarachild 19 and “Account of the Proceedings of the Trial of Susan B. 
Anthony” in Notes from the Third Year 11-12 for additional examples.  
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refers to the “second wave” as “the direct descendant of the radical feminist line in the old 
movement” (Dialectic of Sex 37), or when Tanner writes that her aim is “to draw parallels to 
the movement today and to show the militancy of the early fighters for women’s rights” 
(“Foreword” 29), they are not making connections with the nineteenth-century movement as 
a whole, but constructing a particular strain within it. Firestone makes this distinction 
immediately apparent in a footnote appended to the acronym “W.R.M.” in which she clarifies 
the definition of the term: “Women’s Rights Movement, sometimes confused with one of its 
branches, the Suffrage Movement” (“Women’s Rights Movement,” par. 2, emphasis in 
original). Firestone is not interested in establishing ties with suffragists; she instead 
constructs suffrage as its own movement, a branch that is separated from the wider 
movement for women’s rights. The suffrage struggle might have been the most visible of the 
nineteenth-century women’s movement, the only one historians had bothered to write about 
up until then, but it was “only one small aspect of what the W.R.M. was all about” (Dialectic 
of Sex 23).  
 Radical feminist texts repeatedly highlight this distinction. Hole and Levine write that 
“[a]lthough the Seneca Falls Convention is considered the official beginning of the woman’s 
suffrage movement, it is important to reiterate that the goal of the early woman’s rights 
movement was not limited to the demand for suffrage” (“The First Feminists” 7), adding that 
suffrage had not even initially been included in the resolution drafted at the 1848 convention. 
Suffrage is portrayed not as a laudable goal, but a paltry part of a larger, more radical whole. 
In her essay “Women and the Left” (1969) Redstockings co-founder Ellen Willis describes 
what suffrage meant to the radical feminists marching on Washington in the anti-Inaugural 
activities of the Left in January 1968: not much. The women’s liberation group involved in 
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the march designated the rally’s theme as “Give back the vote;” the women would burn their 
voter registration cards as an act of “repudiation of suffrage as a sop for women” (55). 
Suffrage is historicized as a symbol for misguided efforts and compromised politics; far from 
a revolutionary struggle, suffragists could be satisfied with the mere crumbs of democracy, 
rather than the transformation of the nation.  
  Radical feminists consistently construct narratives that divide the suffragists from the 
true revolutionaries of the past movement, who they claim have never truly been understood. 
According to Firestone, “the Nineteenth Century WRM was indeed a radical movement from 
the start” but this “radical strain” “has been purposely ignored and buried” so as to be more 
palatable, less threatening (“Women’s Rights Movement,” par. 2). Hole and Levine similarly 
suggest that historians have purposely obscured the radicalism of the “first wave”:  
It must be remembered, however, that for most of the period that the woman’s 
movement existed, suffrage had not been seen as an all-inclusive goal, but as a 
means of achieving equality—suffrage was only one element in the wide-
ranging feminist critique questioning the fundamental organization of society. 
Historians, however, have for the most part ignored this radical critique and 
focused exclusively on the suffrage campaign. By virtue of this omission they 
have, to all intents and purposes, denied the political significance of the early 
feminist analysis. Moreover, the summary treatment by historians of the 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century drive for woman’s suffrage has made that 
campaign almost a footnote to the abolitionist movement and the campaign 
for Negro suffrage. (“The First Feminists” 10)26 
 
The authors use suffrage to again symbolize a “sop” that lacked the “political significance” 
of the more “radical critique” offered by the other part of the movement, the one more 
concerned with “wide-ranging” issues and the fundamental reorganization of society. The 
same narratives that invoke Stanton and Anthony as icons of political struggle !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 As I will discuss in greater detail below, these texts frequently use references to the black 
struggle (both nineteenth-century and Civil Rights era iterations) as a way of representing 
their own struggle.   
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simultaneously disavow suffragists: on the face of it, this is rather astonishing. Two of the 
most famous suffragists, according to this narrative, were actually not suffragists at all, but 
women’s rights revolutionaries ahead of their time. This reinvention is an ambitious task, but 
the return on this narrative work is substantial. These radical feminist writers authorize the 
politics of the “new” movement by dividing the “first wave” into conservative and radical 
“sides” and then declaring that the conservative “side” failed women even as it won them the 
vote.  
 
Radical Narratives of a Divergent Past 
 The 1869 “split” is the discursive construct by which this narrative feat is 
accomplished. Cellestine Ware, co-founder of the New York Radical Feminists along with 
Firestone and Anne Koedt, writes that “the schism between the National and the American 
was one between radical and conservative” and that while Stanton and Anthony’s “side” was 
interested in “women’s rights as a broad cause,” the AWSA “avoided issues that it 
considered might alienate the influential sectors of the community” (149). Hole and Levine 
construct the “split” in a similar way, to symbolize radicalism versus conservatism: the 
AWSA wanted to make woman’s suffrage “respectable” and therefore “limited its activities 
to that issue” while the NWSA “embraced the broad cause of woman’s rights of which the 
vote was seen primarily as a means of achieving those rights” (“The First Feminists” 8). In 
their essay “You’ve Come A Long Way Baby: Historical Perspectives,” Connie Brown and 
Jane Seitz likewise deem the NWSA “militant” and the AWSA “more respectable” (17-18) 
while Firestone writes that the “conservatives formed the [AWSA]” while the “radicals 
separated into the NWSA” (Dialectic of Sex 18).  
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 This recurrent trope of radicalism versus conservatism in the past allows these writers 
to identify with the radical “side” while assigning the conservative “side” the blame for 
“killing” feminism. Ellen Willis hints at this strategy as she describes why women wanted to 
“give back the vote” in 1968: “Since women’s 80-year struggle for the vote had achieved a 
meaningless victory and vitiated the feminist movement, we planned to destroy our voter 
registration cards publicly as a symbol that suffragism was dead and a new fight for real 
emancipation beginning” (“Women and the Left” 55). In this iteration, suffrage is separated 
from the struggle for true freedom; by declaring the old suffragism “dead,” a new, “real” 
feminism is born.27 Suffragism is not represented as part of the feminist movement, but 
instead, as a separate entity that would ultimately destroy the movement.  
“Real feminism” had existed once before, but after the “split,” it was eventually 
subsumed by the suffrage struggle. Firestone writes that even though “the Stanton-Anthony 
forces struggled on in the radical feminist tradition for twenty years longer,” “the back of the 
movement had been broken” (Dialectic of Sex 18) after 1869. The true feminists could not 
withstand the onslaught of the conservatives; by the time the NWSA and the AWSA merged 
in 1890, the radical cohort was too old to put up much of a fight for radical strategies, and 
instead “[was] slowly being replaced by a second group far more limited in their political 
analysis” (Hole and Levine, “The First Feminists” 9). Brown and Seitz pin this reunification 
“on the basis of a surrender on the part of the more militant NWSA” (19). While the 1869 
“split” allows these narratives to designate a radical side to identify with, the 1890 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 While the habit of declaring feminism “dead” is by now a rather familiar one in both 
popular and academic contexts, to my knowledge the “second-wave” radical feminists that 
are the focus of this chapter were the first to develop this narrative practice. See Gubar 
“What Ails Feminist Criticism?” and “Feminism Inside Out”; Henry, “Feminist Deaths”; 
Marcus; Moi; and Elliot for scholarly examples of a similar practice. See Wiegman for a 
critique of this mode of feminist criticism. 
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“reunification” represents the death knell for radicalism. In “The Women’s Rights Movement 
in the U.S.” Firestone laments the uniting of the two organizations:  
“Stanton and Anthony made a mistake merging their radical feminist National 
Suffrage Association with the timid provincial American Suffrage 
Association…But [they] were getting old, and with many misgivings, they 
finally merged with the ‘better organized’ American, a single issue 
organization, devoted strictly to suffrage, and working on the state level. 
Again, they might have saved fifty years. Once the pressure was taken off 
Washington, the Suffrage issue sank into the ‘doldrums’ until years later…” 
(par. 31-32) 
 
The radicals make a “mistake,” in this rendering, but as they were aging, and running out of 
time to make headway on their sweeping agenda, they caved into the conservatives. The 
dilution of the radical feminist cause, in turn, causes suffragism to founder as well. In 
Firestone’s narrative, the suffrage “side” is separate from the radical “side,” but it is powered 
by the radicals’ momentum, nonetheless. Once the radicals are subsumed by the suffrage 
cause, it is suffrage itself that suffers a setback.  
 While Firestone’s describes suffragism as mired in the “doldrums” after 1890, the 
fact remains that suffrage would eventually be won thirty years later.28 The attainment of 
suffrage, however, is defined not as a victory, but as another defeat in these radical feminist 
texts. Tanner notes that the “conservative turn” in the movement causes its eventual 
“collapse” (“Foreword” 29) while Hole and Levine identify the winning of the vote with both 
feminist dissolution and fatigue: “By 1920, so much energy had been expended in achieving !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Several radical feminist narratives use the term “doldrums” to discuss this post-“split” 
period, always with quotation marks around it but without citation. They appear to be taking 
the term from Flexner’s 1959 Century of Struggle, who to my knowledge is the first to use 
the terminology to refer to a “lull” in the movement’s momentum; see Flexner 248. Kraditor 
picks up the term six years later in the introduction to The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage 
Movement, 1890-1920 (1965); see Kraditor 6. See Rupp and Taylor for a critique of this 
terminology. 
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the right to vote that the woman’s movement virtually collapsed from exhaustion” (“The 
First Feminists” 10). This “exhaustion” would have lasting effects; after the movement 
“virtually died in 1920,” “feminism was to lie dormant for forty years” (10).29 Winning the 
vote is not a triumph, but rather an enervating blow to the “real” movement. In The Politics 
of Women’s Liberation (1975), Jo Freeman details the suffrage “defeat” as a “failure of 
imagination” on the part of suffragists who had “failed” “to provide an ongoing program 
which the vote could be used as a tool to institute” (18). To the contrary, the momentum of 
the movement was stymied once they achieved their goal: “They never faltered until the end. 
No defeat was as devastating as victory” (18).  
Firestone provides what is perhaps the clearest iteration of the defeat-in-victory 
narrative: 
The granting of the vote to the suffrage movement killed the W.R.M. Though 
the antifeminist forces appeared to give in, they did so in name only. They 
never lost. By the time the vote was granted, the long channeling of feminist 
energies into the limited goal of suffrage—seen initially as only one step to 
political power—had thoroughly depleted the W.R.M. The monster Ballot had 
swallowed everything else. Three generations had elapsed from the time of the 
inception of the W.R.M.; the master planners all were dead. The women who 
later joined the feminist movement to work for the single issue of the vote had 
never had time to develop a broader consciousness; by then they had forgotten 
what the vote was for. The opposition had had its way. (Dialectic of Sex 22) 
 
Firestone encapsulates the radical feminist “second-wave” narrative of the “first wave” in its 
entirety: she references the limitation of the movement through the “split” and the eventual 
conservative takeover; the depleting result when radicalism is subsumed; and the subsequent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Firestone constructs a particularly gloomy iteration of this narrative: “When, in 1890, with 
their leaders old and discouraged, the radical feminist National merged with the conservative 
American to form the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), all 
seemed lost. Conservative feminism, with its concentration on broad, unitive single-issues 
like suffrage, with its attempt to work within and placate the white male power structure—
trying to convince men who knew better, with their own fancy rhetoric yet—had won. 
Feminism, sold out, languished” (Dialectic of Sex 18). 
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death of the movement. The image of the “monster Ballot” consuming feminism constitutes a 
profound reversal; far from representing women’s rights, suffrage is a monstrous creature 
that feeds off of women’s energies, sucking them dry and leaving them with less than they 
had before. Three generations of activists, the radicals included, as well as the drive, 
direction, and future of the movement—all are casualties laid at the feet of the rapacious 
Ballot. The vote is so powerful and insidious, it even seizes the memories of woman’s rights 
activists, clouding their recollections and making it impossible to remember the radical 
“side” of the movement that knew what to do with suffrage if it were ever to be won. The 
power of the vote lay in the radicals’ vision of its use, and without that, the figure of the 
Ballot is not a success for women’s rights, but an accomplice of the antifeminists who could 
accept the change of woman’s suffrage as long as women’s position in society did not 
change. 
 The production of the “monster Ballot” is perhaps the most striking of the narrative 
techniques used in these radical feminist texts to secure the ground for their “new” 
movement. The image contains the entire story of the “first wave”—its split, its failures, and 
its death—and allows Firestone to point to the need for a new movement that could take up 
the radicalism that was snuffed out by suffrage. Firestone’s main point, after all, is to show 
that there is work to be done, rights to be won, in this new era of feminism; she concludes 
“that contrary to what most historians would have us believe, women’s rights were never 
won. The Women’s Rights Movement did not fold because it accomplished its objectives, 
but because it was essentially defeated and mischannelled. SEEMING freedoms appear to 
have been won” (“Women’s Rights Movement,” par. 34, emphasis in original). The suffrage 
success only looked like achievement; the objectives accomplished only appeared to bring 
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women more freedom. Instead, this narrative suggests that the suffrage “victory” provided 
cover for the failure of the movement to fundamentally change society in any “real” way, and 
if that was victory, then defeat was preferable.  
In Woman Power (1970), Cellestine Ware deploys a similar, succinct version of the 
same rationale for the new movement’s necessity; for her, the “split” “narrow[ed] the 
struggle for emancipation” to the suffrage cause, and “[t]his narrowing of the focus of 
feminism, with its eventual rejection of a radical analysis of the position of women, meant 
that feminism could never get to the root causes of women’s oppression. The result was that 
the full emancipation of women has yet to be achieved” (144). Suffrage is again imagined as 
the culprit behind the lack of change in women’s social and economic positions. It covers 
over the “root” of women’s subjugation, which, according to Ware, the radicals could have 
revealed and, presumably, eradicated. Fooled by the mighty Ballot, women did not gain the 
emancipation they had been promised. This, then, is where the “second wave” radical 
feminists come in—by picking up where the radical strain of the nineteenth century left off, 
learning from their mistakes, and refusing to be fooled again. By constructing suffragism as a 
separate movement, and imagining it as the assassin of true women’s rights, these texts 
construct an imaginary world in which they can reject the traitor Suffrage and identify with, 
and resurrect, true feminism.  
 
False Feminism, True Radicalism, and “The Arcs of History” 
 The narrative resurrection of the “real” feminism of the “first wave” is not simply a 
means for claiming a historical predecessor, but a method for radical feminists to define and 
control the “second wave” in the contemporary moment. This process includes the 
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construction of an origin story about the new “wave’s” official inception: who ushered in the 
start of this revolution? Firestone’s decision to publish Notes from the First Year with the 
New York Radical Feminists in 1968 was an effort to begin documenting the history of the 
women’s liberation movement as it unfolded.30 If historians had failed to take account of the 
significant milestones, events, and texts of the “first wave,” or if the figures, strategies, and 
goals of that “wave” had been distorted through the hazy lens of history, then these activists 
were not going to let that happen again. As Firestone and Koedt put it in their editorial 
introduction in the journal’s next installment, Notes from the Second Year, the movement 
needed a venue “in which to present the proliferation of new ideas and to clarify the political 
issues that concerned us” and that could “expand with the movement, reflect its growth 
accurately, and in time become a historical record” (2).31 The NYRF were “sick and tired” of 
their ideas being “distort[ed]” by “intermediaries”—the Notes periodical would give them a 
way to reach other women directly with their political messages and at the same time leave 
behind an unmitigated historical record.  
But that is not the only work the Notes series would perform. By defining the “first 
year” of the new “wave” as 1968, the editors shift the movement’s timeline forward to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Notes from the First Year was edited by Firestone and Anne Koedt. They describe the 
publication as “the first feminist journal put out by the new Women’s Liberation Movement” 
and frame its low official circulation as a form of making the journal all the more coveted 
and valuable: “Almost impossible to get hold of even within the movement—one dare not 
leave one’s tattered copy unguarded even now—its impact was nevertheless profound” 
(“Editorial” 2).  
 
31 In this editorial, Firestone and Koedt compare Notes to nineteenth-century suffragists’ 
foray into movement journalism; they want their periodical to “functio[n] politically much as 
did Stanton and Anthony’s Revolution exactly a century ago” (2). This type of historical 
analogy is a recurrent reference in these movement documents, using the “first wave” as both 
a grounding and a model for “second-wave” activities and strategies. And as I trace above, it 
is most frequently Stanton and Anthony who are the points of reference. See Ware 165-169; 
Tanner, ed.; and Hole and Levine, “The First Feminists” 5 for additional examples.!!
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official founding of the radical feminist movement in New York, and away from 1963 and 
Betty Friedan. This periodization places the origin of the new feminism squarely in the 
radical camp, relegating liberal feminism to the margins of its historical trajectory of 
revolutionary time. Claiming the mantle of true feminism means tracing a radical nineteenth-
century lineage directly to 1968, specifically passing over Friedan, the Mystique, and the 
National Organization for Women. The origin story of a radical “side” to the “first wave” 
that was subsumed by a conservative, suffragist “side” is tied to the 1968 resurrection of that 
radical feminism. By identifying who the real feminists were in the past, and why they failed 
after their more conservative cooptation, the NYRF attempt to cordon off liberal feminism 
from true feminism in the contemporary moment.  
 Kathie Sarachild’s “The Power of History” provides a representative case for this 
kind of historical “protection” against false feminists who sought to temper the aims of 
feminism and lower the revolutionary expectations of the women in the movement. As its 
title suggests, Sarachild’s article is concerned with the uses (and abuses) of history and its 
potential liberatory (or oppressive) effects. From the outset, the author’s anxiety about 
“losing” the meaning of the original ideas of the “second wave” is palpable; she is worried 
about the liberal feminist cooptation of the (true) feminist cause: 
The sources of the movement’s achievements are unknown—disembodied 
ideas, slogans, phrases. Though only a few years old, their origins are already 
seemingly unidentifiable, attributed to nothing more precise than ‘the 
women’s liberation movement’ and, therefore, their meaning is highly 
debatable and imprecise, their definitions lost, and with this, the power behind 
them. (14)     
 
The “origins” of the “second wave” have already become murky, according to Sarachild, and 
this is a problem; without the originary claim, its ideas become subject to “debate,” 
ambiguity, or, worse, redefinition. “Power,” in this iteration, does not come from the ideas of 
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the movement, but from being able to pin those ideas down to a particular time, place, and 
“part” of the movement. She continues: 
What is more, even though the actual, living people who began the movement 
are treated as unascertainable and irrelevant, history itself is not treated as 
irrelevant. Instead a new, false ‘feminist’ history is blithely created out of 
mistaken secondary sources to support political strategies long ago discredited 
by real history (as traced through the original sources). (14) 
 
The strategies Sarachild refers to here are the accommodating, measured, and 
mainstream ones of liberal feminist organizations such as NOW. The false feminists 
have constructed a false history that covers over the failures of the liberal strain of 
feminism in the U.S. and relegates the radicals to invisibility and disrepute.32 As these 
narratives have demonstrated, radicals were the source of true feminist promise in the 
nineteenth century, the promise that was destroyed by the conservative, suffragist 
“side.”33 But if history could be used to install a false feminist pretender as the real 
thing, it can also be used to set the record straight and deliver the movement back to 
its true pioneers. By returning to history, the pretenders can be unveiled: “When one 
does realize there are original sources and checks, one discovers that personal 
variations of the idea are substituted for original versions, and liberal versions for 
radical versions—all selling under the original names. The interpreters both cash in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Sarachild notes that this process has happened before, to the radicals of the nineteenth 
century, again constructing a narrative of the past that draws a connection to the present. In 
discussing the importance of history in general for the women’s movement, and the 
significance of the rehabilitation of the “real” “first wave,” she writes that Firestone was the 
first to show how “feminists in general and the radicals in particular [were] written out of the 
history of the last century” and then makes the correlation to the present day: “we ourselves 
almost immediately began to experience this invisibility happening to us even as we were 
there” (13).  
 
33 The terminology is different, but these radical feminist narratives define the liberal 
feminists of their era as the inheritors of the conservative “side” that won out in 1869.  
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on and water down the original ideas” (15).34 “Radical,” here, is the corollary to 
“original,” while “liberal” is relegated to the “personal”—the inference is that true 
feminism is radical, while liberal feminism is a weak substitute used for personal gain 
(rather than collective progress). 
Sarachild identifies the goal of this liberal bait-and-switch: “to wipe the original, 
authentic feminism and radicalism out of visibility” (22) and “to take it over, to lasso it for 
one’s private ends, to slow it down, to stop it” (20). To combat this process, radicals must 
follow Firestone’s lead and learn to use history to wrest control of the movement from liberal 
feminists and define the “second wave” in radical terms.35 While she suggests that she was 
initially resistant to “using history” for these ends, she writes that once she learned “how to 
use the past for taking present action and mapping future change,” she saw how history could 
become a powerful “tool” for radicalism, likening “continuity—or history” to “unity” and 
then claiming that continuity is a “higher form” of power in politics “because it also involves !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 If these excerpts from Sarachild’s essay seem vague, or strangely lacking in substantive 
nouns or references to the actual ideas the author is worried about losing, that is because they 
are. One of the remarkable features of this article is its drive to use history as a tool for the 
definition of feminism’s proper strategies and goals, without ever articulating what those 
strategies or goals are. History, in this sense, comes to stand in for the promise of radical 
feminism, rather than its substance. 
 
35 Sarachild lists off a number of Firestone’s accomplishments where this project is 
concerned: starting the Notes series, writing about the radicalism of the nineteenth-century 
movement, and lastly, dedicating her book to Beauvoir: “Firestone displayed again her sense 
of history and derivation and established in one of the few places on the public record that 
the feminism of the radical women who put the women’s liberation movement on the map 
and into the world vocabulary derived from the radical Simone de Beauvoir and her book 
The Second Sex, not the liberal Betty Friedan—with all the political implications this 
involves…We knew, of course, that personally we derived from Beauvoir, not Friedan. But 
too few of us had enough of a sense of history, particularly our own history, to see the 
political importance of making our tradition clear” (27). See the cover page of the 
Redstockings’ Feminist Revolution for another Beauvoir dedication. See Henry, Not My 
Mother’s Sister 68-72 for an extended analysis of the “choice” of Beauvoir over Friedan by 
radical “second-wave” feminists. !
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the power of persistence. To win, women uniting is not enough. Women must unite and 
persist! But without a history, persistence is impossible” (24). Narrating the past is the 
method by which feminism is not only defined and controlled, but also able to “persist” into 
the future. Constructing the “first wave” is an exercise in pinning down feminism as a 
movement in the present, controlling the terms in which it is articulated, and determining its 
future direction, parameters, and goals.  
The “power of history,” put simply, is its use as a detector of false feminism. This is 
perhaps most clearly demonstrated in a rough line-drawing included in the middle of 
Sarachild’s essay. The image depicts two “arcs of history”: one in which the women’s 
liberation movement is plotted against “truth,” and the other in which liberal feminism is 
plotted against radical feminism (see Figure 2). The “truth” and “radical” axes are correlated, 
both with arrows pointed up toward the blank space of the page, presumably on a trajectory 
of greater and greater knowledge, enlightenment, and progress. The “liberal” and “present 
state of the Women’s Liberation Movement” trajectories, once also ascendant, are shown to 
flatten out. They do not point toward the same future of “truth” and liberation but instead, to 
more of the same. Here is perhaps the most direct iteration of the radical feminist/truth 
narrative. History is the tool by which radical feminism critiques its liberal feminist rivals as 
“false” and claims the designation as the true feminism of the “second wave.”  
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Figure 2. “The Arcs of History” (Sarachild 39). 
 
If constructing and connecting to one “side” of the “first wave” allows these “second-
wave” writers to separate false feminism from the genuine sort, it also provides legitimation 
of that feminism as not only truly feminist, but truly radical. Ellen Willis demonstrates this 
problem at the outset of “Women and the Left” when she describes “certain assumptions 
about the women’s movement” that subsume women’s liberation under the umbrella of a 
larger cause, as “a branch of the Left and women a constituency like students or GIs” (55). 
This part-of-a-larger-whole view of the movement expects that its “emphasis is on 
contributing our special insights to the Left as a whole and using feminist issues as an 
organizing tool” (55). Willis, however, rejects this view; feminists, according to Willis, “are 
not simply a part of the Left” but instead must “make [their] own analysis of the system and 
put [their] interests first, whether or not it is convenient for the (male-dominated) Left” (55). 
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Willis is concerned with establishing a feminist movement that is independent from 
the male Left; working within the “larger” movement only subordinates women’s ideas and 
concerns and “perpetuate[s] the idea that our struggle is secondary” (56). Being a part of the 
Left, in these terms, means “subordinating [women’s] concrete interests to a ‘higher’ 
ideology” and defining feminism as a lower form of revolutionary politics. As a mere part of 
a larger Left, the women’s movement is not only limited, but less significant; according to 
Willis, “To believe that concentrating on women’s issues is not really revolutionary is self-
depreciation” (56). Willis’s narrative demonstrates the central problem between the Left and 
radical feminism: true radicalism lay in a “higher” form of Leftist politics committed to 
destroying capitalism or racism, and feminism only aspired to “secondary” struggles that 
were not universal in the same way.36  Radical feminism, however, could be construed as 
more radical, because it demanded the overthrow of not one, but two systems: both 
capitalism and the patriarchal family (56). 
Firestone uses the same language of parts and wholes, smaller and larger, to build a 
cast of characters of the new movement and then delineate which ones are the “real” 
feminists who can create true revolution. This cast includes a variety of types of “politicos,” 
including “Ladies’ Auxiliaries of the Left,” “Middle-of-the-Road Politicos,” and “Feminist 
Politicos,” but all of them fall prey to the same problem: they “see feminism as only tangent 
to ‘real’ radical politics, instead of central, directly radical in itself” (Dialectic of Sex 33). 
Politicos see “male issues” like the draft “as universal” and see “female issues,” like 
abortion, “as sectarian” (33) and likewise think of feminism as part of a “Larger Struggle” 
that is ultimately more significant. Firestone pulls a quote from a leftist underground !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 See Willis “Radical Feminism and Feminist Radicalism” (1984) for a later, but similar, 
iteration of this argument. 
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newspaper, The Movement, to give voice to this character and the kinds of things she is likely 
to say:37  
“[Feminists] lose sight of the Primary Struggle. Some special organizing of 
women’s groups is possible, perhaps, but dangerous: in terms of turning in on 
themselves, in terms of becoming petit-bourgeois little cliques where they can 
just talk about taking care of the kids all the time, or become a gripe session. 
(qtd. in Dialectic of Sex 34, emphasis in the original).38  
 
When women discuss women’s issues, it’s complaining; when men discuss men’s issues, it’s 
radical. Firestone gives voice to the classic Leftist critique of feminism: that it is a personal 
crusade without real political or revolutionary potential. The Left is the true radical 
Movement, and feminism in this depiction is not only “smaller” or a mere branch of it, but 
actually anti-radical, the “petit-bourgeois” to the Left’s revolutionary proletariat.  
But after portraying the Leftist critique, Firestone sets out to debunk it and turn its 
assessment of feminism toward the Left itself. Politicos are not true feminists because they 
see feminism as “secondary in the order of political priorities,” something that “must be 
tailored to fit into a preexistent (male-created) political framework” (36). They do not see 
feminism as “a legitimate issue in itself, one that will (unfortunately) require a revolution to 
achieve its end” (36). Firestone pronounces the verdict on this “type” of activist: their need of 
Leftist “approval” “consign[s] them to mere left reformism, lack of originality, and, 
ultimately, political sterility” (36). Politicos, in their attachment to the Left, are actually tying !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Firestone clearly resents the Left’s ownership of the label “the Movement”—she 
frequently, and sarcastically, refers to it in capital letters and in parentheses, underscoring the 
radical feminist desire to secure legitimacy as a “Movement” with a capital M in itself. 
 
38 Firestone notes in an aside that this quotation is taken from women associated with the 
Black Panthers. The choice to voice the male leftist critique of feminism through black 
women is peculiar, but one that points toward a larger strategy in these texts: the use of the 
black struggle as a medium through which to represent the women’s movement as 
significant, radical, and necessary.  
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themselves to a less radical and less innovative movement. The Left is depicted as not only 
less revolutionary and less productive, but “sterile”—unable to produce a politics of change 
or a truly emancipatory future. The reversal here is clear: it is not the feminists who are 
sectarian, or “small,” or short-sighted, but the Leftists. They are the ones who are producing 
dogmatic and restrictive analyses that are less revolutionary and even antithetical to the spirit 
of a radical politics.39  
In describing the Leftist critique of feminism, and then reversing that critique to apply 
it to the Left itself, Firestone sets up a clear contrast with radical feminism, which she then 
describes as “the direct descendant of the radical feminist line in the old movement, notably 
that championed by Stanton and Anthony” (37). While above I have shown how this radical 
lineage distinguishes radical feminists from their liberal counterparts, it simultaneously 
breaks the link between radical feminists and leftist radicals. Firestone insists that radical 
feminism does not get its radicalism from the male Left; how could it if the so-called 
“Movement” has grown tired, narrow, and doctrinaire? Instead, radical feminism derives 
from the politics of the radical “side” of the “first wave.” By establishing an alternate 
narrative of the movement’s heritage, Firestone reroutes where “radicalism” comes from: not 
from the Left but from a century-old, established heritage of feminism. Firestone continues to 
contrast this radical feminism rooted in history with the contemporary Left:  
 It [radical feminism] refuses to accept existing leftist analysis not because it 
is too radical, but because it is not radical enough: it sees the current leftist 
analysis as outdated and superficial, because this analysis does not relate the 
structure of the economic class system to its origins in the sexual class system, 
the model for all other exploitative systems, and thus the tapeworm that must 
be eliminated first by any true revolution. (Dialectic of Sex 37, emphasis in 
original)  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 See Echols 103-138 for a more general description of the relationship between “second-
wave” feminists and the Left.  
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Feminism is the new radical vanguard; it is the radical feminists who are on the cutting edge, 
while the Left struggles to adapt and expand its perspective. But Firestone goes further here, 
moving beyond the root of radicalism (which lies in feminism and its history) to establishing 
a root form of oppression: patriarchy. Indeed, feminism is more radical than the Left 
precisely because it takes on this originary exploitative system while the Left leaves it in tact. 
If the “sexual class system” is the “model” for all other oppressive systems, if it is the 
“tapeworm” that drains the body politic and renders its other ailments less urgent, then the 
movement that takes this system as its primary target will necessarily be the most 
revolutionary. Firestone’s depiction of an originary form of oppression is directly linked to 
the need to establish the feminist movement as radical in the face of a male-dominated Left 
that refused to understand women’s issues and analyses as important, revolutionary, or 
universal.  
 This drive to legitimate feminism’s radicalism by constructing sexism as the root of 
all other kinds of oppression is a narrative technique deployed across a variety of radical 
“second-wave” texts. For instance, in the “Redstockings Manifesto” (1969), a statement of 
principles by the New York group’s founding members, patriarchy is identified as the 
ultimate origin of subjugation; as they put it, “Male supremacy is the oldest, most basic form 
of domination. All other forms of exploitation and oppression (racism, capitalism, 
imperialism, etc.) are extensions of male supremacy: men dominate women, a few men 
dominate the rest…All men have oppressed women” (113, emphasis in original).40 As in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Willis and Firestone founded the Redstockings in 1969 after leaving the New York Radical 
Feminists; the group would function for less than two years. As they put it, they wanted to 
launch “an explicitly radical feminist group, as opposed to a group [like NYRW] that had 
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Firestone’s narrative, this declaration positions feminism as the one indispensable, and truly 
radical, form of critique and activism; if patriarchy is at the root of all other forms of 
exploitation, then feminism is necessarily the most essential and far-reaching movement. 
Establishing an original form of oppression is a method for establishing radical credentials in 
these texts. Legitimating radical feminism as both the true form of feminism and the real sort 
of radicalism requires the creation of historical origins in the form of a founding heritage, on 
the one hand, and a founding oppression, on the other. 
 
The Race/Sex Analogy in Radical Feminism 
Establishing patriarchy as the originary oppression paradoxically occurs through the 
development of parallels between race and sex. These parallels often take the form of an 
explanatory aside that forms an analogy between the two categories, as when Ti-Grace 
Atkinson explains that women must paradoxically hope for the “eradication” of their group: 
“The feminist dilemma is that it is as women—or ‘females’—that women are persecuted, just 
as it was as slaves—or ‘blacks’—that slaves were persecuted in America: in order to improve 
their condition, those individuals who are today defined as women must eradicate their own 
definition” (33). The idea that women might constitute a class does not stand on its own, but 
is supported through the analogy to “slaves” and “blacks.” Women’s oppression is 
rhetorically fused to the oppression of slaves, their “persecution” undergirded by the 
persecution of another class.  
Willis deploys a similar tactic in “Women and the Left,” equating gender difference 
with racial difference in order to argue that the two struggles are inherently similar: “Our !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
radical feminists in it along with other people” (qtd. in Echols 140). The NYRF continued on 
without its founding “brigade” until 1972.  
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oppression transcends occupations and class lines. Femaleness, like blackness, is a biological 
fact, a fundamental condition. Like racism, male supremacy permeates all strata of this 
society” (56). In this iteration, sexism and racism are parallel forms of oppression, both 
fundamental facts that construct people’s lives, but as Willis continues, sexism becomes not 
just the same as racism, but perhaps even more damaging because it is “even more deeply 
entrenched” and while “[w]hites are at least defensive about racism,” “men—including most 
radicals, black and white—are proud of their chauvinism. Male supremacy is the oldest form 
of domination and the most resistant to change” (56). Initially parallel, the two forms of 
oppression are then separated to demonstrate the seriousness of the feminist cause. Willis 
uses the analogy with racism to bolster the idea that sexism, too, is a significant issue, and 
once established, uses women’s legitimated oppression as a tool for establishing radical 
feminism as the most revolutionary movement of the era. Racism is appealed to as the most 
obvious, most extreme form of oppression that then highlights the comparative invisibility of 
sexism.  
Willis plays out this analogy at length in a “Sequel” piece to “Women and the Left,” 
as she defends her article to a letter-writer who claimed that she was not “thinking seriously” 
because of her view that the “enemy is man, not capitalism” (57). After explaining how 
capitalism is subordinated to patriarchy, Willis ends by constructing an elaborate imaginary 
conversation between black activists and white liberals of the Left. When white liberals 
suggest that both black and white activists should work together to defeat the “common 
enemy” because “racism affects [them] too,” she constructs a black activist response:  
“We can’t work together because you don’t understand what it is to be black; 
because you’ve grown up in a racist society, your behavior toward us is bound 
to be racist whether you know it or not and whether you mean it or not; your 
ideas about how to help us are too often self-serving and patronizing…If you 
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as whites want to work on eliminating your own racism, if you want to 
support our battle for liberation, fine. If we decide that we have certain 
common interests with white activists and can form alliances with white 
organizations, fine. But we want to make the decisions in our own 
movement.” (58) 
 
Willis then ends the “conversation” by reversing its characters: “Substitute man-woman for 
black-white and that’s where I stand” (58).  
 In this fantasy dialogue, the “black position” stands in for women’s position, racial 
oppression substituted for women’s oppression. But why is this substitution necessary? 
Could a “conversation” such as this not have been constructed around a radical feminist and 
a male Leftist? The black activist is used to voice radical white women’s ownership of the 
feminist movement; the claim to feminism is filtered through the claim to the black struggle. 
Rather than directly represent the case for the necessity of an independent women’s 
movement, that case is represented through the black activist claim to the civil rights 
movement. Again, the black struggle is deployed as the struggle all activists can understand; 
it is above questioning, above reproach, and cannot be denied, and because of this, becomes a 
tool for white women’s claims to their own forms of oppression.41   
The analogy is then deployed to underline the perceived lack of political concern over 
sexism. Directly after Willis suggests that substituting “woman” for “black” demonstrates her 
point, she goes on to make “one important exception:” “while white liberals and radicals 
always understood the importance of the black liberation struggle, even if their efforts in the 
blacks’ behalf were often misguided, radical men simply do not understand the importance of 
our struggle” (58). These men, according to Willis, see the woman’s movement as “just !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 See Firestone, “Abortion Rally Speech,” par. 21; Firestone, “The Women’s Rights 
Movement” par. 3; Hanisch and Sutherland par. 3; Morgan, “Introduction” xv; and Brown 
and Seitz 3 for additional examples of this tactic. 
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chicks with ‘personal’ hangups” and “minimize the extent of male chauvinism” (58). Male 
Leftists do not “grasp that we have a grievance, and that we are serious,” a lack of 
understanding that ultimately makes sexism and racism not parallel, but different. Women’s 
oppression is not as visible as black oppression, but this lack of visibility does not mean it is 
not there—to the contrary, it instead signifies the ways in which sexism is acceptable in ways 
that racism is not.  
The construction of the race/sex analogy in these movement documents has been fully 
critiqued, most notably by hooks in Ain’t I a Woman, for the way it obscures black women’s 
experience and its tendency to envision sexism as more harmful than racism. The 
problematic use of the analogy in radical feminism is surely one of the reasons behind the 
canonical narrative of the “second wave’s” failures when it comes to race. Hooks suggests 
that the analogy “would not have been necessary” “if the situation of upper and middle class 
white women were in any way like that of the oppressed people in the world” (142). Hooks 
argues that the use of this analogy covers over not only the true oppression of people of 
color, but also the fact that the women using it were not really oppressed. But this kind of 
critique, and its subsequent canonization through the wave model, does not account for why 
the analogy is turned to again and again, and is instead satisfied to construct a monolithic 
(and white) “second wave” that failed the future of feminism.42  In situating this technique 
within the larger narrative practices of radical feminists, it becomes more clear how we might 
read the analogy as a representation of a political culture in which feminists sought to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 For instance, black feminist Cellestine Ware has virtually been written out of the history of 
the “second wave,” with her monograph Woman Power (1970) receiving very little critical 
attention. We might read this absence as a result of her association with Firestone and the 
NYRF, and the ways in which Ware’s activism and written work fails to fit the standard story 
of the “second wave.”  
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legitimate their movement through the movement considered “most radical” at the time—
Civil Rights. Just as Casey Hayden and Mary King attempted to demonstrate women’s 
position within SNCC through the struggle the organization’s leaders knew best, radical 
feminists demonstrated sexual oppression in terms of the racial oppression that the Left 
claimed to understand. The tendency to read this tactic as simply the failure of feminism, 
rather than an index of the political economy that radical feminists negotiated, is an 
illustration of a larger feminist narrative practice that I have been mapping throughout this 
chapter, in which narratives of the feminist past underwrite the authority of the feminist 
present.  
 
Fixing Racism—and Race-vs-Gender—in Feminism 
These radical feminist texts display a continual shifting between competing 
contemporary political needs in an ongoing effort to establish feminism as a truly radical 
movement. Feminism is thus both new and rooted in a long history, both radical and 
conventional, both the same as the civil rights movement and more significant. The reversals 
and contradictions that stem from these shifts might be read as a representation of these 
needs, rather than only as evidence for the latent or manifest problems of race in the 
movement. The canonical story of the “second wave” cannot recognize the race/gender 
analogy in these texts as anything other than pernicious, but we might also read it as a 
narrative form for attempting to draw connections between race and gender rather than 
conceiving of the terms in opposition to one another. These attempts are by no means always 
successful—as we see above, radical feminists at times privilege gendered forms of 
oppression by minimizing racial oppression. But the critical tendency to construct and deploy 
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that failure as a warrant for a present-day feminism refuses to situate these practices as part 
of larger narratives of legitimation that radical feminists construct as they negotiate the 
political culture of their era. 
I want to suggest that the narrative production of the failures of the “second wave” 
cannot be attributed solely to improper reading of these texts, as if somehow they have not 
been truly understood in all their context, but also, that these narratives are fundamental to 
what Catherine Orr calls the “reinvention process” of feminism itself (32). Just as the radical 
feminists of the “second wave” construct a legitimating narrative out of a “first wave”—
splitting that “wave” and declaring one “side” responsible for the failures of feminism— the 
story about the “second wave” is not simply a convenient way to convey the broad strokes of 
a previous movement (though it is that too), but a story about authority over feminism in the 
present. The metonymic practice of “waving” the past—substituting a part of a historical 
feminism for its entirety, defining its contributions and displacing others—is not just a 
method for controlling who “owns” the past, but who can inhabit the future of feminism. 
Wave narratives are thus about who controls, defines, and enacts feminism, or, as Clare 
Hemmings puts it in a different context, about the true subject of feminism. 
In her critique of narratives of progress and loss in feminist theory, Hemmings 
suggests that forms of storytelling rooted in generational logic are those that we ought to be 
“most wary of” because they place “too much emphasis on the capacities of feminist subjects 
to safeguard as progressive the politics of the narratives they author” (Why Stories Matter 
150). While “waves” and “generations” are not precisely the same thing—the latter relies 
more strictly on a familial framework, while the former evokes a looser structure of heritage, 
ancestry, or lineage—Hemmings’s critique could productively apply to the wave model as 
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well. She continues, citing that the trouble with “generations” is that it “allows loss without 
responsibility and progress without obligation” (150-151). Wave discourse, in my view, 
facilitates much the same process: political problems and needs are displaced onto the past in 
order to allow for the present to come into being, unfettered and free. In this way, we might 
read “waving” feminism as a parallel practice to “splitting” suffrage: both practices manage 
present-day feminist anxiety by telling a story about the past and its failures so as to secure a 
progressive feminism that can move beyond the “old” and toward a successful politics in the 
future.  
While feminist theorists have recently called for an abandonment of the wave model, 
or at least its recalibration, the attachment to the year of 1869 in feminism that I have tracked 
throughout this project suggests that the periodization of feminism is a narrative process 
undergirded by strong attachments not so easily eradicated.43 If the attachment to 1869 and 
the “split” has operated as a method for displacing feminist racism onto the past and 
calcifying the race/gender opposition in the present, wave discourse recapitulates both of 
these problems by functioning as a rhetorical strategy for “fixing racism,” in all the multiple 
meanings of that phrase: pinning racism to the past; conceptualizing racism as a static thing, 
rather than a changing practice; and through this process, ultimately repairing the problem of 
racism in the present. Just as radical feminists of the “second wave” attempt to legitimate the 
movement through the narrative of failure rooted in the “split” of 1869, “third wave” 
critiques of this legitimation operate in much the same way, pinning failure to its predecessor 
and thereby establishing a “new” feminism, absolved of the problems of the past.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 See Boris, Hewitt, Gallagher, and Cobble for recent calls to recalibrate “waves.”  
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Hemmings suggests that generational discourse “carries the weight of what might 
better be characterized as theoretical or political differences of opinion manifest in the 
present, rather than across time” and “thus not only substitutes change over time for contest 
or concurrence in the present, but further, acts as a mechanism for obscuring these contests or 
concurrences” (151). Wave logic performs a similar function, substituting the discourse of an 
increasingly sophisticated teleology of feminist progress for the “contests or concurrences,” 
contradictions and conflict, of feminism in the past. This substitution allows for narratives of 
superiority and progress while refusing stories that highlight the ways in which feminism is 
compromised within its historical context, a practice that maintains the race/gender 
opposition in the name of maintaining a progressive feminism.  
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